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0 Introduction 
  
 When one November 9th, I called my grandmother to ask how she had experienced the 
November pogrom in 1938 – still unsure how much of a Nazi she had really been, I 
formulated my question carefully in order to make her talk rather than remain silent –, there 
was a thoughtful pause. “The pogrom ...,” – she finally said, and I could sense her frown 
uneasily –, “what year was that again?”  
 
 In our days, historical understanding is strained by a number of alarming tendencies. A 
selective historical memory is bequeathed in the families of culprits and followers, while our 
schools are still teaching versions of the Austrian “victim myth.” Inside the international ivory 
tower, there is an ongoing academic controversy among historians, Holocaust authors and 
literary critics, centering around the question of the “proper” representation and emplotment 
of National Socialism. In the last decades, a number of controversial literary and historical 
works have been published, Holocaust representability as such has been called into question, 
and the reliability of historical memory has been challenged. 
 The literary work that first brought the unreliability of eyewitness testimonies to 
greater public attention was Jerzy Kosinski’s 1965 novel The Painted Bird. In 1998, this 
question gained urgency with the scandal caused by the exposure of Binjamin Wilkomirski’s 
(Bruno Dössekker’s) professed autobiography Fragments: Memories of a Wartime Childhood 
1939-1948 (1995) as a work of fiction. In 2000, Norman G. Finkelstein used both these books 
as evidence in his case against “‘The’ Holocaust industry,” American Jewry and Israeli 
politics, while in the ivory tower’s narratology departments, scholars of literature continued to 
contemplate the differences of fact and fiction in search of textually inherent criteria to 
distinguish one from the other. A few weeks ago, yet another Holocaust autobiography 
scheduled for publication next month (February 2009) was exposed as a fraud: Herman 
Rosenblat’s Angel at the Fence. 
 In a parallel debate, suggesting the relativity and meta-narrative nature of all historical 
writing, Hayden White, F. R. Ankersmit and Keith Jenkins started providing grist to the mill 
of Holocaust deniers and revisionists in the 1970s. Among those revisionists are the literary 
scholar and Holocaust denier Robert Faurisson and the self-appointed historian David Irving, 
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who between 1963 and 2002 published thirty books significantly altering, distorting and 
denying World War II history. Finally, in 1998, London saw the climax of revisionism in 
Irving’s libel case against Deborah Lipstadt. 
 
 This paper attempts to portray narratological and historical controversies about 
Holocaust writing, identify their links and reveal their political and ideological implications in 
and outside academics. In the first part, I shall ponder the differentiability of fact and fiction 
defended by narratologists and questioned by postmodernist historiographers. In the second 
part, I will focus on Holocaust biographies and autobiographies and illustrate that, as Doron 
Rabinovici has noted, “[b]eyond the scientific handicraft, there lie the possibilities of [a] 
literature that does not even pretend to only depict the facts. It is for that reason that [literature] 
can approximate a truth exceeding all reality without betraying it” (“Wie es war,” my 
translation).  
 
1 Limits and Possibilities of Narratology 
 
1st premise: A  B 
2nd premise: B  C 
Inference:  A  C  (Modus Barbara) 
 
 
 Martin Löschnigg defines three kinds of approaches to the differentiability of factual 
and fictional narration: logico-linguistic approaches, semantic approaches, and pragmatic 
approaches (59–69). In adopting this classification to show the limits of either exclusive 
school and explore the heuristic value of the three categories, I will try to find exceptions 
rather than examples affirming their professed universality. When applicable, my examples 
are taken from post-Auschwitz literature in order to illustrate the scope of the problem writers 
like Robert Faurisson, David Irving, Bruno Dössekker and Norman Finkelstein present us.  
 
1.1 Logico-linguistic Approaches 
 
 The logico-linguistic school assumes that fictional and factual texts are distinguishable 
by means of grammatical structures alone and has been established by Käte Hamburger’s 
1957 book The Logic of Poetry. Hamburger argues that in fictional texts, the preterite loses its 
grammatical function. She writes, “In a statement about reality, the preterite implies that the 
reported event is a past event, or, which means the same, that it is known to be past by an I-
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origo (Ich-Origo1)” (64; my translation). In epic fiction, the real I-origo of a factual text is 
substituted by fictional I-origines. From this, Hamburger infers, it follows that the preterite 
loses its grammatical function. The grammatical symptom of this premise is the occurrence of 
the epic preterite, which can only be observed in fictional texts. The phenomenon manifests 
itself in a concurrence of adverbial time deictics (today, now, tomorrow etc.) and the preterite 
and, according to Hamburger, does not indicate past tense but the fictional nature of a given 
text. While the preterite in non-fiction indicates that what is recounted belongs to the past, the 
epic preterite evokes the impression of being set in a fictional presence (cf. Hamburger 64–
67).  
 Hamburger’s theory has been expanded by Harald Weinrich’s book Tempus. Weinrich 
distinguishes between narrated world (erzählte Welt, i.e. fiction) and reviewed world 
(besprochene Welt, i.e. non-fiction), and assigns a “tense group” to either world, arguing that 
not only the preterite, but all tenses carry information concerning their fictional or factual 
nature. The tense group of the narrated world comprises epic preterite, past perfect and 
conditional, the tense group of the reviewed world present tense, perfect (preterite) and future.  
 In the approach taken by Hamburger and Weinrich, things seem almost too easy to be 
true. Taking a random non-fiction book from my bookshelf, I need not read further than page 
10 to come across the first epic preterite. In her autobiography Still Alive, which recounts her 
youth in Vienna, her detention at the concentration camps of Theresienstadt, Auschwitz-
Birkenau and Christianstadt, and her life thereafter, Ruth Klüger writes,  
 But this English bourgeois [her cousin] had been tortured in Buchenwald as a young 
 boy, when his little relative had perked up her ears under the blanket and not fallen 
 asleep, bent on learning something about his detention [...]. Only that then, I was 
 not allowed to know, because I was too little. And now? Now I knew a lot anyway and 
 could [konnte] ask straight out, however and whenever I wanted, for those who had 
 forbidden it were gone, scattered, gassed, had died in beds or elsewhere.  
 (10; my translation, my emphases) 
According to Hamburger and Weinrich, the combination of adverbial time deixis (“now”) and 
preterite (“I knew [...] and could [konnte]”) would not be possible in autobiographical writing, 
but Klüger’s book is not a fictional text.  
 Weinrich and Hamburger rightly observe the effect created by the epic preterite; their 
error in reasoning, however, lies in the assumption that only fictional texts want or should 
create a fictional presence. Taking the reader to a fictional presence and letting him or her 
know that he or she is reading about the past are not mutually exclusive. Just like a work of 
fiction, Klüger’s autobiography wants to make the past come alive for her readers. This effect 
                                                 
1 Hamburger substitutes the term “I-origo” as an epistemologically connotated synonym for “Aussagesubjekt.” 
Cf. Hamburger 62.  
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is more easily created by means of combining the verbs in the preterite with “now,” a deictic 
adverb of presence, than with a deictic adverbial of temporal ambiguity, such as “that day.” 
The “now” draws the reader into the story, takes him or her closer to the events, while “that 
day” would keep him or her at a distance. “He who wants to feel along, think along, needs 
interpretations of the events. The events alone are not enough,” writes Klüger later on in her 
book (160; my translation). The epic preterite is one of the elements that enable us to think 
along and feel with her rather than merely observe the events from a distance. 
 Hamburger’s and Weinrich’s argument can be depicted in terms of what logic calls the 
“modus Barbara”:  
 
 1st premise: The epic preterite is a distinctive feature of fiction. 
 2nd premise: N makes use of the epic preterite.                           x     
 Inference: N is a work of fiction. 
 
It seems that the shortcomings of Hamburger’s and Weinrich’s inference do not lie in an error 
in reasoning – within the closed system of logic, it holds perfectly true –, but in assuming an 
untenable 1st premise: the epic preterite is not a distinctive feature of fiction. Hence, rather 
than reading Hamburger’s epic preterite and Weinrich’s tense group as evidence of 
fictionality, we can identify them as narrative strategies used in fiction and non-fiction alike.  
 
 As these theories do not prove useful for distinguishing fact from fiction, let me take a 
look at the approaches taken by Dorrit Cohn and John Searle.  
 In her 1990 essay “Signposts of Fictionality,” Dorrit Cohn assumes a differentiability 
of fictional and historical narration (1) in terms of the different reference/story/discourse 
dynamics (“levels of analysis”) in factual and fictional narrations, (2) in terms of focalization 
(“narrative situations”), and (3) in terms of the concordance or dissimilitude of author and 
narrator. Cohn notes the insufficiency of the traditional bi-dimensional story/discourse model 
when applied to historical narratives. Disregarding the level of reference, she argues, misleads 
theorists like Hayden White to assume a constitutive indifferentiability of factual and fictional 
narration2. As Cohn points out, historical discourse is a priori different from fictional 
discourse due to the different nature of its referential constraints. “[T]he former’s [history’s] 
ties to the level of reference and the latter’s [fiction’s] detachment from this level determine 
distinct discursive parameters [...]” (Cohn 784).  
                                                 
2 In “The Fictions of Factual Representation,” White writes, “Readers of histories and novels can hardly fail to 
be struck by the similarities. [...] Viewed simply as verbal artifacts histories and novels are indistinguishable 
from one another” (Tropics 121 f).  
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Cohn focuses on an essential feature of historical discourse that is also observed by 
Genette: its “perigraphic apparatus3,” i. e., its footnotes, endnotes etc. Relying on Genette, she 
identifies focalization as the distinguishing element, but argues that the focalization modes 
need to be modified in order to apply to historical narratives: a new category combining 
external focalization and zerofocalization must be introduced. According to Cohn, historical 
narration “remains stably unfocalized from start to finish” (Cohn 787), and hence cannot be 
described by zerofocalization, which according to Genette refers to a constant shift of 
focalization.  
However, I would argue that historical narration is in fact far from “remain[ing] stably 
unfocalized.” Although a typical work of history will remain externally focalized in its 
dominant narrative framework, it may, drawing on secondary sources such as a historical 
character’s diaries, also implement the findings derived from them by means of internal 
focalization. This is facilitated by what Cohn herself identifies as the “perigraphic apparatus.” 
The fluctuation resulting from the shifts between external and internal focalization, the 
historian’s “zooming in” on different historical characters, meets Genette’s definition of 
zerofocalization. Without being aware of it, Cohn herself provides an example that disproves 
her position and confirms Genette’s. She quotes the “Author’s Note” introducing Barbara 
Tuchman’s World War I history book The Guns of August. In this foreword, Tuchman 
justifies her style:  
 Sources for the narrative and for all quoted remarks are given in the Notes at the end 
 of the book. I have tried to avoid spontaneous attribution or the “he must have” style 
 of historical writing [...]. All conditions of weather, thoughts or feelings, and states of 
 mind public or private, in the following pages have documentary support”  
 (Tuchman xx).  
As a result, Tuchman’s book contains passages of internal focalization such as “[t]he German 
ambassador thought [...], and supposed [...]” and “he [Emperor Wilhelm II] allowed himself to 
confess the wish to Edward” (Tuchman 5; my emphases). 
 Taken out of context and disregarding the perigraphic apparatus, Tuchman’s style 
could easily be thought to belong to a fictional text: “the German ambassador thought [...], 
and supposed [...]” and “he allowed himself to confess” clearly show the narrator’s insight into 
the character’s mind, i. e., internal focalization, which is facilitated by the author’s access to 
the historical character’s diaries and personal documents.  
 Furthermore, Cohn attests a “qualitatively different [reading] experience” (Cohn 799) 
between fictional and historical narratives, which she sees as a manifestation of Paul 
                                                 
3 Cohn uses the term coined by Carrard to refer to foot- and endnotes, appendices etc., which are more frequently 
used in historical than fictional discourse. 
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Hernadi’s proposal that “[f]ictional narratives demand, historical narratives preclude, a 
distinction between the narrator and the implied author” (Hernadi qtd. in Cohn 793). Although 
Cohn deems the presence (or absence respectively) of a narrator not a textually inherent 
feature but an extratextual cognitive model applied by the critic, she strongly rejects both 
Barthes’ notion of the death of the author (in fiction as well as nonfiction) and Hamburger’s 
“narratorless model for third-person fiction” (Hamburger 111–141, Cohn 795).  
 To conclude that the concordance of author and narrator is a decisive trait of 
nonfiction writing is tempting indeed. Unfortunately, as in most things tempting, there is a 
catch. The Wilkomirski scandal illustrates this catch in bright colors. In 1995, Suhrkamp’s 
Jüdischer Verlag published an autobiographical novel by Binjamin Wilkomirski. In 
Fragments: Memories of a Wartime Childhood 1939-1948, the homodiegetic narrator 
recounts his childhood experiences during the “Third Reich.” The book was showered with 
literary awards4, compared to the works of Primo Levi and Anne Frank, and translated into 
thirteen languages. Wilkomirski himself appeared in public as a contemporary witness and 
expert on the Shoah. In 1998, however, the journalist Daniel Ganzfried revealed that 
Wilkomirski was in fact Bruno Dössekker, who was neither Jewish nor had he, as claimed in 
his book, spent his childhood in the concentration camps of Majdanek and Auschwitz. I will 
later return to the consequences of Wilkomirski’s exposure as an impostor, which the 
American political scientist Norman Finkelstein exploits in making his case against “‘The’ 
Holocaust industry.” First let me take a look at Fragments in the light of Cohn’s insistence on 
a differentiability of author and narrator underlying the narrative text5.  
The book shows that in certain texts, there may well be an absence of textually 
inherent criteria telling us whether the author and the narrator coincide. In order to expose 
Wilkomirski as a fraud, Ganzfried had to leave the logico-semantic realm and conduct 
investigations on the author’s person and biography. It follows that within the logico-semantic 
realm, it may indeed come to a “death of the author,” albeit not in the Barthes’ sense. Barthes 
disregards the narrator and exclusively focuses on the author-reader relationship, concluding 
that “the true locus of writing is reading” and “the birth of the reader must be ransomed by the 
death of the author” (Barthes, section 7). In Wilkomirski’s case, it is not the birth of the reader 
which “must be ransomed by the death of the author,” but the birth of the narrator. In writing 
the autobiography of Binjamin Wilkomirski, Dössekker, homodiegetically narrating from 
                                                 
4 It won the 1996 National Jewish Book Award for Autobiography and Memoir in the US, the Jewish Quarterly 
Literary Prize in Britain and the Prix Memoire de la Shoah in France. 
5 I use the term “text” as defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Linguistics: “Strictly, a written text in the 
usual sense.” While “text” in this paper refers to the words on the page as such, the term “discourse” is used to 
refer to the text (i. e., those same “words on the page”) as a product of  the author’s communicative intention.  
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Wilkomirski’s point of view, becomes Wilkomirski and ceases to be Dössekker. His 
readership, then, is not “born” from the narration, but constitutes the crucial link in the chain 
of transforming Dössekker into Wilkomirski. If his readers had not accepted the identity of 
author and narrator, the two would have remained distinct. The decisive momentum when it 
comes to answering the question “Who speaks?” happens neither on the level of the author 
nor on the level of text/story/discourse, but on the level of the reader.  
I agree with Barthes in so far as he stresses the importance of the reader, and also 
admit that certain narratives suggest the “death of the author,” although this is not a universal 
criterion. Either way, by teaching us a lesson on the potential unreliability of the author (not 
the narrator!), the Wilkomirski scandal also shows the untenability of Barthes’ relativization 
of the author. Referring to an example sentence taken from Balzac’s Sarrasine, Barthes states: 
“its source, its voice is not to be located” (Barthes, section 7), a finding he assigns validity 
across all genres6. However, while the reader is the decisive final link in the chain of the 
author/narrator identity assignation and the text its mediator, the author is its crucial starting 
point. The way he molds his narrative discourse does not determine, but influence and 
manipulate the reader’s resulting interpretation. Hence it is important to bear in mind that all 
discoursive origin – in Barthes’ words, “its source, its voice” – can in fact be located: it is 
always the author. 
 Returning to Cohn, her section on voice (“Narrative Situations”) deserves further 
attention. Cohn rejects (as she has to in defense of her own position) Searle’s conclusion that 
“[t]here is no textual property, syntactical or semantic, that will identify a stretch of discourse 
as a work of fiction” (Searle 325). Searle argues that all writing “consists in performing [...] 
‘illocutionary [speech] acts7’” (319): while factual narration performs illocutionary acts in 
agreement with the rules Searle establishes in Speech Acts8, fictional narration merely 
“pretends” to perform illocutionary acts. Since the speech acts of fiction are “pretenses,” they 
may violate the rules governing conventional illocutionary acts. That is to say, while a 
journalist “commits himself to the truth of the expressed proposition” (essential rule) and 
“must be in a position to provide evidence or reasons for the truth of the expressed 
proposition” (preparatory rules), a writer of fiction waives commitment to these rules (cf. 
“Logical Status” 322). From that follows what Cohn criticizes in her “Signposts of 
Fictionality”: since “pretended” illocutionary acts may look exactly like ordinary ones, Searle 
                                                 
6 Cf. “The Death of the Author,” section 6: “Thus literature (it would be better, henceforth, to say writing) [...]” 
(my emphasis), and Cohn 792.  
7 On the speech act theory, cf. J. R. Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: 1969), esp. chapters 3–5. 
8 The “essential rule,” the “preparatory rules,” the “sincerity rule” etc., cf. J. R. Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: 
1969), chapter 3. 
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points out that there is no innertextual property that allows for a distinction. Cohn argues that 
Searle’s statement is disproved by the very example he provides to illustrate it. Interestingly, a 
little later she gives the Tuchman example quoted above, unintentionally disproving her own 
approach and in turn confirming the one she disagrees with.  
 Searle’s example is taken from Iris Murdoch’s The Red and the Green. The novel 
begins thus: “Ten more glorious days without horses! So thought Second Lieutenant Andrew 
Chase-White [...]” (qtd. in Searle 322 and Cohn 784; my emphasis). Cohn writes, “What 
‘serious’ discourse ever quoted the thoughts of a person other than the speaker’s own?” 
However, Tuchman’s The Guns of August is a striking example that serious discourse may not 
only quote the thoughts of historical characters, but even do so without footnotes in the text 
proper, provided their authenticity can be documented.  
 Cohn rightly assumes that fictional narration is characterized by the difference of 
author and narrator, and factual narration by their sameness. However, matters are not that 
simple, for, as Fragments demonstrates, an unreliable writer may make false pretenses. For 
the research interest of this paper, it can be concluded that Cohn’s findings are tendential 
rather than universal, for (1) difference and sameness cannot always be decided on the basis 
of the text alone and (2) the actual relation between author and narrator may be overruled by 
the relation assumed by the readership. 
 
 Searle’s “Logical Status of Fictional Discourse” deserves further attention. With 
reference to Fragments, I want to agree with Searle that “[t]here is no textual property, 
syntactic or semantic, that will identify a text as a work of fiction” (Searle 325; my emphasis) 
in principle, though I do not want to dismiss the observability of semantic and syntactic 
tendencies in factual and fictional narration. However, Searle’s reasons for his premise and 
the conclusions drawn from it prove problematic when we take a look at the context of the 
premise:  
 [T]he identifying criterion for whether or not a text is a work of fiction must of 
 necessity lie in the illocutionary intentions of the author. There is no textual property, 
 syntactical or semantic, that will identify a text as a work of fiction. What makes it a 
 work of fiction is, so to speak, the illocutionary stance that the author takes toward it, 
 and that stance is a matter of the complex illocutionary intentions that the author has  
 when he writes or otherwise composes it. (Searle 325) 
What Searle means by the author’s illocutionary stance is that “whether or not [a work] is 
fiction is for the author to decide” (Searle 320). This is not only an unorthodox, but a rather 
odd definition of fact and fiction – isn’t it history’s decision rather than the author’s? A work 
is a work of fiction when the events it recounts never happened, and it is a historical work if 
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they did. Despite the fact that Dössekker-Wilkomirski’s illocutionary stance is that he has 
written an autobiography, the fact remains that he is Bruno Dössekker and never had the 
experiences he claims to have had.  
Taking Searle’s line of thought, Dössekker-Wilkomirski’s claim to use ordinary (and 
not “pretended”) illocutionary speech acts, that is, his alleged adherence to the illocutionary 
rules according to Searle, would make Fragments a work of non-fiction – which it is not. Its 
fictionality does not lie in the kind of speech acts the author uses, but in the historico-
biographical refutability that takes the author’s illocutionary stance ad absurdum.  
 A little later, Searle draws another misleading conclusion. Principally disagreeing with 
“a school of literary critics who thought one should not consider the intentions of the author 
when examining a work of fiction,” he nevertheless agrees with them to some extent when he 
says, “perhaps one should not consider an author’s ulterior motives when analyzing his work” 
(Searle 325).  
Yet it seems that an author’s “ulterior motives” are precisely what is at stake when it 
comes to the authenticity of a work like Dössekker’s. If his critics had disregarded his 
“ulterior motives,” they might never have found out about Wilkomirski’s fictional identity. 
Thus it can be said that the author’s person forms a crucial point in the investigation of factual 
and fictional narrative discourse. Dismissing the author’s “ulterior motives,” Searle ultimately 
contradicts himself, for what are these motives if not the very illocutionary stance his theory 
is based on? 
 
 Another important contributor to the debate on fact and fictionality, Philippe Lejeune, 
focuses on the distinction of autobiography and fiction. In his seminal work The 
Autobiographical Pact, Lejeune defines the genre as follows: “Retrospective narrative in 
prose written by a real person about his or her own existence, if he or she emphasizes his or 
her individual life, [and] in particular the history of his or her personality” (Lejeune 15; my 
translation). Similar to Cohn, Lejeune identifies the congruence of author and narrator as the 
distinctive criterion of autobiography. His approach is more subtle than Cohn’s in the way it 
tackles the question of authenticity. Lejeune argues that the identity of author and narrator 
necessarily demands affirmation, which can be met in a number of ways: 
1. implicitly in the author-narrator’s “autobiographical pact,” which may be contracted 
by means of (a) the title of the book (“The Story of my Life,” “Autobiography” ...), or (b) the 
narrator’s introductory commitment to the autobiographical nature of his or her book.  
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2. explicitly “on the level of the name the author-narrator gives him- or herself in the 
narration, and which is the same as the author’s [name] on the cover” (cf. Lejeune 26 f; my 
translations). 
According to Lejeune, author-narrator identity has to be affirmed by at least one of 
these means in autobiographic writing.  
 At first sight, this seems like a sound approach, and a more detailed one than Cohn’s 
claim for the author/narrator identity. Lejeune’s theory holds true for Ruth Klüger’s 
autobiography (quoted above) in terms of “explicit identity” (2). Klüger writes how she 
became “Jewish in defense” at the age of seven, as her belief in Austria started to falter: 
“Before Hitler, everyone called me Susi; then, I insisted on the other name, which, after all, 
was mine as well; why did I have it if I must not use it? A Jewish name was what I wanted, 
befitting the circumstances. No one told me that Susanne is a Biblical name just like Ruth” 
(Klüger 51; my translation).  
 However, an example confirming a given theory does not make it universal – does all 
autobiographical writing explicitly or implicitly allude to its genre? Re-reading The Periodic 
Table (the translation by Edith Plackmeyer in the 2004 Süddeutsche Zeitung edition) confirms 
my doubts. There is neither an introduction nor an afterword affirming the concordance of 
Primo Levi and the narrator, and the title is not suggestive of the book’s autobiographical 
nature either. The narrator remains nameless throughout the text. This is not to say that there 
are no textual hints at the author-narrator’s congruency, but Levi’s hints are slightly more 
subtle and do not conform to Lejeune’s criteria. For example, in the chapter “Vanadium,” the 
author-narrator, now working as a chemist in the manufacture of lacquer, wonders whether 
the representative of the company “W.” is the same inspector he had to work for at the Buna 
works near Auschwitz. In order to find out, he sends him a letter and a copy of his (i. e., 
Primo Levi’s) book If this is a Man.  
 Although The Periodic Table is known to be among Levi’s autobiographical works, I 
want to add that the author himself did not regard it as an autobiography. Not because it is a 
work of fiction (which it is not, although it contains three fictional stories written by Levi 
himself), but because Levi saw it as a collection of stories about the chemist’s profession 
rather than his own life. Since Levi’s life and his work as a chemist are intrinsically tied to 
each other, we can, I think, say that the book is both an anthology of stories and an 
autobiographical work. 
 While The Periodic Table would not be autobiographical by Lejeune’s criteria, 
Dössekker’s book would, matching both implicit (1 b) and explicit criteria (2): although there 
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is no introduction, there is an afterword claiming the congruency of author and narrator. In 
addition, the narrator is called “Binjamin” and even “Binjamin Wilkomirski” throughout the 
text (1 b). When the camp is freed, a woman recognizes the narrator and takes him with her to 
Sandomierz:  
 Binjamin,” she screams, “Binjamin, oj Binjamin!”, and she is still running in my 
 direction. Mesmerized, I watch her. What’s wrong with her? She is almost there 
 already. 
 “Binjamin – you?!”, she screams in utter excitement, and her screaming sounds like a 
 question. 
 The realization strikes me like a blow: it is me she is calling! Yes, I – I am Binjamin, 
 she’s calling out to me! 
Already, I have almost forgotten that I have a name.  
(Dössekker-Wilkomirski  
102 f; my translation).  
A few pages later, the woman consigns him to the care of a rabbi in Kraków: “I’ve got 
someone for you, the little Wilkomirski, Binjamin Wilkomirski!” (Dössekker-Wilkomirski 
106; my translation). The narrator is surprised and proud to have two names now. 
 It becomes clear that, while Cohn’s claim for congruency of author and narrator seems 
too general, Lejeune’s Autobiographical Pact presents an imprecise approach that both 
excludes certain autobiographies and includes works of fiction. 
 
 Another theorist who has dedicated himself to the study of autobiography is Gérard 
Genette. In “Fictional Narrative, Factual Narrative,” he assumes a “different behavior” of 
factional and fictional narration “towards the story they report.” He assumes such a difference 
based on “the mere fact of this story’s (supposedly) being in one case ‘truthful’ [...], in the 
other case fictional [...]” (Genette 756 f). The decisive momentum, Genette concludes within 
the same paragraph, “is the official status of the text and its reading horizon” (horizon de 
lecture).  
This is a somewhat paradoxical introduction, for it seems to contradicts itself. Genette 
first refers to a textually inherent indicator of difference, manifest in the textual “behavior,” 
but then, like Searle, bases it on extratextual criteria. While Searle’s approach suggests that it 
is the author who decides on the status of a text, Genette, in contrast, introduces the criteria of 
textual status and reading horizon. Extratextual criteria, as will be shown later, cannot change 
the “behavior” of the text itself but only its reception. The text itself – the words written on 
the page – do not change with the angle from which the reader looks at them, it is only the 
reader’s interpretation that changes. 
 Genette sees the decisive differentiator of fact and fiction in the focalization mode and 
voice of the narration. For him, Hamburger’s epic preterite does not in itself constitute fiction, 
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but is symptomatic of interior monologue and free indirect discourse (style indirect libre), 
which do constitute fiction. Factual texts do not preclude the presence of psychological 
insights in a character’s mind, however, they have to legitimize their assumptions in terms of 
either references to the source of knowledge (cf. Cohn’s perigraphic apparatus) or modalizing. 
A fictional text, on the other hand, is not constrained by footnotes or bibliographies, nor need 
the thoughts put into a character’s mind be modalized. While it is clear that fiction need not 
constrain itself on internal focalization, let me return to Tuchman’s “Author’s Note” quoted 
earlier, which illustrates the two ways of legitimization open to factual texts. Tuchman assures 
the reader that evidence for “[a]ll conditions of weather, thoughts or feelings, and states of 
mind public or private” in The Guns of August are documented in the “Notes” at the end of 
the book. In order to avoid modalization (the “‘he must have’ style of historical writing”), she 
refers us to the annexed perigraphic apparatus: “I have tried to avoid spontaneous attribution 
or the “he must have” style of historical writing: ‘As he watched the coastline of France 
disappear, Napoleon must have thought back over the long ...’” (Tuchman xx). 
 A further indicator of fictionality according to Genette is external focalization. 
External focalization, i. e., utterly objective narration, is fundamentally fictional. Hemingway 
and Robbe-Grillet are mentioned as examples of external focalization. Zerofocalization, 
which describes the focalization mode of third-person limited or effaced narration, i. e., a 
narrator who does not privilege one point of view but shifts the focalization from one scene to 
the next, is opposed to omniscient narration. Since knowing everyone’s thoughts is not 
possible outside the realm of fiction (“One intuits with complete certainty only what one has 
invented oneself” [Genette 762]), omniscient narration constitutes a trait of fiction, while 
zerofocalization, as has been shown in the section on Cohn, is identified as nonfictional. 
Genette concludes, “[M]ode is, at least in principle, revelatory of the factual or fictional status 
of a narrative and, therefore, a point of narratological divergence between the two types” 
(Genette 763).  
 As for voice, Genette sees the presence of metadiegetic narration as “a quite plausible 
indication of fictionality,” although, he adds, “its absence is no indication of anything” 
(Genette 764). Expanding on Lejeune and Searle, Genette, like Cohn, further concludes that 
factual narration is defined by the strict identity of author and narrator. What makes his 
approach clearer than Cohn’s and less problematic than Lejeune’s is that he adds that this 
holds true only as long as the author takes responsibility for the statements of his narration 
and does not allow autonomies of his narrator(s). Without this restriction, fictional 
(auto)biographies and historical fiction would both have to be considered factual narrations. 
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At the same time, Genette does not insist on the authority of the autobiographical pact. He 
concludes that the relationship between author and narrator is elusive and sometimes 
ambiguous.  
 Genette’s approach to autobiography proves more useful than Cohn’s and Lejeune’s, 
but also raises a new problem when applied to Fragments: Dössekker does take responsibility 
for the statements of his narrator or, in Searle’s terminology, claims to adhere to the 
illocutionary speech act rules; he openly pretends to be Wilkomirski, and so convincingly that 
it has been argued that Dössekker himself believed to be Wiklomirski9. Furthermore, he 
certainly does allow “autonomies of his narrator.” What can be learned from Genette is that, 
in order to decide on the factual or fictional nature of a text, the discoursive universe has to be 
held up to extratextual reality. Before expanding on this important theorem in the second part 
of this paper, let me turn from logico-linguistic theories of fact and fiction to semantic and 
pragmatic ones. 
 
1.2 Semantic Approaches 
 
 The semantic scholars such as Gottfried Gabriel and Thomas Pavel suggest that “the 
fictional discourse is [necessarily] a pseudo-referential one, that is, an “as if”-discourse” 
(Löschnigg 63; my translation), while factual texts are consistently referential. However, as 
Löschnigg points out, the discursive elements tend to be neither exclusively fictional in fiction 
nor exclusively factual in non-fiction.  
The Periodic Table provides a good example again. Levi includes three short stories in 
his factual text (“Lead,” “Mercury” and “Hydrogen”). Vice versa, fictional texts more often 
than not contain references to historical sites, characters and events. For instance, fictional 
autobiographies such as Kosinski’s Painted Bird and Wilkomirski’s Fragments are set in 
historical Eastern Europe, and Rosenblat’s Angel at the Fence is set in historical Germany. 
All of them concern the historical “Third Reich.” Semantic approaches only hold true for a 
small number of unambiguously fictional fairy tales, and certain fantasy and science fiction 
novels. Even these genres more often than not contain at least some references to reality. With 
Löschnigg, we may dismiss the heuristic value of semantic theories for “non-escapist” genres, 
and turn to pragmatic approaches. 
 
1.3 Pragmatic Approaches 
 
                                                 
9 Cf., for example, Diekamann, Irene and Julius H. Schoeps. Das Wilkomirski-Syndrom. Eingebildete 
Erinnerungen oder von der Sehnsucht, Opfer zu sein, or and Salecl, Renate. “Why One Would Pretend to be a 
Victim of the Holocaust.”  
  
22 
 
 Pragmatic approaches assume that the differentiability of factual and fictional texts is 
linked to their “communicative context” (Löschnigg 63). Lejeune and Genette have already 
highlighted the shortcomings of a definition of fiction and non-fiction that is based on the text 
alone. Pragmatic approaches take this insight a step further.  
Paul John Eakin acknowledges that “fictions and the fiction-making process are a 
central constituent of the truth of any life as it is lived and of any art devoted to the 
presentation of that life” (Eakin 5). Unlike Lejeune and Genette, Eakin does not consider this 
concept problematic, but embraces it as his point of departure in Fictions in Autobiography. 
Eakin assumes that “[t]he fictive nature of selfhood [...] is [...] a biographical fact” 
(Eakin 182). That is to say, in living our lives, each of us automatically employs 
fictionalization techniques. The mere acts of thinking about ourselves and narrating past 
experiences to others shape our lives into story-form, a form the referential past lacked at the 
moment of happening. In being faithful to “the reality of remembered experience” (Eakin 167) 
when thinking or talking about it, we are not necessarily faithful to the past “as such.” 
According to Eakin, the autobiographer simply goes one step further by putting the 
remembered past, including the traces of fiction it already shows, into words. 
 Eakin’s Studies in the Art of Self-Invention mark a paradigm shift in autobiographical 
narratology. If one does not want to argue like David Carr, who holds that “narrative structure 
pervades our very experience of time and social existence, independently of our 
contemplating the past as historians” (or autobiographers) (Carr 9) – that is to say, that the 
past is not given story-form in the process of writing it down, but that the story-form is 
inherent to the past itself – one can only approve of Eakin. His insight that communicating the 
past in thinking, speaking or writing necessarily renders it into a different form, which may 
include, but is not limited to arranging the material in chronological or non-chronological 
order, smoothing it out, and stressing certain memories and omitting others, does not only 
apply to autobiography, but to any non-fictional text. In this context, it seems important to 
stress that “fictionalization” refers to changes in the form of the past, not to its truth value. 
That is to say, a historical fact does not lose its validity when it is written down. Meaning is, 
as it were, “translated” from the past itself into its textual form. Although this process of 
translation involves techniques of fictionalization, truth is usually carried over from the past 
to the text, just as the meaning of a story is not normally lost when we translate it from one 
language to another. At the same time, it lies in the nature of translation processes that they 
involve, even require change:  
 Fragments of a vessel which are to be glued together must match one another in the 
 smallest details, although they need not be like one another. In the same way a 
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 translation, instead of resembling the meaning of the original, must lovingly and in 
 detail incorporate the original’s mode of signification, thus making both the original 
 and the translation recognizable as fragments of a greater language, just as fragments  
 are part of a vessel. (“Task of the Translator” 81) 
Walter Benjamin’s contemplations of translating Baudelaire’s Tableaux Parisiens can 
be seen as a metaphor for Eakin’s take on writing one’s life. The historical or 
autobiographical text is no more a replica of the life it refers to than Benjamin’s translation of 
Baudelaire is a replica of the French original. However, both “translations” – the 
historical/autobiographical text and the translation of the Tableaux Parisiens – “must lovingly 
and in detail incorporate the original’s mode of signification.” It is not their sameness, but this 
“loving and detailed incorporation” that makes them “recognizable as fragments of a greater 
language”: the language of truth. 
 
 There is, however, a school of postmodern philosophers of history who do, as it were, 
not believe in the translatability of lived experiences into story form. Hayden White, Frank 
Ankersmit and Keith Jenkins share Eakin’s point of departure, but assume that the translation 
process is at least as likely to fail as it is to succeed. The narratological background having 
been established, I will now turn to the postmodern historico-philosophical debate about the 
representation and representability of truth. 
 
2 A Critical Reflection on Postmodern Philosophies of History. 
 
 On Tuesday, X ventures along a deserted road and loses nine copper coins. On 
 Thursday, Y finds on the road four coins, somewhat rusted by Wednesday’s rain. On 
 Friday, Z comes across three coins on the road. On Friday morning, X finds two coins 
 in the corridor of his house. [The heresiarch is trying to deduce from this story the 
 reality, that is, the continuity of the nine recovered coins.] It is absurd, he states, to 
 suppose that four of the coins have not existed between Tuesday and Thursday, three 
 between Tuesday and Friday afternoon, and two between Tuesday and Friday 
 morning. It is logical to assume that they have existed, albeit in some secret way, in a 
 manner whose understanding is concealed from men, in every moment, in all three  
 places. 
 (Jorge Luis Borges, “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius”) 
 
 
2.1 Narrative “Effectiveness” and the Ethics of Relativism in the Light of Holocaust 
Denial  
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 For Hayden White, the avant-gardist of metahistory10, the historical work is “a verbal 
structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse that purports to be a model, or icon, of past 
structures and processes in the interest of explaining what they were by representing them” 
(Metahistory 2). The historian’s cognitive interest, which will determine the form the 
“narrative prose discourse” takes, is based on the historian’s interpretation of the past – an 
interpretation that is but one out of numerous possible interpretations. White bases his theory 
on the assumptions that (1) facts do not exist in the form of re-narratable stories but “only as a 
congeries of contiguously related fragments” (Tropics 125), while (2) “[t]he historian 
arranges [these fragments ...] into a hierarchy of significance by assigning events different 
functions as story elements in such a way as to disclose the formal coherence of a whole set of 
events considered as a comprehensible process with a discernible beginning, middle, and end” 
(Metahistory 7). The historian’s proceeding corresponds to the novelist’s: just as a novelist 
“put[s] together figments of [his] imagination to display an ordered world,” the historian 
arranges the fragments “to make a whole of a particular [...] kind” (Metahistory 7).  
 The central problem with White for the Holocaust debate is his understanding of the 
historian’s task and his historical relativism. Studying pre- and post-Revolution 
historiography11 and French existentialism, White seeks to pinpoint the task of today’s 
historians. Taking Gottfried Benn (of all people) as a point of departure, he comes to the 
conclusion that “the burden of the historian in our time is to [...] transform historical studies 
in such a way as to allow the historian to participate positively in the liberation of the present 
from the burden of history” (Tropics 40 f). White does not mean, as this statement seems to 
suggest, that the task of the historian is the annihilation of his own discipline, but pleads for 
its radical transformation. When he takes up this thought again two decades after “The Burden 
of History” (1966) in “The Politics of Historical Interpretation” (1982), he amplifies that 
historical interrogation should not concern itself with the study of history, but with “the study 
of the study of history” (“ Politics” 137).  
 White’s historical relativism is perhaps best outlined by means of his controversy with 
Carlo Ginzburg. In his essay “The Politics of Historical Interpretation: Discipline and De-
Sublimation,” White suggests that “perspectives on history” are innocent in themselves and 
therefore equally valuable in principle. White makes this point because, as he points out, he 
himself has “been implicitly praising” a perspective on history which “is conventionally 
                                                 
10 White adopts the term “metahistory” from Northrop Frye, who uses it as a synonym for “speculative 
philosophy of history.”  
11 Historiography in this paper adverts to both what White calls “proper history” (Michelet, Ranke, Tocqueville, 
Burckhardt etc.) and “philosophy of history” (Marx, Nietzsche, Croce etc.). 
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associated with the ideologies of fascist regimes” (“Politics” 130). The roots of a perspective 
and its past political instrumentalization(s) are not to bias our take on them:  
 [...] we must guard against a sentimentalism that would lead us to write off such a 
 conception of history simply because it has been associated with fascist ideologies.  
 [... W]hen it comes to the historical record, there are no grounds to be found in the 
 record itself for preferring one way of construing its meaning rather than another. 
 (“Politics” 130) 
 
 However, I would argue that it is impossible to separate the latent authorial intentions 
from their manifest discourse. When White praises “[the kind of perspective on history ...] 
conventionally associated with the ideologies of fascist regimes,” he does not only advocate 
their sublime, apolitical essence, but also the fascist patina intrinsically connected with it.  
What does this reveal about White’s own ideological disposition? In fact, it hardly 
reveals anything. It is merely reflective of his – as I would argue, mistaken – assumption that 
historical facts do not exist in the form of stories and hence cannot be a priori ideologically 
charged, and that their meaning solely depends on the historian’s interpretation. In short, it 
shows his historical relativism; a relativism White “conceive[s] [...] to be the basis of social 
tolerance, not a license to ‘do as you please’” (White, Content 227).  
However, as Ginzburg points out in his argument against the “Politics of Historical 
Interpretation,” the claim that relativism serves as “the basis of social tolerance” is  
 historically and logically untenable. Historically, because tolerance has been 
 theorized by people who had strong theoretical and moral convictions [...]. Logically, 
 because absolute skepticism would contradict itself if it were not extended also to 
 tolerance as a regulating principle. Moreover, when moral and theoretical differences  
 are not ultimately related to truth (my emphasis), there is nothing to tolerate.  
 (Ginzburg 93 f) 
White does take truth into account, but his historical relativism leads him to define a 
“true” historical narration as the most effective (i. e., most convincing, most widely accepted) 
interpretation: “[...] its truth, as a historical interpretation, consists precisely in its 
effectiveness (in justifying a wide range of [...] political policies [...])” (“Politics” 135). As 
Ginzburg bitterly notes, “We can conclude that if Faurisson’s12 narrative were ever to prove 
effective, it would be regarded by White as true as well” (Ginzburg 93). 
 However, there is certainly a grain of truth in White’s stressing of the “effectiveness” 
of historical arguments. A 1998 British court case shows that the “effectiveness” of an 
argument and an assumed equal validity of historical and revisionist statements are not 
restricted to the postmodern ivory tower (where Noam Chomsky rushed to the defense of 
                                                 
12 Robert Faurisson is a French literary scholar and Holocaust denier. 
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Faurisson’s Holocaust denial, writing “Freedom of Expression” on his flags), but can also be 
observed in British libel law.  
In 1997, the self-appointed historian and later Holocaust denier David Irving published 
the first edition of Hitler’s War, a book striving to exculpate Adolf Hitler from his 
responsibility for the “final solution.” The second edition of the book (1991) was subject to a 
number of changes, for Irving had turned to Holocaust denial in the meantime: “In the 1977 
edition he accepted [the Holocaust] as an historical truth in all its essentials, systematic mass 
murder of Jews in purpose built extermination factories, but in the 1991 edition all trace of the 
Holocaust in this sense has disappeared” (Rampton, Trial Transcripts, Day 1, 95). In line with 
that, Irving said about the 1991 edition, “You won’t find the Holocaust mentioned in one line, 
not even in a footnote. Why should you? If something didn’t happen, then you don’t even 
dignify it with a footnote” (qtd. in Trial Transcripts 98).  
Statements like these led Deborah Lipstadt to refer to Irving as a Holocaust denier in 
Denying the Holocaust: the growing assault on truth and memory, which was published by 
Penguin Books in 1994. Irving responded by suing Lipstadt and her publisher for libel.  
In British libel law, it is the defense which has to prove that what it is being accused of 
(having called Irving a Holocaust denier) is grounded in reality, rather than the prosecution 
having to demonstrate the validity of its accusation (cf. Menasse 64 f). Consequently, in 2008, 
Lipstadt and Penguin Books were summoned to prove that the Holocaust had indeed taken 
place. It goes without saying that, after three long months, this grotesque court case, at one 
point of which Irving accidentally called Judge Gray “mein Führer,” was won by the defense. 
Yet, the bottom line is that the trial nevertheless provided Irving with the public attention he 
may have been seeking above all things. Neal Ascherson writes in the Observer that Irving 
“was also suing before ‘the court of world opinion’.” Paradoxically, because Irving lost the 
case against Lipstadt, “[...] a minority of people clearly think it was Irving [rather than 
Lipstadt] who was on trial, being sued for his opinions by Penguin Books. [...] In consequence, 
there is now a tendency to see the trial outcome as a form of censorship, a clamp on the limits 
of historical inquiry.”  
 The court, in accordance with British libel law, treated the two parties in a way White 
would approve of: as if the past were not a given, but subject to debate, Irving and Lipstadt 
were granted equal points of departure, that is, points of departure from which Lipstadt and 
Penguin Books had to prove that their historical “interpretation” was, as White might say, 
more “effective” than Irving’s.  
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The impression could arise that, as White has it, “the best grounds for choosing one 
perspective on history rather than another” are not inscribed in the past as such, but 
“ultimately aesthetic or moral rather than epistemological” (Metahistory xii). Certainly, 
justice has “won” the Lipstadt-Irving case. But should Irving, already well known for his 
revisionism, have been granted the right to sue for libel in the first place? Should Lipstadt 
have had to prove that the Holocaust did indeed take place?  
Neal Ascherson closes his article with a remark on the British court: “[...] an English 
libel court is for justice, not for history.” Justice has won, but history’s victory was less 
complete, as is reflected in the “tendency to see the trial outcome as a form of censorship, a 
clamp on the limits of historical inquiry.” Just as a Chomsky was ready to defend Faurisson’s 
“freedom of expression” in the 1980s, there were now voices defending Irving’s right of 
“historical inquiry.”  
Democratic societies are not and should not be subject to censorship, and they do not 
and should not impose limits on serious historical inquiry indeed. But as, I think, Benjamin 
Franklin once said about what to publish and what not to publish in a democratic newspaper: 
“this is not a public stage coach that has to take anyone who buys a ticket.” Freedom of 
speech does not abolish the difference between historical truth and its distortion, but requires 
the audience (be it individuals, publishers, courtrooms ...) to think for itself and simply not 
devote attention to falsehood. Unfortunately, this is something the postmodern “Whiteist” 
society seems all too eager to forget. 
 
2.2 From White to Ankersmit 
 
 Frank Ankersmit takes as his starting point the current “overproduction of historical 
literature [read: historiography] which is spreading like cancer in all fields” (“Historiography” 
138). This abundance of texts about the past, he argues, makes it impossible to see the past as 
such: “The reality is the information itself and no longer the reality behind that information” 
(“Historiography” 140). For radical postmodernists such as White, Jenkins and Ankersmit 
himself, this understanding of reality probably holds true. But, before immersing myself in 
Ankersmit’s theory, I would like to anticipate my doubts that the past is experienced in quite 
that way by the average person, either inside or outside academia.  
 Ankersmit’s argument is congruent with White’s, although his terminology and main 
“metahistorical” focus are different. Like Eakin and White, Ankersmit argues that “the 
historical text consists of (many) individual statements” and “the evidence available to 
historians would have permitted them to write many more true statements about the past than 
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we actually find in their texts” (“Reply” 277). With “[t]he reality [being] the information itself 
and no longer the reality behind that information,” the replacement of the past by the text is 
identified as “the historical text’s ‘disciplinary goal’,” just as metaphors and works of art 
strive to “replac[e] what [they] represen[t]” (cf. “Historiography” 143 f, “Reply” 280, 291). 
However, just as Plato finds that objects never live up to the ideas they have been shaped after, 
representations of the past are always found lacking.  
 While this argument is logically coherent in its own closed system, it should be noted 
that Ankersmit’s conclusion (history fails in reaching its “disciplinary goal,” i. e., in replacing 
what it represents) only holds true if one agrees with his premise that historiography strives to 
replace the past by representing it. As I have expounded in the chapter on pragmatic 
approaches, I would argue against this goal and assume with Benjamin a complementary 
rather than hierarchical relationship between the past (“the original”) and its story-form (its 
“translation”): “[...] a translation, instead of resembling the meaning of the original, must 
lovingly and in detail incorporate the original’s mode of signification, thus making both the 
original and the translation recognizable as fragments of a greater language, just as fragments 
are part of a vessel” (“Task of the Translator” 81).   
 As Robert Anchor points out, this does not mean that the past is replaced by its 
representation (by its translation into story-form), but that the historical narrative “provides 
everything needed to tell what actually happened in the past, or at least what we are entitled to 
actually think happened in the past and what it means, so far as the evidence allows and the 
generally recognized criteria of objectivity are applied [...]” (Anchor 110).  
As for the abundance of historical narratives criticized by Ankersmit, it could be 
replied that, since the temporal distance between a given historical epoch and the present 
moment continues to grow, there is nothing to be said against the number of links growing 
simultaneously and bridging the temporal distance. Ankersmit, contrary to this notion, claims 
that not only has the “referential past” been lost with the dawn of postmodernism, but that it is 
“epistemologically a useless notion” and therefore has “no role to play in historical debate” 
(“Reply” 281). Instead of making the truth value (the “referential past”) the central concern of 
the historical debate, Ankersmit introduces a concept related to White’s effectiveness: the 
“successful” implementation of the “available historical evidence.” The “successful” 
implementation of historical evidence leads to the “stylistic superiority” of one narration over 
another (cf. “Reply” 294).  
Treating historiography like literature and judging it according to its “stylistic 
superiority,” Ankersmit holds that, unlike science and politics, history, “[a]long with poetry, 
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literature, painting, and the like,” belongs to the sphere of culture (“Historiography” 139). 
Drawing a clear line between science and politics on the one hand, and “the sphere of culture” 
on the other, he adds, “politics should not interfere with culture” (“Historiography” 139). But 
is there one historical period in which politics has not, in more or less subtle ways, interfered 
with culture?  
The “sphere of culture” (education, media, literature ...) is one of the most powerful 
spaces to be infiltrated with ideological doctrines and one that has always been claimed by 
politics. During the “Third Reich,” the cultural sphere was not only (ethnically and 
ideologically) “cleansed” by means of censorship, but also actively instrumentalized for 
indoctrination. The Nazi children’s book Der Giftpilz is but one example. For a contemporary 
case, consider Norman Finkelstein’s instrumentalization of The Painted Bird and Fragments 
in his case against the “Holocaust industry,” Israeli politics and American Jewry.  
Ankersmit’s l’art pour l’art trivialization seems rather quixotic. Art is a strong 
intellectual means to fight political systems or dominating ideologies, and the gate-keeper of 
sanity. Many seminal works of art have been political and socio-critical ones (think of Heine, 
Brecht, Huxley, Orwell, to mention but a few). Voices claiming that politically engaged art 
may have been important in the past, but is “dead” in our postmodern times, should, as 
Margarete Rubik has pointed out, remember Britain’s thriving documentary drama scene: 
Granada TV’s 1990 TV documentation Who Bombed Birmingham, which revealed a judicial 
error in the case of six supposed IRA terrorists and brought about a re-opening of the case and 
a subsequent acquittal, or Richard Norton-Taylor’s play The Colour of Justice, which “raised 
awareness for institutional racism and is now used in the training of police cadets,” or, more 
recently yet, Victoria Britain’s and Gillian Slovo’s Guantanamo (2004), which “not only 
changed the life of the detainees, [...] but could also have contributed to the release of several 
British prisoners [...]” (Rubik, “Documentary Drama,” my translation) prove beyond doubt 
that politically engaged art is thriving and continues its work in the name of justice.  
 With these examples in mind, I would like to oppose Ankersmit’s axiom (“politics 
should not interfere with culture”) with a different proposition: culture has to interfere with 
politics, lest all culture be lost. Following Walter Benjamin’s assessment of the task of the 
work of art, the aesthetization of history has to be met with the politicization of art (cf. “Das 
Kunstwerk” 169). 
 The above examples further point out that culture (literature, art, journalism ...) rather 
than “not [being] a mimetic reproduction of reality but a replacement or substitute for it,” as 
Ankersmit holds (“Historiography” 144), obtain a regulatory function in defense of a reality 
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that is all too often “replaced or substituted” by politics. As Rubik points out for the genre of 
political drama, “[...] political plays [...] have come to fulfill a therapeutic function of voicing 
the frustrations of an electorate which has learned to distrust the truth value of official 
political information, and for enlightenment turns to the dramatist instead” (“Everything you 
always wanted to know ...” 270). 
   
 Drawing a parallel to psychoanalysis, Ankersmit makes the important observation that 
“the past is also what it is not” (“Historiography” 147). Therefore, we should also pay 
attention to what is not written but deliberately or unconsciously left out. This is characteristic 
of the postmodernists’ literary approach to historiography, since for scholars of literature, 
juxtaposing what is said to what is not said has long been common practice. Ankersmit’s 
proposal to pay attention to what is silenced in the historical discourse shows that the 
instruments of literary criticism may also be fruitful to the philosopher of history.  
The link Ankersmit sees between historiography and psychoanalysis can also be 
observed between literature and psychoanalysis. At the turn of the 20th century, Schnitzler 
(Anatol [1893], Lieutenant Gustl [1900], Die Traumnovelle [1926]) and Freud (“Der Dichter 
und das Phantasieren” [1907], “Das Unheimliche” [1919]) drew attention to the propinquity 
of psychoanalysis and literature. The early 20th century saw a paradigm shift for both 
psychology and literature and explored the potential of art and science to influence and refine 
each other. The development of psychoanalysis shows that art and the sciences are indeed 
neighboring disciplines. However, unlike White and Ankersmit, I fail to see a problem with 
this vicinity. Why should the neighborly relationship not be a good one, based on each party’s 
willingness to look beyond the rim of their own tea cup and learn from the other? I shall 
return to this notion a little later.  
 Ankersmit’s observation that the past is also what has not been written about is an 
important one, although I do not agree with the conclusion Ankersmit draws from this insight. 
He deduces that “the essence of the past [i. e., historiography] is not, or does not lie in, the 
essence of the past [i. e., the historical past]” “Historiography” 148), and hence essentialist 
and positivistic approaches to historiography are doomed to failure. Ankersmit, in line with 
his theory that the disciplinary goal of historiography is to replace what it refers to, equates 
the (historical) past with what has been written about it. The essence of historiography, 
however, does undeniably lie in the historical past.  
I propose to take Ankersmit’s insight that the past is also what has not been written as 
a starting point for a psychoanalytical approach to given (historical, political) discourses. 
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Contemporary political drama is doing just that. Shedding light on the latent motives/motifs 
underlying a manifest narrative, a psychoanalytical approach that pays attention to “what is 
not said and what is suppressed” (“Historiography” 147) can provide insights to illegitimate 
ideological biases and help us distinguish between, for example, serious historians and the 
Faurissons, Irvings and Finkelsteins of this world. 
  
 Summing up, Ankersmit like White finds that the historiographic debate is to be a 
purely narratological and literary one, and defines the “successful” (i. e., convincing, effective) 
“individuation” of narrative substances as the central yardstick on the historical opinion 
market, while truth and falsity are not to be criteria at all. However, the insight that 
“successful” narratives are not necessarily true should not lead to letting go of all notions of 
truth, but stimulate a critical approach to historical and political discourses in the manner of 
standards set by political and socio-critical art. The fact that there is a close affinity between 
art and the sciences does not require an l’art pour l’art aestheticization of historiography, but 
may serve as a starting point to explore new ways in which the two disciplines can 
complement and refine each other.  
 
2.3 Keith Jenkins: History and Ethics – “Why bother?”  
 
 In his manifesto Why History? Ethics and Postmodernity, the “post”-postmodernist 
Keith Jenkins discriminates between “modernist upper case (metanarrative) and lower case 
‘proper’ (professional/academic) histories”13 (15). Jenkins argues that the dusk of 
postmodernism brings about “the end of history” – that is, a point where the study of history 
as such, both in its upper and lower case excrescences, has become obsolete: “[...] it is now 
clear that ‘in and for itself’ there is nothing definite for us to get out of [the past] other than 
that which we have put into it” (3).  
White and Ankersmit, Jenkin’s heroes of historical relativism, are contrasted to 
Richard Evans, whom he “want[s] to read [...] ‘symptomatically’; as a representative of an 
attitude constitutive of contemporary lower case orthodoxy” (92). Evans (who, as I would like 
to note in passing, was one of the expert witnesses in the Lipstadt/Irving libel case referred to 
earlier, and provided a minutely researched expert report on Holocaust history and denial that 
helped justice to win out), is ridiculed as the representative of an orthodox historical practice 
long outdated. Thus the chapter “On Richard Evans” begins: “We now enter an intellectual 
                                                 
13 Unless specified otherwise, I will use the term “history” to refer to both “upper case” and “lower case” 
historiography in this chapter.   
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world utterly unlike that of the generous quasi-transcendental, cross-discursive, playful, 
radical one of Derrida, Baudrillard and Lyotard. Here is a world of the flat-earth variety” (95).  
 One of the fundamental shortcomings of history in “flat-earth intellectual universes,” 
he argues, is that it fails to serve as a parameter for “moral decisions.” Jenkins distinguishes 
between ethics, by which he means “ethical systems” established in the past (e. g. the Ten 
Commandments), and morality, which refers to “ungroundable, aporetic decisions” (Why 
History? 2). Moral decisions, which Jenkins deems superior, “must be taken outside of ethics 
yet in morality in that the singular (moral) choice, if it is to be a real choice, if it is to pass 
through the aporia, can never be the application of a previously existing ethical system with 
claims to omniscience” (20).  
 But can we do without “heteronymous ethics,” and is “autonomous morality” more 
valuable than “heteronymous ethics” in the first place? Instead of taking a direct stab at this 
question, I would like to approach it through the back door of contextuality and first assign 
Jenkins his place in the broader canon of ideas. 
 In his review of Why History?, Robert Anchor suggests that Jenkins writes, among 
others, in the tradition of Dostoevsky. So it must be this tradition that compels him to reject 
history for not “serv[ing] morality.”  
What exactly is morality?, what did it use to be before various interpretations were 
superimposed on it, we may ask, for Jenkins’ post-Kantian interpretation does not seem 
wholly convincing. The etymology of “morality” reminds us that morality is intrinsically 
linked to written instructions, it is something that is taught, and it has to do with 
interpretation:  
 Anglo-Norman moralité moral treatise, symbolism, interpretation and Middle French 
 moralité (12th cent. in Old French in sense ‘moral treatise, moral teaching’; 13th cent. 
 in sense ‘moral interpretation which an author or reader takes from a literary work’; 
 late 13th cent. in sense ‘moral character, ethical value’; 1601 in French in sense 
 ‘positive or negative value of a person's behaviour in relation to moral standards’)  
 (Etymology of “morality, n.” in OED online).  
Origins such as “moral treatise,” “interpretation” and “moral teaching” intrinsically link 
morality to the past: it is past experiences that we draw a moral from, it is (hi)stories that we 
interpret, and it is the historiographic narrative that teaches us morality. The artificial 
distinction Jenkins draws between morality and ethics is not convincing, for morality is 
grounded in “ethical value.”  
 Dostoevsky, in whose tradition Anchor suggests that Jenkins is writing, provides an 
early example of what happens to “morality” if history is neglected. While Dostoevsky is 
well-known for his works of fiction, he also wrote non-fiction. One of these pieces concerns 
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“the Jewish question” and can be found in The Diary of a Writer. Dostoevsky’s logic is anti-
Semitic (and hence amoral) precisely because he does not look at the historical origins of anti-
Semitic thought, but only at the present (1879) “evidence”: he argues that anti-Semitism 
“must have stemmed from something” and hence is “the Jews’ fault” (Dostoevsky qtd. in 
Dershowitz 232). He does not investigate the roots of anti-Semitic thought on the side of the 
anti-Semites but simply infers that it “must have stemmed from something” (a “something” he 
does not care to look at more closely) “the Jews” have done. It becomes clear that morality is 
among the first values at stake when history is abandoned.  
 Jenkins is well aware of past failings of ethics/morality, but he does not attribute this 
to historical unawareness but rather to its opposite, from which follows “that [historical] 
scepticism and relativism are not problems at all, but the best solutions we can come up with” 
(Why History? 27). Modern history, explains Jenkins, has been written “as the history of the 
European nation state, perhaps the most efficient (rational) killing-machine that has ever 
existed, a killing-machine that includes amongst its manifestations the actuality of the 
Holocaust – that supreme, modern event” (27).  
His answer to the obvious accusation that “neo-pragmatism and postmodernism gives 
us no absolute basis upon which to resist fascists and neo-Nazis” is that “a modernist or any 
other type of absolutist thinking [rooted in history] won’t do the job either, simply because all 
absolutes can be claimed by just anybody and thus relativised with ease” (27 f). Jenkins 
quotes Richard Rorty to support his theory: “No sooner does one draw up a categorical 
imperative for Christians than somebody draws one for cannibals ... [Accordingly, since] the 
time of Kant, it has become more and more apparent ... that a really professional philosopher 
can supply a philosophical foundation for just about anything” (Rorty qtd. in Why History? 
28).  
Jenkins would certainly agree with White that, from a strictly rational point of view, 
fascist narratives are no more “guilty” or “innocent” than, say, democratic ones. While White 
deduces that therefore, there is no rational “moral wrong” in “implicitly prais[ing] [the kind of 
perspective on history ...] conventionally associated with the ideologies of fascist regimes” 
(White, “Politics” 130), Jenkins concludes that the danger lies in ethical systems as such, 
since they can be constructed by both fascist and democratic raconteurs. “[Y]ou can, if you 
like,” he writes,  
 exchange love and justice for fascism (make them equivalent). And it is no good 
 asking which of these really is ‘love and justice’, because it is only and precisely in the 
 intrinsic ascribing of such values to one or the other that ‘it’ has a value in the first 
 place. Things in themselves – liberal democracy or fascism – don’t have value in them 
 as if value is some kind of property. No. Things are just things (‘the past’ is just ‘the 
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 past’) and we can ascribe value(s) to things (to the past) as we wish. In that sense, the 
 referent doesn’t really enter into it ‘except rhetorically’; it is symbolic ‘all the way  
 down’. (Why History? 24) 
He holds that “for [a] decision to be a moral decision [...], ethical systems cannot 
provide the ‘moral’ answer any more than the moral [aporetic] choice can.” The aporetic 
moral choice, however, is deemed superior because it is based on the individual’s 
“responsibility.” There are no lessons to be learned from earlier decisions; history fails to 
provide a basis for present decisions: “each decision has to be marked and re-marked as a 
singularity – forever” (21).  
Foreseeing the objections raised by his opponents, Jenkins explains that upon the 
realization that there has never been a rational ethical system, we will also find that past 
generations have developed “moral discourses” all the same, which “means that we didn’t 
need such [ethical] foundations in the first place, and that the unending and unrewarding 
search for foundations can now be called off” (25). “[T]heorists today [...] do very well [...] 
without modernist histories,” and “if Derrida, Baudrillard, Lyotard, Rorty, Ermarth et al. can 
do without a historical consciousness [...], then we all can” (202 f). Accordingly, instead of 
bothering about the past, we should “begin to live out of history and ethics and in time and 
morality in relaxed and [...] emancipatory ways” (28).  
 Jenkins’ utopian vision of a society without collective historical memories is an 
intriguing thought experiment. However, in human society – in a societies defined by our 
ability to “bind time” (as Korzybski phrased it) –, living “out of history” does not seem 
feasible, as I will try to show in the next chapter.  
  
2.4 The Merits of Postmodernism: Historical Relativism and the Planet Tlön   
     
 Three prestigious promoters of postmodernism having had their say, it now seems fair 
to give a louder voice to one of its opponents, whose approach may provide an interesting 
insight to the nature of the postmodern phenomenon.  
Robert Anchor suggests that admitting that the positivistic historiography of the 19th 
century (e. g. Ranke) has long had its heyday does not necessarily imply agreeing with 
postmodern historical relativism (White, Ankersmit, Jenkins). He advances a critical 
rationalism in the tradition of Popper, and agrees with Chris Lorenz that “[f]rom the correct 
insight that no certain knowledge is possible, postmodernism draws the unjustified conclusion 
that no knowledge at all is possible (instead of the correct conclusion that all knowledge is 
fallible)” (Lorenz qtd. in Anchor 109). Anchor suggests that we “think of historians as jurors” 
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who investigate narratives by means of historical evidence. “No judicial system is perfect 
[...],” he fumes, “[b]ut what are the alternatives? No judicial system at all? What would a 
society [...] look like without a judicial system? What would it look like without history?” 
(Anchor 109 f). Anchor ironically remarks that it might look like the planet Tlön in Borges’ 
short story “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” (1940). This idea is worth pursuing, for the 
difference between Tlön and the planet earth can serve as a vivid illustration of the 
shortcomings of postmodernist historiography.  
 The narrator in Borges’ story tells us that over the course of two centuries, a secret 
society of intellectuals (one of whom was George Berkeley) invented the planet Tlön. 
Originally only pursuing the invention of a country built around the intellectuals’ perceptions 
of “’hermetic studies,’ philanthropy, and the cabala” (Borges 18), the society found itself 
challenged by one Ezra Buckley from Memphis, “a freethinker, a fatalist, and an apologist for 
slavery,” who laughed at “the modesty of the project” and “proposed the invention of a whole 
planet” in its stead (18). Buckley, an atheist, demanded that the planet have “no truck with the 
impostor Jesus Christ” (18), and suggested the publication of an encyclopedia detailing the 
planet’s landscapes, languages, literature and sciences.  
 Due to a number of coincidences, the narrator gets hold of volume XI of this 
encyclopedia and shares the Tlönian facts with his readers: Tlönians are “congenitally 
idealist” in the sense of Berkeley’s subjective idealism. Different languages are spoken on the 
northern and the southern hemisphere. In connection with the postmodernist world of White, 
Ankersmit and Jenkins, it is primarily Tlön’s northern hemisphere that is of interest. In its 
language, there are no nouns, but objects are referred to by “an accumulation of adjectives”: 
“One does not say moon; one says airy-clear over dark-round or orange-faint-of-sky [...]” 
(11). There is no fixed signified and corresponding signifier, but the accumulation of 
adjectives chosen varies according to the situation. Since language shapes our perception of 
the world (or vice versa, if you want), the Tlönians perceive the universe in a way that bears a 
striking resemblance to the postmodernist take on history: a given phenomenon can be 
described in a number of ways, involving adjectives pertaining to all the senses. A sunrise, for 
example, cannot only be connected to its colors, but also to the song of a bird or to the chilly 
morning temperature. Without either finite signifieds or finite signifiers (fixed accumulations 
of adjectives), assuming a connection between a number of events seems illogical: 
 [The Tlönians] do not perceive of the spatial as everlasting in time. The perception of 
 a cloud of smoke on the horizon and, later, of the countryside on fire and, later, of a 
 half-extinguished cigar which caused the conflagration would be considered an 
 example of the association of ideas. 
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 This monism, or extreme idealism, completely invalidates science. To explain or to 
 judge an event is to identify or unite it with another one. In Tlön, such connexion is a 
 later stage in the mind of the observer, which can in no way affect or illuminate the 
 earlier stage. Each state of mind is irreducible. The mere act of giving it a name, that is  
 of classifying it, implies a falsification of it. (12) 
This seems to be a perfect description of the world White, Ankersmit and Jenkins 
would like to be living in. On Tlön, the past does not consist of a re-narratable story, but of 
disconnected single events. However, the fact that “the earlier stage” cannot be put into 
relation with later stages without being falsified does not, as one would imagine, mean that 
there are no sciences on Tlön:  
 [...] science exists, in countless number. In philosophy, the same thing happens as 
 happens with the nouns in the northern hemisphere. The fact that any philosophical 
 system is bound in advance to be a dialectical game, a Philosophie des Als Ob, means 
 that systems abound, unbelievable systems, beautifully constructed or else 
 sensational in effect. The metaphysicians of Tlön are not looking for truth, nor even 
 for an approximation of it; they are after a kind of amazement. They consider 
 metaphysics a branch of fantastic literature. They know that a system is nothing more 
 than the subordination of all aspects of the universe to some of them. Even the phrase 
 “all the aspects” can be rejected, since it presupposes the impossible inclusion of the  
 present moment, and of past moments. (12; my emphases) 
The passage reveals two further parallels to postmodern historiography: the 
“sensational [...] effect” of “systems” corresponds to White’s criterion of effectiveness and 
Ankersmit’s notion of the “stylistic superiority” of a historical narration that “successfully” 
implements the available historical evidence. While Ankersmit and White regard 
historiography as a literary subgenre, metaphysics is treated as “a branch of fantastic 
literature” on Tlön, and while science and philosophy are “dialectical game[s]” on Tlön, 
historiography is a dialectical game for the postmodernists – a game in which “criteria of truth 
and falsity do not apply,” as Ankersmit has it (“Reply” 295), just as Tlön’s metaphysicians [...] 
“are not looking for truth.”  
 I deem a planet Tlön not only deeply fascinating, but also thinkable. We earthlings, 
however, will never be Tlönians, for our languages, and what they can and do describe, 
prevent the coming about of the radical idealism governing Tlön. What the narrator observes 
for Berkeley’s subjective idealism – it is, as Hume has said, “not only thoroughly 
unanswerable but thoroughly unconvincing [... in] our world” (Borges 10), while at the same 
time being thoroughly applicable and thoroughly convincing on Tlön – can also be said about 
our postmodernists. As a matter of course, their arguments would not be questioned on Tlön. 
It would not even need any Whites, Ankersmits and Jenkinses on Tlön, for the relativist 
knowledge would be a priori shared by anyone growing up in a world without fixed signifiers 
and signifieds.  
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Unfortunately for postmodernism, the planet earth is nothing like the planet Tlön, and 
historical relativism entails a number of serious problems. In nuce, two basic facts make for 
all the differences of the Tlönian and the earthly universe: Tlön has “no truck with the 
impostor Jesus Christ,” in fact, the Tlönians do not seem to believe in any god whatsoever. 
Hence they do not need history, for there is no need to remember a creation myth. The planet 
earth, on the other hand, is deeply rooted in its various creation myths. Hence, the earthly 
languages have developed in a way allowing the earthly mind to describe the time span from 
the moment of creation to the present moment as a chain-of-events.  
As Wittgenstein has observed, the limits of our language are the limits of our world. 
“[T]he impostor Jesus Christ” is unthinkable without (1) fixed signifieds and signifiers and (2) 
perceiving time in terms of chains-of-events. Without such chains, certain theories could not 
have developed. For example, one religious chain-of-events would never have been regarded 
as “truer” than another one, one “race” could never have thought itself “fitter” than another 
one, Dostoevsky would not have written in his diary that anti-Semitism “must have stemmed 
from something” and hence faulted “the Jews.” Because the consequences of these arguments 
would not have come about either, postmodernism would not entail the danger of relativizing, 
for example, revisionist chains-of-events.  
 More importantly still, there would be no basis for revisionism in the first place. 
Phenomena of mass hysteria and mass seduction, such as Nazism, would not function on Tlön 
the way they do in our world, for the masses could never be “gleichgeschaltet” as they were 
in the “Third Reich.” In a world without fixed signifiers and signifieds, there are no proper 
nouns to be emotionally charged in order to (mis)guide the masses. Furthermore, Mechanistic 
historical models (if not historical models as such) are particularly unconvincing, for they 
involve an exceptionally long chain-of-events. The Nazi doctrine would be regarded a 
tasteless joke by the Tlönians; Marx’ teleological class struggle might be deemed a fantastic 
piece of art in the dialectic game.  
 In our world – which does not even remotely resemble Tlön – emotionally charged 
proper nouns (such as fanaticism [e.g. in NS reports] or mother-country) have been used to 
guide the masses in the past. We do, of course, also encounter emotionally charged proper 
nouns on a day-to-day basis; advertising slogans and political campaigns rely on their force. 
In order to maintain a critical stance towards emotionally charged nouns and proposed chains-
of-events in the present and future, we cannot, since we do not live on Tlön, afford to forget 
about our history, for the “picture of the past [...] threatens to disappear with each present that 
does not recognize itself as being meant in it” (Benjamin, “Geschichte” 253; my 
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translation). – It seems that, for the time being, we should not dismiss Richard Evans’ 
“intellectual world [...] of the flat-earth variety” (Why History? 95) altogether.  
 Does this mean we are we supposed to “learn from our history,” as is frequently 
demanded? And if so – what exactly is it we are supposed to learn? Is the lesson of history 
ever an unambiguous one? I am afraid it is not. Historical points of view are intrinsically 
linked to political ones, for the historian, just as any other intellectual, philosopher, scientist – 
just as any other human being, that is – is never disinterested.  
 However, while what we ought to learn from the past is debatable, the past as such is 
not. We may draw different conclusions, deduce the causal nexus pursuant to our political 
attitude, and come up with interpretations that are, as Anchor and Lorenz suggest, fallible. But 
we should keep in mind that while “the truth may be debated, the existence of the half-truth 
and of the out-and-out lie cannot be denied” (Rabinovici, “Wie es war,” my translation). 
 Postmodern theories are not irreconcilable with historiography as long as they keep in 
mind an axiom formulated by Jean-Francois Lyotard, himself a postmodernist: “[n]othing can 
be said of reality that does not presuppose it” (Lyotard 9). The present is what has been built 
on the ruins of the past, and the task of the historian is the task of a geologist, archeologist, 
and architect. Pointing out the meta-level of discourse, the postmodernists do open up new 
ways of thinking about the present society, but they cannot, no matter how deadly their pen, 
write away what preceded it.  
 
3 “Poetry after Auschwitz” 
 
 “What are you writing” the Rebbe asked. “Stories,” I said. He wanted to know what 
 kind of stories: true stories. “About people you knew?” Yes, about people I might have 
 known. “About things that happened?” Yes, about things that happened or could have 
 happened. “But they did not?” No, not all of them did. In fact, some were invented 
 from almost the beginning to almost the end. The Rebbe leaned forward as if to 
 measure me up and said with more sorrow than anger: “That means you are writing 
 lies!” I did not answer immediately. The scolded child within me had nothing to say in 
 his defense. Yet, I had to justify myself: “Things are not that simple, Rebbe. Some  
 events do take place but are not true; others are – although they never occurred.” 
 (Elie Wiesel qtd. in Weissman 67 f) 
 
3.1 The Limits of Historiography 
 
 I do not think a binary model of history/fact on the one and fiction on the other hand 
does justice to a topic as complex and controversial as the (mis)representations of Nazism. 
Rather than getting lost in logico-linguistic, semantic and pragmatic categories of fact and 
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fiction, we should bear in mind a different angle, which transgresses the two-dimensional 
model: truth.  
It is not only historical works that can be “true,” there are works of fiction that are 
equally true, and sometimes even more so. As Doron Rabinovici remarks in his essay on the 
writing of history and literature after and about the Shoah: 
 The historian and the chronicler are facing the same problem. They can only point out 
 the extent of the atrocity with the murderers’ measure. Account is given of epidemic-
 hygienical actions, of the technical perfectioning of the barbarism. Nondescript stays 
 that this is reflective of the logic of the murderers. Beyond the scientific handicraft, 
 there lie the possibilities of [a] literature that does not even pretend to only depict the 
 facts. It is for that reason that [literature] can approximate a truth exceeding all reality  
 without betraying it. (“Wie es war,” my translation) 
An unemotional statement of the plain facts will inevitably apply “the murderers’ 
measure” in some way. Cold objectivity will, just as the murderers did, see the victims in 
terms of numbers and (ethnical, racial, religious) categories; it will use the euphemisms of the 
murderers. At the same time, it may fail to see the people, and fail to represent the unsayable, 
the unthinkable. Consider an example taken from the chapter “Anti-Semitism and ‘Ordinary 
Germans’” in Richard Evans’ Rereading German History (Evans is arguing against 
Goldhagen’s claim that “’no other country’s antisemitism came close’ to matching German 
antisemitism in the nineteenth century”):  
 In the two weeks following the Tsar’s October Manifesto, which made major 
 concessions to the idea of a constitutional monarchy, there were 690 documented 
 pogroms in Russia, with over 3,000 reported murders. In the town of Odessa, 800 Jews  
 were murdered, 5,000 wounded and over 100,000 made homeless. (Evans 154). 
Evans’ paragraph, well-documented and objectively (heterodiegetically) formulated, 
states a historical fact – and not more than that. He has given account of factual truth, yet the 
question remains what he has actually conveyed about that time. Will his readers, after having 
thought of this paragraph, see the world any differently than before?  
 “Plain historiography,” along with its merits as well as shortcomings, can also be 
transferred into spoken discourse such as the Lipstadt/Irving dispute brought before the 
English court which I have referred to earlier. Irving argues that the elevator connecting the 
underground gas chambers in the crematorium II in Auschwitz-Birkenau with the incinerators 
did not have the necessary capacity for proving the eyewitness accounts of the (that is, of any!) 
gassings. He is cross-examining Robert-Jan van Pelt, one of the expert witnesses of the 
defense: 
 Irving: [...] What do we know about the carrying capacity of that elevator? 
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 van Pelt: There is a document for that. The elevator, this document in March for  
  that, I think it is March 1943, they carried the original one which was  
  installed for 750 kilos. 
 Irving: 750 kilos. 
 van Pelt: They immediately asked to increase the carrying capacity of that elevator by 
  providing extra cables to 1500 kilos. 
 Irving: What do we know about the provision of the motors for those elevators? 
 van Pelt: [...] I do not have the document. But I do know, because I actually looked it 
  up this morning, that they were adapting that particular -- it was a temporary 
  elevator -- to a weight, to a carrying load of 1500 kilos. So I presume if they do 
  that, that indeed there is a motor which will be able to hoist 1500 kilos. 
 Irving: This was made by Daemarg, I believe, the company? 
 van Pelt: Yes. 
 [...] 
 Irving: Anyway, carrying a load of 1500 kilos, that would be how many corpses? 
 van Pelt: An average one 60 kilos. It seems a little high, by that would be -- the  
  theoretical carrying capacity would be, let us say, 20 corpses, so that would be 
  20, 25 corpses. 
 (Trial Transcripts, Day 10, 183 f) 
 
Mentioned in the same breath with a company manufacturing elevators and reduced to 
their weight, the victims are stripped of all humanity – they are abstracted, turned into mere 
numbers and mathematical equations. Once turned into mere numbers, the inhibition 
threshold for applying the “murderers’ measure” recedes: on his way home from the 
courtroom, James Dalrymple, the journalist covering the Irving/Lipstadt case for the 
Independent, took out his calculator to check what Irving had denied: That 500,000 bodies 
were transported from the gas chambers to the incinerators by a single elevator. He writes in 
his article:  
 And on the way home in the train that night, to my shame, I took out a pocket 
 calculator and began to do some sums. Ten minutes for each batch of 25 [corpses], I 
 tapped in. That makes 150 an hour. Which gives 3,600 for each 24-hour period. Which 
 gives 1,314,000 in a year. So that’s fine. It could be done. Thank God, the numbers  
 add up. 
This is not to say that van Pelt is not doing his job, that he is not stating historical facts, 
or that he is not doing so in a way appropriate to the legal environment. Nor is it to blame 
Dalrymple for taking up the revisionist game, for being tempted to doubt the historical facts 
(his own doubts become quite clear when he says, “Thank God, the numbers add up”), for 
showing the readers of the Independent, some of whom may be equally doubtful, that Irving is 
wrong. We can provide historical evidence for van Pelt’s testimony; we can take out our own 
pocket calculators and confirm Dalrymple’s calculation. Yet we will, just like them, have 
applied “the measure of the murderers.” We will have talked about the “technical 
perfectioning of the barbarism,” we will have confirmed historical facts. Just like van Pelt and 
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Dalrymple, we will have produced factual texts in our analyses, and just like them, we will 
have stripped that time of its humanity, that is, of its atrocities, by turning it into easily 
digestible bites for our respective audiences. Saying something factual about history or about 
the texts produced about history, “scientific handicraft” will have moved yet another step 
away from that time itself – we will, albeit adhering to the facts, have, in Rabinovici’s words, 
betrayed truth.  
 Yet it is, of course, facts, and the truth behind and beyond these facts, that the serious 
historian, author or journalist wants to mediate in his texts. It is art and literature that may 
provide the means to overcome the dilemma and let him or her articulate the unspeakable. 
While truth eludes the texts produced by van Pelt and Dalrymple, literature opens a door to 
the unspeakable beyond the naked facts.  
As Franz Fühmann observes in his juxtaposition of scientific and fictional writing, the 
allegories of art have the power to place the individual experience of an I into the frame of 
understanding by the other, by those who have not been there, while the syllogisms of 
scientific/testimonial/factual writing fail to communicate individual experience across the 
borders inflicted on us by our otherness. Fühmann quotes the Book of Job, and relates it to the 
death of a friend: “Oh that my grief were throughly weighed, and my calamity laid in the 
balances together! For now it would be heavier than the sand of the sea“ (Job 6:2–3, King 
James). Although grief cannot be literally weighed on a scale, and neither can all the sand of 
the sea, the allegory captures a truth that eludes a scientific syllogism like “All humans are 
mortal; Gajus was human; conclusion: Gajus also was mortal; now come off it!” (modus 
Barbara; cf. Fühmann 193). 
 
3.2 An Eakinian/Benjaminian Approach 
  
 Part 1 has shown that in historiography, factual narration can be enriched and rendered 
more easily accessible by means of narrative strategies traditionally associated with fiction, 
such as internal focalization in Tuchman’s The Guns of August. Literary techniques like the 
epic preterite are not limited to the fictional register, but also constitute a fundamental 
component of literary non-fiction (such as Ruth Klüger’s autobiography Still Alive). The 
registers overlap; there is no such thing as a clear boundary between factual and fictional 
narrative techniques. Fiction tends to include factual elements, and non-fiction may make use 
of “fictional,” that is, literary, narrative techniques respectively. Acknowledging a certain 
overlaps of fact and fiction can help us to overcome the logico-linguistic and semantic 
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formalisms and their insistence on the “pureness” of (factual or fictional) genres. Instead of 
falling into the relativist trap of postmodern philosophy upon the finding that generic pureness 
is a mere idealization, I want to propose taking a pragmatic approach to art based on Eakin 
and Benjamin (cf. chapter 2.4).  
 Benjamin’s “[f]ragments of a vessel” shall serve as a metaphor for the act of 
translating experiences into story-form, and the referential past into written words: 
“Fragments of a vessel which are to be glued together must match one another in the smallest 
details, although they need not be like one another” (“Task of the Translator” 81). Like 
fragments of a vessel, the referential past and its story-form “must match one another in the 
smallest details,” that is, they must be truthful. But they “need not be like one another” – it 
lies in their very nature that they must be more than mere replicas of each other. By means of 
“lovingly and in detail incorporating the original’s mode of signification” (81), they become 
“fragments of a greater language”, namely the language of truth.  
 Striving to not only “match the original [the referential past] in the smallest detail,” 
but also to “be like [it],” positivistic historical discourse such as Evans’ Rereading German 
History, if taken to its extremes, will produce texts such as van Pelt’s positivistic account of 
the carrying capacity of the Auschwitz elevator or Dalrymple’s article for the Independent (cf. 
chapter 3.1), that is to say, texts that “can only point out the extent of the atrocity with the 
murderers’ measure” (“Wie es war”).  
As Rabinovici observes, art transcends the limited possibilities of positivistic 
historiography; it can “approximate a truth exceeding all reality without betraying it” (5). 
Moreover, art opens up a space beyond the postmodern controversy about historical 
representability, and it has the means to reach an audience that may not be reached by, or not 
be willing or able to relate to, positivistic historiography: art speaks to everyone. 
 
3.3 Art Spiegelman: Transcending the Limits of Representation 
 
 I have referred to the language of art (literature, film, painting ...) as a “language of 
truth,” that is, a language able to express “a truth exceeding all reality without betraying it” 
(Rabinovici, “Wie es war”), a language that manages to not only share knowledge, but create 
empathy by means of communicating individual experience across the borders inflicted on us 
by our otherness.  
 Communicating what is lost in the “cold facts” of historiography and science, the 
empathy created by art does not only develop a force of expression inaccessible to positivistic 
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historiography, but also fulfills the task of a gate-keeper. While positivistic approaches to 
history run the risk of exploiting the past in order to justify present politics, of stripping the 
victims of their humanity, and of applying “the murderers’ measure,” the empathy of art – its 
ability to not only tell, but to involve, to invite identification – acts as a counterbalance to the 
abstraction of “pure” historiography.  
Furthermore, while postmodern philosophers of history tend to reduce historiography 
to mere theory and disapprove of its attempts to express something realistically that cannot be 
expressed realistically, art sidesteps the postmodern “truth” debate. “[N]ot even pretend[ing] 
to only depict the facts” (Rabinovici, “Wie es war”), but “lovingly and in detail incorporat[ing] 
the original’s mode of signification” (Benjamin, “Task of the Translator” 81) instead of 
mimicking it, art opens up a safe space for the past. This space is not confined to the ivory 
tower, but invites a broader public to engage in it. 
 
 I want to illustrate art’s force of expression by means of a close reading of Art 
Spiegelman’s anthropomorphic graphic novel Maus. A Survivor’s Tale, the biography of 
Spiegelman’s father Vladek, and at the same time an autobiography of the author himself, and 
a critical reflection on the representation and representability of the Holocaust.  
The first volume, My Father Bleeds History (first published as a book in 1986), tells 
the story of Spiegelman’s parents, Vladek and Anja, from their time in Poland until their 
imprisonment at Auschwitz. The second volume, And Here my Troubles Began (1991), 
recounts Vladek’s ordeal in the concentration camp until their liberation. Vladek’s experience 
is juxtaposed with Art’s14 own experience growing up as a second generation Jew in the US.  
I have decided to choose Maus rather than a traditional Holocaust (auto)biography for 
three reasons:  
 (1) First of all, “[comics] offers range and versatility with all the potential imagery of 
film and painting plus the intimacy of the written word” (McCloud 212). Refusing to be 
categorized, that is to say, making use of and reflecting on three artistic genres (writing, 
drawing/painting, film) simultaneously, the book lends itself to an Eakinian/Benjaminian 
analysis not only of Holocaust literature, but of Holocaust art as such. Transcending genre 
boundaries and the border of “popular” and “high” culture, taking a highly experimental 
approach to a serious topic, causing empathy and shock with simple words and simple 
pictures that will speak to any reader, and playing with irony and black humor, Maus seems 
                                                 
14 I will refer to the author Art Spiegelman as Spiegelman, and to his avatar as Art.  
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an ideal juxtaposition to the “thinking inside boxes” popular among both logico-linguistic and 
semantic narratologists, and postmodern philosophers of history.  
It is a rigorously researched autobiography that includes historical material of the 
narrated past (Vladek’s and Anja’s story), such as family photographs:  
Richieu: the second volume is dedicated to Anja’s and Vladek’s first son, who did not 
survive the Holocaust, and introduced with a picture of him.  
Vladek: Maus I 100.  
Spiegelman and Anja: Maus II 134.  
The work also reproduces historical documents, such as a map of Auschwitz-Birkenau 
(Maus II 51; back cover of Maus II), and a map of Poland indicating the location of Polish 
concentration camps on the back cover of Maus I. Furthermore, the CD-ROM edition of 
Maus I includes excerpts of Spiegelman’s taped interviews with Vladek.  
At the same time, Maus employs fictionalization techniques, and Art and Spiegelman 
question Vladek’s eyewitness testimony (the depiction of the orchestra, Maus II 54).  
In addition, Maus reproduces materials from the narrated present (Art’s story), namely 
Prisoner on the Hell Planet, an earlier comic by Spiegelman that was published in the 
underground comics magazine Short Order Comix in 1972 (Maus I 100–103).   
 (2) Secondly, Maus I is the most self-reflective and self-critical Holocaust 
(auto)biography I have come across. It confronts the problematic notion of “Holokitsch” 
(Spiegelman’s term, qtd. in Staub 41) and the phenomenon Norman Finkelstein calls “The 
Holocaust industry” (cf. chapter 4.5), it is well aware of their problematic implications and 
deliberately refuses to become a part of it: “I resist becoming the Elie Wiesel of the comic 
book”, Spiegelman said in a 1992 NPR interview (qtd. in Rothberg 687).   
 (3) Unlike traditional works, which tend to take the representability of the past for 
granted, Maus keeps questioning it (for example in Maus II 45), but simultaneously insists on 
Art’s personal need to put it to paper: his parents’ past keeps intruding into Art’s present life, 
and in order to come to terms with it, he has to break the silence.  
The critical and self-reflexive approach taken by Spiegelman makes Maus a decisively 
postmodern work. As a postmodern artist, Spiegelman acknowledges that “no certain 
knowledge is possible” (cf. Anchor 109). However, unlike White, Ankersmit and Jenkins, this 
insight does not lead him to the misconclusion that no knowledge at all is possible, but to the 
conclusion that truth can only be adequately explored and represented as long as it remains 
aware of its own relativity, constantly questioning itself and exploring all aspects of its 
dialectics and inconsistencies.   
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 I shall explore these three and other aspects of the work in greater detail, and point out 
how Spiegelman came to write graphic novels rather than novels or make films, and what 
Maus can teach us about (auto)biographical art on the one and the culture industry on the 
other hand. 
 
3.3.1 Between Cinema and the Written Word: “the past is also what it is not.”  
 
 An important aspect of graphic novels in general and Maus in particular is the 
proximity to film. The cinematographic element in Art Spiegelman’s work manifests itself in 
the influence of Ken Jacobs’ non-narrative films, and in a number of cinematographic 
allusions and devices on both the level of words and the level of images.  
 Spiegelman’s interest in making comics was sparked by a class with filmmaker Ken 
Jacobs in New York, who was to become an important influence for him. Ken Jacobs’ 
experimental approach to film includes what he calls “mining existing film.” Jacobs wants to 
make his audience aware of what they are not seeing when watching a movie at normal speed 
(24 frames per second). In his Nervous System series, for example, Jacobs confronts the 
viewer with between two and four frames per second, or shows one and the same frame over 
and over again in order to draw attention to what happens “in between” the frames and make 
his audience see everything there can be seen in one frame (cf. Conversation with Ken 
Jacobs). The element of the “in between” was to become equally important for Spiegelman’s 
graphic art.  
The phenomenon Jacobs is experimenting with when showing only a few frames per 
second – the ability of the human mind to “take two separate images and transform them into 
a single idea” (McCloud 66) – is called closure. When watching a movie at normal speed, our 
mind performs closure 24 times per second. Comics are equally dependent on closure, albeit 
in a different sense. In film, closure relies on time: at a certain speed, different frames are 
projected on the same space. In comics, closure relies on space: the panels are all there at the 
same time, but they occupy different spaces. When reading a comic, closure happens in the 
gutters (the blank space separating two panels).  
For Spiegelman, the “space in between” is even more important than for Jacobs. In an 
interview with Grant Rogers, he explained that Maus could not be a movie or an animated 
cartoon because the meaning of the gutters would be lost (Resonance FM). The importance of 
the spatial dimension in his comics is irreconcilable with the temporal dimension of film, for 
showing individual frames on an animated projector, as Jacobs does in the Nervous System 
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series, produces non-narrative cinema. Jacobs cinematographic work can only show and draw 
attention to detail, but it cannot tell a story as Spiegelman’s Maus does. Cinema can only be 
either narrative or non-narrative. The moment it draws attention to what is not seen in 
narrative cinema, it ceases to tell a story. Comics, on the other hand, narrate a story in their 
panels, while the gutters can simultaneously be used to draw attention to what is not 
written/drawn.  
Stressing this aspect of his work, Spiegelman visually solves the problem posed by 
Ankersmit, who claims that the past is hard to adequately mediate because “[it] is also what it 
is not” (“Historiography” 147). In Spiegelman’s work, the gutters can be read as a metaphor 
for the silence of his mother Anja. In addition to Art’s frequent allusions to Anja’s absence 
and inability to tell her side of the story (e.g. “I wish I got Mom’s story while she was alive. 
She was more sensitive ... It would give the book some balance” [Maus I 132]), the gutters are 
framing the panels throughout Maus I and II. They are equally important to the mechanics of 
the comic book medium as the panels themselves, but they are filled with nothing but the 
blank silence characterizing the space-in-between.  
 At the same time he attended Jacobs’ lectures, Spiegelman was deeply impressed by 
Kafka, whose stories required a reading as active and engaged as Jacobs’ films required an 
active and engaged viewing. While Jacobs wanted his audience to closely look at a single 
frame and Kafka’s novels asked to be read more than once, Spiegelman decided to make 
“comics that needed to be re-read”: the idea for Maus was born (cf. Resonance FM).  
Spiegelman had found a way to represent the past that was at the same time accessible 
to anyone (“It is an important book. People who don’t usually read such stories will be 
interested” [Mala in Maus I 133]), but at the same time rejected the easy digestibility sought 
by mainstream Holocaust (“Holokitsch”) works, for Spiegelman’s comics “needed to be re-
read.”  
 
 Apart from closure, graphic novels also make use of a different cinematographic 
device: the voice-over. As Doherty observes, graphic novels “[claim] a dual kinship with the 
narrative voice of the novel and the narrative voice-over of cinema” (Doherty 80).  
The boxed comments rendering Vladek’s present narrating voice in combination with 
a picture of a past scene do for Maus what voice-over does for a movie. They show the past 
and at the same time remind the reader that he or she is not in the past, but watching 
someone’s present thoughts about the past.  
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The boxed comments enable Spiegelman to render the voice of Vladek’s direct speech 
in the narrated past differently from his voice-overs and his direct speech in the narrated 
present. Vladek’s speech balloons in the narrated present and his voice-overs reproduce a 
second-language speaker’s English. For example, two panels depicting Vladek working at a 
prisoner-of-war-camp in Maus I combine with the following voice-overs: “It came very many 
Gestapo and Wehrmacht. We were not at ease. We didn’t know what they could do with us,” 
and “I stood always in the second line. I didn’t want they should see me much” (Maus I 58). 
In the panels depicting the present (Art talking to Vladek), Vladek’s English is also a second 
language learner’s English. After spilling a bottle with pills he has to take, Vladek says, “It’s 
my eye,” “Ever since I got into my left eye the hemorrhaging and the glaucoma, it had to be 
taken out from me. And now I don’t see so well” (Maus I 39). Art’s English, on the other 
hand, is a native speaker’s English, for he has grown up in the US and spoken English all his 
life.  
 Unlike in Vladek’s voice-overs, the English syntax in Vladeks speech balloons in the 
narrated past is always correct. This is because at that time, Vladek would not have spoken 
English but his native languages Polish and Yiddish (also cf. Huyssen 78). Writing a 
traditional biography would have made it difficult for Spiegelman to distinguish between 
Vladek’s past and present voice by means of using English alone without alienating the reader. 
In the comic book, on the other hand, the voice switching works as smoothly and feels as 
natural as it would in a movie. 
 This enables Spiegelman to forego the question of the reliability of memory, which 
traditional biographers may have to struggle with and which their works are frequently 
criticized for when they take the reliability of memory for granted. The panels taking us deep 
into the narrated past (Vladek’s story) and making us forget about the narrated present (the 
conversation between Vladek and Art in the US) are disrupted by Vladek’s voice-overs. The 
syntax reminds us that the Vladek who is narrating/remembering is not the Vladek who is 
being narrated/remembered. The truth of Maus does not lie in a non-verifiable claim that up to 
the minutest detail, this is exactly what happened, but in the verifiable claim that this is 
exactly what Vladek remembers.  
Spiegelman takes the cinematographic dimension even further by “visually fram[ing 
Vladek’s narration] as if it were a movie projected by Vladek himself” (Huyssen 70). When 
Vladek starts his narration, he is sitting on his exercise bike, the mechanism of which 
resembles a movie projector, as Huyssen observes (71). In the background of Vladek’s 
bike/movie projector, there is a large poster of the 1921 movie The Sheik. This panel is 
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situated neither in the narrated present (it is unlikely that Vladek has an oversized Valentino 
poster on the wall of his living room) nor in the narrated past. Instead, it introduces the reader 
to the way the story is going to be narrated. It is a panel that uses what comic artists call 
bleeds, that is, an unframed panel standing out among the surrounding framed panels. With 
bleeds, “time is no longer contained by the familiar icon of the closed panel, but instead 
hemorrhages and escapes into timeless space” (McClaud 103).  
Not confined by a frame, the panel does not only refer to one moment in the story, but 
to the entire story. “People always told me I looked just like Rudolph Valentino” (Maus I 13), 
Vladek muses, starting to pedal and set the spinning wheel/the film reel into motion. The next 
panel is already situated in the small town of Czestochowa, where the young Vladek (who, 
unlike the aged Vladek, does not wear glasses) is portrayed dancing with a girl. However, the 
aged Vladek is still present in the voice-over-style boxed comment: “Eventually, I took Lucia 
to dance ...” Rather than saying “[...] I took Lydia out to dance,” as a native speaker of 
English would, Vladek’s non-native syntax omits the “out.” One panel down, there is no more 
voice-over, Vladek and Lucia are dancing, and the young Vladek’s syntax is correct, 
indicating that he is talking in his native Polish or Yiddish now: “I have a small apartment. 
My parents moved to Sosnowiec” (Maus I 13).  
It only takes Spiegelman three panels to teach his readership how the story is going to 
work. The closure performed by the reader’s imagination in the gutters of these three panels 
reveals the underlying narrative structure of the entire book.  
 The cinematographic structure is revoked on the last page of Maus II. As Huyssen 
remarks, the background to Vladek’s and Anja’s reunification resembles the fade-out iris of 
silent films (80). The panel comes with Vladek’s last voice-over, playing on fairy 
tale/Hollywood-style happy endings: “More I don’t need to tell you. We were both very 
happy, and lived happy, happy ever after” (Maus II 136).  
However, the book does not end where a movie might end. The following two panels 
take us out of Vladek’s memories and back to the narrated present, that is, back to Art’s 
present. Vladek tells Art to turn off his tape recorder, and adds in the next panel: “I’m tired 
from talking, Richieu, and it’s enough stories for now ...” (Maus II 136). In the same panel, 
the last but one, Art looks at his father and seems somewhat lost. Vladek’s accidentally 
referring to Art by the name of Richieu, his dead brother, reminds Art that the past has not 
stopped intruding into his own life, although Vladek has finished telling his story. Richieu, 
Vladek’s and Anja’s first son, who did not survive the “Third Reich,” will always be with 
them.  
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Throughout Maus I and II, the young Art seems to almost feel haunted by the constant 
presence of his dead brother in his parents’ life. He tells his wife Françoise, “[Richieu] was 
mainly a large, blurry photograph hanging in my parents’ bedroom. [...] The photo never 
threw tantrums or got in any kind of trouble ... it was an ideal kid, and I was a pain in the ass. 
I couldn’t compete” (Maus II 15). Richieu, having died at an age where it is still easy for 
children to fulfill their parents’ expectations, has never stopped being the boy who might have 
“become a doctor, and married a wealthy Jewish girl” (Maus II 15). Spiegelman says that he, 
on the other hand, “was in rebellion against [his] parents from an early age and had a difficult 
time coming to terms with them” (qtd. in Staub 40).  
The memory of Richieu adds a further level to the motif of “the past [being] also what 
it is not” (“Historiography” 147): as for Richieu, the past is a life that could have been lived, 
but was not.  
 By the end of Maus II, Art seems to have made peace at last with the brother he never 
got to know: Spiegelman dedicates Maus II to Richieu and to his own daughter Nadja. The 
dedication is accompanied by a photo of Richieu. That way, Spiegelman sets an allegorical 
tombstone not only for his parents, as he does in the bleed that is the very last panel of 
Maus II, but also for his brother Richieu.  
 
3.3.2 Anthropomorphic Characters  
 
 The characters in Maus are not humans but, depending on their ethnicity, belong to 
one of eleven groups of animals, many of which play on stereotypes. The Jews are mice, 
Polish Christians are pigs, the German Nazis are tabby cats, the Roma are gypsy moths 
(Maus II 133), white Americans are white dogs and African Americans black dogs 
(Maus II 98), the French are frogs (Maus II 93), the British are fish (Maus II 131), the 
Russians bears, Swedes are reindeer (Maus II 125) and Israeli Jews are porcupines 
(Maus II 42). Spiegelman is consistent in his imagery: the children of a German Christian and 
a German Jew are tabby mice (Maus II 131), and Jews pretending to be Polish are depicted as 
mice hiding their faces behind pig masks (Maus I 64, 125).  
 Reminiscent of works as different as animal cartoons, traditional animal fables, works 
by Kafka, and Orwell’s Animal Farm, Spiegelman’s anthropomorphic main characters 
prepare the reader to bring a specific moral response to the book.  
While it is easy to sympathize with the mice we readily associate with characters from 
Mickey Mouse and Tom and Jerry, we are quick to recognize the cats – the mice’s natural 
animals – as the villains of the story. The Polish pigs point to Poland being an agricultural 
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country, but also to the fact that pork is not kosher. Furthermore, recalling the most prominent 
pigs in English literature – Orwell’s Stalin parody “Napoleon” and his allies, who revolt 
against the humans only to end up acting just like them –, Spiegelman satirizes the Poles and 
conditions the readers to mistrust the pigs. In contrast, the Americans, depicted as lop-eared 
dogs, evoke the impression of loyalty, fidelity and friendliness. Drawing the Roma as 
woodboring beetles is a pun on the term gypsy and metaphorically evokes the Nazis’ 
understanding of Roma as pests. “Frog” is a common term of abuse for the French, referring 
to the national dish of frogs’ legs and to the French’s alleged cowardice. Similarly, “cold fish” 
is a colloquial expression for an emotionless person. Representing the British as fish, 
Spiegelman contrasts the stereotypes of American extroversion and English reserve. The 
Russian bears are based on the traditional Russian emblem, and the reindeer – typical Nordic 
animals – are a metonymical illustration of the Swedes. The Israeli porcupines – a caricature 
of Jewish-Israeli mentality and Israeli foreign politics – are Spiegelman’s most satirical 
metaphor. Porcupines are prickly, an adjective also used figuratively to describe someone 
who is easily offended and overly sensitive. The porcupines can be interpreted as an allusion 
to traditionalist/nationalist Israeli Jews, who bristle at international criticism, including 
criticism from the more liberal Jewish-American community. Furthermore, a topic is called 
“prickly” if it is sensitive, contentious or hard to deal with, as is the case for Israeli-
Palestinian politics.  
 The different criteria Spiegelman uses when selecting the animals for the individual 
nationalities and ethnicities – from literary references and heraldic animals to puns and 
metonymy – evoke the impression of deliberate randomness and can be read as a comment on 
the irrationality of the stereotypes we live by. Using them to make his story work, Spiegelman 
makes us aware our own readiness to unquestioningly accept these stereotypes. At the same 
time, he attempts to deconstruct them, as becomes clear from the genesis of Maus.  
 Spiegelman’s fascination for anthropomorphic characters and his idea to depict Jews 
as mice was also triggered by Ken Jacobs’ film class he attended in New York. Jacobs 
confronted his students with animated racist cartoons from the 1920s and 1930s, and animated 
Mickey Mouse cartoons. He then asked them to think about the difference between the two, a 
question that engaged the young artist’s imagination (cf. Resonance FM).  
Spiegelman may have associated Jacobs’ class with his own and his father’s personal 
experience with comics. As Thomas Doherty observes, the young Vladek must have been 
surrounded by “anti-Semitic broadsheets and editorial cartoons depicting Jews as hook-nosed, 
beady-eyed Untermenschen, creatures whose ferret faces and rodent snouts marked them as 
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human vermin” (Doherty 74). Spiegelman, on the other hand, remembers “[growing] up with 
everything from Aesop’s fables to the Donald Duck stories and animated cartoons” 
(Resonance FM).  
Cartoons must have seemed to be an ideal means to mediate between his own and his 
father’s life. Spiegelman consciously picks up the Nazi stereotype depicting Jews as vermin, 
and fills the cartoon mouse with new meaning. Spiegelman’s juxtaposition of the Nazi vermin 
and his own anthropomorphic mice becomes clear from the paragraphs Spiegelman quotes as 
an introduction to Maus I and II: “The Jews are undoubtedly a race, but they are not human” 
(Hitler qtd. in Maus I), and  
 “Mickey Mouse is the most miserable ideal ever revealed . . . . Healthy emotions tell 
 every independent young man and every honorable youth that the dirty and filth-
 covered vermin, the greatest bacteria carrier in the animal kingdom, cannot be the 
 ideal type of animal . . . . Away with Jewish brutalization of the people! Down with 
 Mickey Mouse! Wear the Swastika Cross!”  
 (newspaper article, Pomerania, mid-1930s, qtd. in Maus II) 
Spiegelman himself commented on his deliberate deconstruction of Nazi cartoons: 
“My anthropomorphized mice carry trace elements of [editorial cartoonist] Fips’s anti-Semitic 
Jew-as-rat cartoons for Der Sturmer [sic!], but being particularized they are invested with 
personhood; they stand upright and affirm their humanity” (qtd. in Doherty 74), and Huyssen 
observes: “[...] Spiegelman’s mimetic adoption of Nazi imagery [...] succeeds in reversing its 
implications while simultaneously keeping us aware of the humiliation and degradation of 
that imagery’s original intention” (Huyssen 75).    
 Spiegelman’s fondness of Kafka (The Metamorphosis, “A Little Fable,” “Josephine 
the Singer, or the Mouse Folk” etc.) may also have contributed to his interest in 
anthropomorphic characters.  
 In an interview for the Comics Journal, Spiegleman himself stresses that he could not 
have drawn his father’s biography with human characters, because  
 if one draws this kind of stuff with people, it comes out wrong. [...] [F]irst of all, I’ve 
 never lived through anything like that. [...] I don’t know exactly what a German looks 
 like who was in a specific small town doing a specific thing. [...] I’m bound to do 
 something inauthentic. [...] [I]f I did it with people [...], [i]t would come out as some 
 kind of odd plea for sympathy or “Remember the Six Million,” and that wasn’t my  
 point [...]. (qtd. in Ewert 92 and Huyssen 75) 
This statement reflects Spiegelman’s refusal to write “Holokitsch” and become “the Elie 
Wiesel of the comic book” (qtd. in Rothberg 687), and to become part of what Finkelstein 
calls “The Holocaust industry.” Spiegelman does not ask for sympathy and he does not 
primarily want to write one more “Remember the Six Millions” book. “I had a focus,” he 
writes, “for dealing with the issues that were important to me – my parents, my ethnic 
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background, the ghosts of the dead – and I could sustain the illusion of doing work that was 
making a difference” (“Saying Goodbye” 44) Not trying to tell a universal story, but taking an 
unconventional as well as personal approach to family history is what enables him to make 
the fragments of his parents’ past and his present “recognizable as fragments of a greater 
language,” as Benjamin has it (“Task of the Translator” 81).  
 What would Spiegelman’s work have looked like, had he used people instead of 
animals? An earlier comic by Spiegelman, Prisoner on the Hell Planet (Maus I 100–103), 
affirms the artist’s intuition that “it comes out wrong” “if one draws this kind of stuff with 
people.” The human characters in Prisoner on the Hell Planet do not evoke immediate 
empathy; the need to draw their faces in greater detail to distinguish one human avatar from 
another defeats the universal appeal of Spiegelman’s mouse people. As a whole, the human 
characters (in combination with the different drawing style) rather turn Prisoner into a dark 
and desperate splatter comic than into a sensitive, subtle, ironic and thought-provoking work 
like Maus. 
 “To use these ciphers, the cats and mice,” Spiegelman continues to explain his 
approach, “is actually a way to allow you past the cipher at the people who are experiencing 
it” (qtd. in Huyssen 75). The ciphers work, that is, Maus makes us see “past the cipher at the 
people who are experiencing it” because of the way our mind processes cartoons: “[...] when 
you look at a photo or realistic drawing of a face[,] you see it as the face of another. But when 
you enter the world of the cartoon[,] you see yourself (McCloud 36). This is exactly the effect 
Spiegelman creates: he wants the animal metaphor “to be shed like a snake-skin” (qtd. in 
Ewert 95). Indeed, as the story progresses, the reader soon overlooks the anthropomorphism 
and identifies the mice as humans. The universal appeal of cartoons invites reader 
identification, and their simple drawing style makes the characters less and their message – 
what they have to say – more vivid (cf. McCloud 37, Ewert 97).  
 Spiegelman’s ciphers make use of this effect: of all of his anthropomorphic characters, 
the mice most closely resemble a  – the simplest and most universal representation of a 
human face we are all familiar with. As McClaud points out, it is not a specific shape that 
prompts our mind to recognize a face in an object or drawing, but any two dots combined 
with a line that marks the mouth. Our mind may make us see a face in an object as mundane 
as a socket, or even in the headlights and front spoiler lip of a car. In any case, the more 
minimalist a  in a comic, the greater the chance that the reader will see him- or herself in it 
rather than another.  
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As for the main ethnic groups in Maus, the faces of the mice – two dots combined 
with the smile-shaped chin – are more minimalist than the faces of the cats and the pigs. The 
Nazi cats, in contrast, are mostly drawn with uniform caps overshadowing their eyes. This 
simple device – the missing eyes – makes them less human; they appear sly and untrustworthy. 
The civilian cats (Maus II 130) and the cat married to a mouse (Maus II 131) do not wear 
uniform caps and hence look more human and less sly. However, at this point of the story, the 
reader has learned to associate cats with Nazis, and he or she will automatically approach the 
civilian cats with initial wariness and distrust. A similar effect is created by the Polish pigs, 
whose prominent snouts, although they do not evoke the eyeless cats’ dangerousness, prevent 
resemblance to the universal  and hence do not invite reader identification either. In 
contrast to the Nazi cats, the American dogs always have eyes, no matter if they are wearing 
uniform caps or not (e. g. Maus II 112). Together with the loyalty and faithfulness we 
unconsciously associate with dogs (“man’s best friend”), Spiegelman’s dogs, like his mice, 
immediately win the readers’ sympathy. However, as the identification with the mice has 
already happened long before the reader encounters the first dog, the reader has already 
identified with the mice, and the dogs – the rescuers in the narrated past as well as the 
Americans Vladek, Art and Françoise encounter in the narrated present – are bound to remain 
the friendly other.  
 It is not only Spiegelman who reflects on the animal metaphor in his interviews and on 
the author’s picture on the blurb of both volumes, his avatar also wonders about his 
anthropomorphic characters on a meta-level of the story itself.  
 Maus II begins with Art and his wife Françoise on a summer vacation in Vermont. The 
first panel shows Art’s notebook, where he has tried to draw his wife as an elk or reindeer, a 
poodle, a frog, a mouse and a rabbit. This panel is larger than Spiegelman’s average panels 
and uses bleeds, introducing the question of a possible representability of the past in general 
and as an anthropomorphic graphic novel in particular as an underlying sub-theme for the 
entire second volume.  
 The first page continues with a conversation between Art and Françoise (both of 
whom are depicted as mice): 
 Françoise: What are you doing? 
 Art: Trying to figure out how to draw you ... 
 Françoise: Want me to pose? 
 Art: I mean in my book. What kind of animal should I make you? 
 Françoise: Huh? A mouse, of course! 
 Art: But you’re French! 
 Françoise (points at Art’s notebook): Well ... how about the bunny rabbit? 
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 Art: Nah. Too sweet and gentle. 
 Françoise: Hmmph. 
 Art: I mean the French in general. Let’s not forget the centuries of anti-Semitism ... I 
  mean, how about the Dreyfus affair? The Nazi collaborators! The – 
 Françoise: Okay! But if you’re a mouse, I ought to be a mouse too. I converted, didn’t  
  I? (Maus II 11) 
Drawing Françoise poses a problem to Art: is she primarily French, or is she primarily Jewish? 
Or should a convert be a different animal altogether? If she is primarily French, she has to be 
a frog, for the Frenchman Vladek meets in Dachau is a frog as well (Maus II 93). If Françoise 
is primarily Jewish, she has to be a mouse like him.  
Art solves the problem by simply drawing it to the reader’s attention. As we get to 
know Art’s and Françoise’s marriage better in the course of Maus II – it is a partnership based 
on mutual understanding, a shared sense of humor and, not the least, a certain opposition to 
Vladek’s character –, it becomes clear that drawing Françoise as a mouse fits best indeed: it is 
her rather than Art who is driving their car, and when it comes to confronting Vladek’s racism, 
she shows the courage of Jerry, the mouse, rather than a “French frog’s” stereotypical 
cowardice. As Françoise herself remarks in the dialogue quoted above, she has to be “a mouse, 
of course!”  
 Spiegelman also uses the animal metaphors to introduce more general thoughts on the 
representability of his parents’ past and on the translatability of lived lives into narrated lives. 
“I feel so inadequate trying to reconstruct a reality that was worse than my darkest dreams,” 
he explains to Françoise, “And trying to do it as a comic strip! I guess I bit off more than I can 
chew, maybe I ought to forget the whole thing.” He continues talking about his self-doubts 
until Françoise advises him to “just keep it honest, honey.” Art retorts, “See what I mean ... In 
real life, you’d never have let me talk this long without interrupting” (Maus II 16). 
Spiegelman acknowledges that “fictions and the fiction-making process are a central 
constituent of the truth of any life as it is lived and of any art devoted to the presentation of 
that life” (Eakin 5). However, rather than inferring that the past cannot be truthfully translated 
into words and “participat[ing] [...] in the liberation of the present from the burden of history” 
(White, Tropics 40 f), Spiegelman embraces this insight like Eakin and Benjamin do, and 
wittily addresses rather than avoids the problems he encounters in his work. 
  
 While Maus won Spiegelman a Pulitzer Prize Special Award, it has not been greeted 
with positive reviews only. The animal metaphors have been criticized by Marianne Hirsch as 
“duplicating the Nazi’s racist refusal of the possibility of assimilation or cultural integration 
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when [Spiegelman] represents different nationalities as different animal species” (qtd. in 
Ewert 100 f).  
The approach a reader takes to the animal metaphors is certainly important when it 
comes to assessing the status of Maus as a Holocaust memoir. However, I believe that the 
different animal species represent a concept diametrically opposed to what Hirsch reads into 
them: they represent the utter arbitrariness of putting people into ethnical/racial/religious/... 
categories. As Spiegelman has stressed, he wants the animal metaphors to be “shed like a 
snake-skin” (qtd. in Ewert 95), which is illustrated by the unmasking of the artist and his 
interlocutors in the chapter “Auschwitz. Time flies.” (Maus II 41–47).  
 The possibility to shed one’s old identity “like a snake-skin” and acquire a new one is 
also explored on more subtle levels in the visual narrative. One striking example is what 
Ewert calls Spiegelman’s mouse tail metonymy (cf. Ewert 98 f). The tail is a distinctive 
marker of Jewishness. For mice with tails, being Jewish constitutes an important part of their 
identity, while mice without tails are assimilated Jews. The 10-year-old Art depicted in the 
preface (Maus I 5–6) does have a tail. As the introductory conversation with his father 
suggests (“Friends? Your friends? ... If you lock them together in a room with no food for a 
week ... then you could see what it is, friends!”), Art is raised in a Jewish household, 
surrounded by his parents’ Holocaust memories and photographs of dead relatives. He is 
constantly made aware of his Jewish identity. However, when the adult Art first visits Vladek 
in order to question him about his past, he is drawn without a tail (e. g. Maus I 12). The reader 
soon learns that Art does not have a good relationship with his father. By now, Art rather sees 
himself as an American than an American Jew, and he is married to a French woman who 
“only converted to make Vladek happy” (Maus II 12). However, as Art gets drawn into the 
story and starts relating to his father’s past again, he is soon represented with a prominent tail 
(e. g. Maus I 45; fig. 1).  
The mouse tail illustrates that Jewish identity can indeed be shed and acquired “like a 
snake-skin.” This fact is also illustrated by Françoise who, having converted, is depicted as a 
Jewish mouse rather than a French frog. The panels depicting Vladek successfully disguising 
himself as a Pole with the help of a pig mask (e. g. Maus I 64 or 155) further underline the 
meaninglessness and arbitrariness of ethical/racial/religious/... categories: it did not matter 
whether someone “felt” Jewish or lived a religious life – it was the Nazis who decided who 
was a Jew and who was not.  
 In the panels depicting Auschwitz, the mice are hardly drawn with tails (Maus II 58). 
Ewert suggests that rather than trying to show that Jews were killed at Auschwitz, Spiegelman 
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consciously “moves towards the universal and away from the particular [visual rendering of 
his characters]” in order to show that humans were killed at Auschwitz. Spiegelman moves 
beyond categorizations and suggests that the universal wrong, rather than consisting in killing 
a certain group of people, consists in killing people, period.  
This reading of the animal metaphors seems more appropriate than Hirsch’s reading 
and is underlined by what Spiegelman himself said in an interview: “One thing that fascinated 
me, and it was a fascination that I suspect I share with many non-religious Jews, was the fact 
that the people sent to their slaughter as Jews didn’t necessarily identify themselves as/with 
Jews; it was up to the Nazis to decide who was a Jew” (qtd. in Ewert 101). It is this arbitrary 
categorization and the powerlessness of the victims that Spiegelman captures in the animal 
metaphors that can be “shed like a snake-skin.”  
 
3.3.3 Maus vs. “Holokitsch”: “I resist becoming the Elie Wiesel of the comic book.”  
 
 The technical irreconcilability of Maus and the film medium referred to in the 
beginning of the Spiegelman chapter is not the only reason Spiegelman has turned down 
numerous offers for a Maus movie or animated cartoon. He did not want Vladek and Art to 
become “objectified characters in a grander narrative that’s the film” (Resonance FM), which 
would inevitably happen in a movie. His art should be art “on the other side of the high/low 
hyphen,” an art that “establish[ed] a new kind of relationship with the reader” 
(Resonance FM). Comments like these reflect that Spiegelman has never primarily tried to 
sell, but to accurately tell the story he felt he had to tell, and to tell it in the medium and way 
that seemed most appropriate to his take on life, art, and communication. Writing beyond the 
reach of a culture industry producing merchandise articles and blockbuster movies, yet within 
both popular and high culture, Spiegelman has found a new way of looking at both art and the 
past that expresses “a truth exceeding all reality without betraying it” (Rabinovici, “Wie es 
war”).  
 The notion of “the other side of the high/low hyphen” reflects the bold mingling of 
“high” and “popular” culture Spiegelman seeks. Refusing to be put into a category, Maus 
invites people of all ages and from all backgrounds to engage with the narrated past. 
Spiegelman says about his work that it “doesn’t try to simplify the complexities of 
interpersonal relationships and disastrous history ... and yet it comes across in an easy-to-take 
tablet” (“Saying Goodbye” 45).  
  
57 
 
The refusal of simplifications and categorizations is reflected on the level of the visual 
narrative, where both past and present refuse to be put into boxes and panels. Spiegelman 
frequently uses bleeds in order to remind the readership that the narrated past is filtered 
through the narrated present. For example, when Vladek talks in voice-overs (two panels 
showing the soldiers hiding in the woods with their guns accompanied by boxed comments) 
about his military training in 1939, he says: “[...] We were given army trainings for a few days 
and then, by the start of September we were on the frontier [...]” (first 1939 panel; Maus I 44), 
“It was everything quiet until near morning ...” (second 1939 panel; Maus I 45). In the 
frameless panel that follows – a bleed depicting Art talking to Vladek in the narrated present – 
Art interrupts his father’s voice-over: “Wait a minute, they only trained you for a few days 
before sending you into combat?” (Maus I 45, fig. 1). In the panel illustrating Art’s question, 
he is lying stretched out on the floor of his father’s living room, taking notes. Art’s legs reach 
far into the previous panel with the soldier and Vladek’s “It was everything quiet”-voice-over. 
Unlike the panel showing Art’s question, the panel depicting the narrated past is framed and 
smaller in size. As a consequence, the visual impression is that the second panel – the narrated 
present – is spatially closer to the reader, an impression that is underscored by Art’s legs 
protruding into the 1939-panel.  
Unlike traditional Holocaust literature such as Elie Wiesel’s Night or Primo Levi’s If 
this is a Man, who narrate only the past as if stowed away in a memory-box – to be 
remembered, but also strictly separated from the present –, Art’s present visually touches, 
reflects on and filters the past, refusing to draw a line between the “then” and the “now.”  
 
 
Fig. 1. From Maus I by Art Spiegelman. Copyright © 1973, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986  
by Art Spiegelman. Reprinted by permission of Random House, Inc. 
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 It is not only the present that engages in the past, the past also repeatedly intrudes in 
the present. The drawing of the Auschwitz gate, accompanied by Vladek’s voice-over – “And 
we came here to the concentration camp Auschwitz. And we knew that from here we will not 
come out anymore [...]” – takes up more than half a page and uses bleeds (Maus I 157). 
Unlike the bleeds depicting the narrated present, for which Spiegelman leaves the background 
blank, the background of the Auschwitz bleed is shaded, making the missing frame even more 
prominent. The dreariness of the large image spanned by the “Arbeit macht frei” inscription 
does not only overshadow the entire scene. The shaded background appears to bleed over the 
edges of the book into the reader’s present (an effect Spiegelman does not create with the 
blank backgrounds going with the bleeds depicting the narrated present).  
 The panel that best illustrates how the past intrudes into Art’s life is probably 
Spiegelman’s self-portrait on the inner back cover of both books, which is accompanied by a 
short biography of the author. At the spot where books traditionally feature a photo of their 
author, Spiegelman has drawn himself as a human wearing a mouse mask, sitting in his study, 
supporting his head with his hands, and holding the chain-smoker’s omnipresent cigarette the 
reader is familiar with from the story. The self-portrait is the only color panel found in Maus. 
On the level of the present, it depicts Art’s pens, pencils, ink, brushes, cigarette pack and 
ashtray. On the wall behind the avatar, there are a poster of the comics magazine Raw that 
Spiegelman co-founded with his wife, and the cover picture of Maus I. However, the level of 
the past violently disrupts the otherwise peaceful image. Outside the window of Art’s study, 
there is a watch tower manned with a German cat getting ready to shoot, and a high chimney 
reminiscent of the incinerator’s chimney at Auschwitz. This image is framed by the window 
frame as if by the frame of a panel, locating it at the same time inside and outside the larger 
panel of the author’s portrait. More disturbing yet is the cigarette brand Art is smoking. 
Looking closely, it is possible to read the brand name “Cremo.” As Rothberg observes, 
Vladek refers to the Auschwitz incinerators as a 
“cremo buildings” in one of his voice-overs: “I 
came to one of the four cremo buildings. It looked 
so like a big bakery ...” (Maus II 70). Furthermore, 
the picture on the cigarette pack shows two giant 
chimneys.  
 Another intrusion of the past into the 
present, also connected with a chimney, happens 
when Vladek, talking about the incinerator in 
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Maus II in a panel depicting the narrated present, stresses that he is “not telling rumors, but 
only what really [he] saw” (Maus II 69, fig. 2). In the next panel, we are in the narrated past 
again, in a (framed) panel depicting the brick chimney, accompanied by Vladek’s voice-over: 
“For this I was an eyewitness” (Maus II 69).  
 
Fig. 2. From Maus II by Art Spiegelman.  
Copyright © 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991 by Art Spiegelman.  
Reprinted by permission of Random House, Inc. 
 
Although the panel is framed, the chimney sticks out of it as if the past were too large and too 
heavy to fit in a box. The chimney reaches into the panel located above, which depicts Vladek 
holding a cup of tea and Art smoking a cigarette in the narrated present. The trail of smoke 
from Art’s cigarette is located exactly on top of the chimney as if it were smoke from the 
incinerator. The jagged line of smoke visually separates Art and Vladek, cutting the panel into 
two halves. However, Vladek’s speech balloon transcends the barrier of smoke. Although Art 
has no direct experience of the “Third Reich”, Vladek’s narration takes him there, and 
although Vladek cannot make Art experience the past he has lived through, he can make him 
see it as he projects his memories on a metaphorical movie screen by means of his narration. 
 The powerful chimney motif Spiegelman repeatedly picks up illustrates the 
omnipresence of the past not only in Vladek’s, but also in Art’s life. Art grows up surrounded 
by attitudes shaped by Auschwitz, a topic revealed to the reader in Maus I’s two-page 
introductory chapter. Under the heading “Rego Park, N.Y. c. 1958,” Spiegelman draws Art as 
a boy of ten years, sobbingly telling his father that he fell on his skates and that his friends did 
not wait for him. Vladek replies, “Friends? Your friends? ... If you lock them together in a 
room with no food for a week ... then you could see what it is, friends!” (Maus I 6).  
The introductory scene can be read as a metaphor for Art’s need to draw the story. As 
a young Jew whose parents survived Auschwitz and whose émigré life remained shaped by 
the past (the mother commits suicide and, as Art admits in respect of his father’s pedantic 
austerities, even Vladek “in some ways [...] didn’t survive” [Maus II 90]), the Jewish people’s 
and especially his parents’ history become a defining part of Art’s identity as well. He feels 
held up to Richieu, the brother he never knew, and grows up surrounded by photos of dead 
relatives. Telling his father’s story provides a means to explore the way Art’s own life has 
been overshadowed by a past he never directly experienced, to record a survivor’s testimony, 
but also to subtly criticize the reification and commercialization of memory in the American 
culture industry at the turn of the 21st century.  
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 Maus refuses to become part of the culture industry traditional autobiographers like 
Elie Wiesel have actively engaged in with their works and public appearances. Wiesel’s 
approach differs from Spiegelman’s not only in the obvious fact that Wiesel is a survivor, 
while Spiegelman is a survivor’s son. They also differ in their motivation for telling their 
story. For Spiegelman, it is the wish to engage in (his family’s) history and a personal need to 
mediate between the Jewish people’s past and his own presence in a meaningful way, while 
Wiesel, as he says in the preface to the 2006 edition of Night, “believes he has a moral 
obligation to try to prevent the enemy from enjoying one last victory by allowing his crimes 
to be erased from human memory. [...] Convinced that this period in history would be judged 
one day, I knew that I must bear witness” (viii).  
However, once Wiesel had become a celebrated survivor and writer, and sought-after 
public speaker, he was facing the accusation of “exploiting” the Holocaust for political and 
ideological reasons and personal benefits (cf. chapter 3.4.1).  
Spiegelman sidesteps these problems by actively defining himself against the culture 
industry and “resist[ing] [to become] the Elie Wiesel of the comic book.” In the same breath 
Spiegelman says that Maus has provided a way to “[deal] with the issues that were important 
to me – my parents, my ethnic background, the ghosts of the dead” (“Saying Goodbye” 44), 
and adds: “The scary part to me is that Maus may also have given people an easy way to deal 
with the Holocaust [...], that reading Maus now makes it possible for them to feel that they 
understand it [...]. And since that isn’t true for me, it’s peculiar if it’s true for people reading 
my book” (“Saying Goodbye” 44). The “Holokitsch” works (Spiegelman’s term) Spiegelman 
rejects tend to try and smooth out the story they tell, portray the survivors as heroes or saints, 
or allude to a “moral lesson” to be learned from the Holocaust. In short, they do what 
Spiegelman is afraid of: they “make it possible for [the readership/audience] to feel that they 
understand [the Holocaust].” While “Holokitsch” submits to the culture industry and tries to 
give answers, Spiegelman wants to raise questions. This decision gives his work an integrity 
that is scarcely reached by literature and other works of art deliberately submitting to the 
culture industry.  
 The critique of the culture industry becomes most explicit in the second chapter of 
Maus II (“Auschwitz. Time flies.”). A depressed Art sits in his study situated on a pile of 
corpses and critically reflects on the success of Maus I, which was published five years earlier 
(fig. 3): 
 Between May 16, 1944, and May 24, 1944 over 100,000 Hungarian Jews were gassed  
 in Auschwitz ... 
 In September 1986 [...], the first part of Maus was published. It was a critical and  
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 commercial success.  
 At least fifteen foreign editions are coming out. I’ve gotten four serious offers to turn  
 my book into a T.V. special or a movie. (I don’t wanna.)  
 In May 1968 my mother killed herself. (She left no note.) 
 Lately I’ve been feeling depressed. (Maus II 41) 
Art’s crisis is also reflected in the font he is thinking in. While the entirety of Maus I 
and the first chapter of Maus II have been rendered in capital letters only, Art is thinking in 
upper and lower case from the beginning of the chapter “Auschwitz. Time flies.” The 
puniness of the font mirrors Art’s feeling of insignificance, senselessness and shrinking self-
confidence on the visual level.  
 Through the window of Art’s study, we can see the watch tower that also features in 
Spiegelman’s author’s portrait on the inner back cover of the book. Symbolized by the pile of 
dead mouse bodies and the watch tower, the past is lurking at the edges of the presence. With 
Maus I having become “a critical and commercial success,” it seems as if Art has drawn it 
back into the present rather than written it off his mind: in contrast to traditional Holocaust 
memoirs that successfully stow the past away as if in a “memory-box,” Spiegelman’s text  
constantly toggles between past and present, (his)story world and metatextual level.  
  
 
Fig. 3. From Maus II by Art Spiegelman. Copyright © 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991 by Art Spiegelman.  
Reprinted by permission of Random House, Inc. 
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 Most notably, Art is depicted as a human wearing a mouse mask. It is this element that 
has the strongest impact on the reader, who by then has already identified with the mouse Art 
and started overlooking the fact that Spiegelman has not drawn actual humans, but mice. Art’s 
mouse mask reminds Art himself and his readership of the fragility of his metaphor, and of 
the sensibility of the topic as such. Upon realizing the critical and commercial success Maus I 
has become, Art starts doubting the legitimacy of his work. He realizes, so to speak, that, after 
all, he is no Elie Wiesel. Although Auschwitz has greatly impacted his life, Art, unlike Wiesel, 
has never “lived through anything like that” (qtd. in Ewert 92). Hence, Art sees himself 
wearing only a mask, while the dead bodies his desk is standing on are the bodies of mice, not 
masked humans. The metaphor suggests that Art wonders if his project is turning into 
something he never wanted it to be: is he exploiting his family’s and his people’s past, a past 
he has not had to live through himself?  
 In the same picture, someone – a photographer, as the reader assumes – calls out to 
Art from outside the panel. Only his speech balloon is visible: “Alright Mr. Spiegelman ... 
We’re ready to shoot!” (Maus II 41). As Rothberg observes, this sentence adds an 
uncomfortable ambiguity to the scene: “Among other meanings hovering, like the flies, in this 
frame, the overlay of positions and temporalities communicates an important fact about anti-
Semitism: its effects persist across time and situation; someone is always ‘ready to shoot,’ 
even when no Nazis are visible and the media is under your control” (Rothberg 683). Like the 
watch tower outside Art’s window, the utterance suggests the irreverence of the culture 
industry, which is exposed on the next page.  
The press team interviewing Art consists of men wearing cat’s, mice’s and dog’s 
masks. The American journalist (the dog), stepping onto the pile of corpses, asks, “Tell your 
viewers what message you want them to get from your book?” (Maus II 42). Art answers, “a 
message? I dunno ...” (Maus II 42; my emphasis). In this speech balloon, Art starts his answer 
(“a message?”) with a lower case “a,” indicating that his self-doubts have further risen. As 
Spiegelman points out in the Comics Journal interview quoted earlier, it “wasn’t his point” to 
write “some kind of odd plea for sympathy or ‘Remember the Six Million’” (qtd. in 
Huyssen 75).  
This also means not accepting the somewhat kitschy patina Wiesel tends to apply to 
his works and his public appearances (see 4.2). In contrast to Wiesel, Spiegelman, not willing 
to accept commercialization of his work and his father’s memories without a word of protest, 
consciously defines himself against the culture industry. With Maus I having become the prey 
of the very culture industry he deplores, the only way of taking Maus II beyond Holocaust 
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heritage commercialization Spiegelman sees is to have his avatar directly address the reader, 
as he does in the beginning of the chapter “Auschwitz. Time flies.” (cf. Rothberg 683), and to 
critically address his animal metaphor in the second volume.  
The merchandising industry is dealt with on page 42, where Art is offered a “licensing 
deal” to turn the black coat both Spiegelman and his avatar Art are frequently wearing into a 
fan article: an Israeli (porcupine-masked) business man confronts Art with a poster saying 
“Maus – you’ve read the book, now buy the vest!” (Maus II 42). Making the business man an 
Israeli, Spiegelman makes an ironic reference to the stereotypical Jewish mammonism and 
further distances himself from “politically correct Holokitsch,” which tends to paint a black-
and-white picture of the world by means of portraying Jewish characters as saints. 
Questioning (positive as well as negative) stereotypes, Spiegelman draws attention to the utter 
arbitrariness of thinking inside boxes and invites his readers to see different individuals rather 
than members of different ethnic/racial/religious/... groups.  
An even stronger indicator of the arbitrariness of stereotypes can be observed in the 
portrayal of Vladek. Rather than smoothing out the story and portraying his father as the 
survivor-“saint” typically found in “Holokitsch” works, Art tries to “keep it honest,” as 
Françoise advises him to do in the beginning of Maus II (16). Hence, quite unlike the Vladek 
of the narrated past who recounts his own life and appears as a loving husband and father, the 
Vladek of the narrated present – the father Art has known since his childhood – appears rather 
greedy, stubborn and selfish, and even racist. When Françoise is about to stop the car and pick 
up a (black) hitch-hiker, Vladek shouts, “It’s a colored guy, a shvartser! Push quick on the 
gas!” (Maus II 98). Françoise gives the hitch-hiker a ride all the same, and Vladek starts 
complaining in Polish. As soon as the hitch-hiker has gotten off the car, Vladek gives vent to 
his anger: 
 Vladek: What happened on you, Françoise? You went crazy, or what?! I had the  
  whole time to watch out that this shvartser doesn’t steal us the groceries from 
  the back seat! 
 Françoise: What? That’s outrageous! How can you, of all people, be such a racist!  
  You talk about blacks the way the Nazis talked about the Jews! 
 Vladek: [...] I thought really you are more smart than this, Françoise ... It’s not even to 
  compare, the shvartsers and the Jews! 
 (Maus II 98 f) 
By means of including episodes like this in his books, Spiegelman violently 
undermines the concepts of the stereotypical survivor-saint, of a “moral lesson” to be learned 
from the Holocaust, and of any “ethically purifying” effects it must have on a survivor. In a 
conversation with Mala, Vladek’s second wife, Art worries about his portrayal of Vladek’s 
character: 
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 Art: I used to think the war made him that way ... 
 Mala: Fah! I went through the camps ... All our friends went through the camps.  
  Nobody is like him! 
 Art: [...] It’s something that worries me about the book I’m doing about him ... In 
  some ways he’s just like the racist caricature of the miserly old Jew.  
 (Maus I 131) 
However, the decision to honestly render Vladek’s character in the narrated present 
gives Spiegelman an opportunity to avoid what he is afraid of: “that Maus may [give] people 
an easy way to deal with the Holocaust [...], that reading Maus [...] makes it possible for them 
to feel that they understand it [...]” (“Saying Goodbye” 45).  
Vladek’s character expresses a greater truth that is in line with Spiegelman’s take on 
the past, and that cannot be expressed by smooth “Holokitsch” works. Maus’ refusal to read 
“moral lessons” or “ethically purifying” effects into his parents’ past is at the same time the 
refusal to attribute any “sense” to the Holocaust. Maus does not comfort its readership, try to 
make the Holocaust approachable and understandable, or give easy-to-digest answers. In this 
way, Spiegelman’s approach succeeds in what Elie Wiesel’s work and mainstream movies 
like Schindler’s List15 fail to do: at the end of Maus, a reader may be pondering more 
unanswered questions than at its beginning. And this, I believe, may be precisely what is 
needed in order to express “a truth exceeding all reality without betraying it” (Rabinovici, 
“Wie es war”). 
 However, in the second chapter of Maus II, Art feels that his work has already been 
sucked into the machinery of the culture industry despite his efforts to resist it. In the scene in 
Art’s study, his crisis is represented on the visual level, and in the subsequent conversation 
with his shrink, it is reflected on the narrative level. As Art is assailed with questions by the 
journalists – “Tell our viewers what message you want them to get from your book?”, “Many 
young Germans have had it up to here with Holocaust stories. [...] Why should they feel 
guilty?”, “If your book were about Israeli Jews, what kind of animal would you draw?”, 
“Could you tell our audience if drawing Maus was cathartic?” – and with the offer for a Maus 
merchandise vest by the business man, Art’s avatar is getting smaller in size and younger 
from panel to panel. By the end of the page, he has turned into a small child. The public 
attention and the demand to formulate a message Art never had in mind are becoming too 
                                                 
15 In A cinema of loneliness, Kolker observes a number of simplifications and trivializations in Schindler’s List 
and attributes them to the fact that “Spielberg wants us to understand the heroism of one German who saved 
some Jews. At the same time, he wants the viewer to see the huge, disgusting canvas of the slaughter. He cannot 
only do the latter, because the film would be like a documentary and, without a drama, would not draw a large 
audience. He cannot make the drama too complex, because that would endanger the emotional bond that 
Spielberg must build between audience and film. Depth and ambiguity are not acceptable qualities of popular 
cultural artifacts” (321, my emphasis).  
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much for him. As his self-confidence and security are shrinking, he stops “feel[ing] like a 
functioning adult” (Maus II 43).  
 After the journalists’ visit, he leaves to see his shrink Pavel, a survivor like his father, 
and tells him: “[T]hings couldn’t be going better with my ‘career,’ or at home, but mostly I 
feel like crying. I can’t work. My time is being sucked up by interviews and business 
propositions I can’t deal with” (43). Art and Pavel talk about Art’s feeling that “[n]o matter 
what [he] accomplish[es], it doesn’t seem like much compared to surviving Auschwitz” 
(Maus II 44) and about the commercialization of survivor memory Art finds himself 
confronted with. Pavel muses, “[L]ook at how many books have already been written about 
the Holocaust. What’s the point? People haven’t changed ... [...] [M]aybe it’s better not to 
have any more stories” (Maus II 45).  
Pavel is both wary of the culture industry and doubts the possibility to tell accurate 
stories as such, since “the victims who died can never tell their side of the story” (Maus II 45). 
Stories usually end up consciously or unconsciously evoking the impression of a survivor-
hero, while in fact, as Pavel stresses, “it wasn’t the best people who survived, nor did the best 
ones die. It was random!” (Maus II 45). Art agrees, responding with a Samuel Beckett quote: 
“Every word is like an unnecessary stain on silence and nothingness.” After a thoughtfully 
silent panel, he adds: “On the other hand, he said it.” Pavel says, “He was right. Maybe you 
can include it in your book” (Maus II 45).  
This dialogue holds the key to the way the story is presented in Maus II. Art does want 
to continue telling Vladek’s past despite the fact that the first volume has become a prey of 
the culture industry he deplores. Pavel’s advice to include Beckett’s words and the fact that 
Beckett said them all the same, thereby both stressing and undermining his dictum, provides 
Art with the means to position his book beyond the reach of the culture industry without 
undermining its success.  
Maus II is highly self-reflexive, which makes it as much a book about writing about 
the past as a book about the past. Art’s thoughts about what animal to make his wife 
(Maus II 11), the revelation of the animal metaphors as masks (41 ff) and the inclusion of 
Art’s conversations with the journalists and the business man (42) and Pavel (45) play on the 
meta-narrative level and keep reminding the reader about Art’s own stance towards writing 
Maus. The portrayal of Vladek’s character affirms Pavel’s testimony that “it wasn’t the best 
people who survived, nor did the best ones die. It was random!” (Maus II 45).  
 However, the realization of the randomness of survival and the incompletion of any 
representation of the Holocaust does not lead to depression. While in several meta-narrative 
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scenes, Art’s deliberate deconstruction of the animal metaphor has a disturbing and alienating 
effect (such as the portrayal of the characters as people wearing animals’ masks), others play 
with irony and remind the reader that Art, although at times depressed, is a humorous narrator 
and does not take himself too seriously. This impression is evoked by Art’s sketches of 
Françoise as an elk, poodle, frog and rabbit, and by his voice-over introducing Pavel’s office, 
portraying Pavel next to one of his dogs: “His place is overrun with stray dogs and cats. Can I 
mention this, or does it completely louse up my metaphor?” (Maus II 43). 
 The inescapability of the commercialization of survivor memory is not only referred to 
on the level of the narrated presence, but also in the narrated past. Spiegelman includes a 
photo of his father in a camp uniform, taken at a souvenir photo shop shortly after the 
liberation of Auschwitz (Maus II 134). The photo indicates that it is not only survivor-writers 
like Elie Wiesel and second generation writers like Spiegelman, but all survivors who have to 
come to terms with, and either reject or accept, the omnipresence of a culture industry that 
does not stop short of their experiences. Vladek, having taken the souvenir picture, accepts its 
terms.  
Another visual pun concerning the culture industry is observed by Robert Storr, who 
notes that the stripes of the bar code on the back cover of Maus II are visually connected to 
the stripes on Vladek’s prison uniform: “The text’s very ‘wrapping’ asks the reader to 
consider its implication in a system of economic entrapment. The self-conscious irony of this 
parallel between imprisonment and commodity production marks one of the many places 
where Spiegelman rebels against the terms of his success.” (Rothberg 667). 
 Spiegelman seems to overcome the crisis depicted in the chapter “Auschwitz. Time 
flies” upon realizing that the economic entrapment of art and culture is ultimately inescapable, 
a fact that is illustrated in the bar code on the back cover. However, he refuses to resign and 
accept this entrapment but wittily undermines and criticizes it by constantly drawing it to the 
reader’s attention. 
 
3.3.4 A Postmodern Answer to the Culture Industry 
 
 Fredric Jameson defines postmodern works as “an attempt to think the present 
historically in an age that has forgotten how to think historically in the first place” (Jameson 
x-1). As for Maus, it is indeed an “attempt to think the present historically” in an age in which 
“the past as ‘referent’ finds itself gradually bracketed [by philosophers like White], and then 
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effaced altogether [by radical ahistoricists like Jenkins], leaving us with nothing but texts [as 
in Ankersmit’s theories]” (Jameson 18).  
Unlike traditional representations of the Holocaust such as Wiesel’s Night, which 
rejects postmodern narrative techniques, Spiegelman acknowledges the problematic nature of 
traditional historical representations, but finds a way to reconcile this central insight of 
postmodernism with the concept of faithful historical representation. As “an instance of 
postmodernism that has not yet eschewed morality” (Blume), as Spiegelman himself once 
described his work in an interview, Maus brings the concept of “a truth exceeding all reality 
without betraying it” (Rabinovici, “Wie es war”) to new life within the framework of 
postmodern narrative techniques.  
Among the most prominent postmodern devices found in Maus are the nonlinear story 
line composed of the overlapping levels of narrated past and narrated present, Spiegelman’s 
playing with genres (the comic book tradition, biography, autobiography, the animal fable, 
cinema ...) and narrative conventions (drawing attention to the animal metaphors by means of 
drawing people with masks), Spiegelman’s/Art’s weariness of personal memory (Maus II 54) 
and the rejection of one objective truth or “message” (Maus II 42), Art’s direct address of the 
reader (Maus II 41), Spiegelman’s mingling of popular and high culture, his self-irony, the 
meta-narrative reflections on the limits of representation, and the underlying cultural criticism. 
I shall explore three of the most interesting postmodern traits – (1) Spiegelman’s refusal of 
mimetic representation, (2) his calling into doubt of Vladek’s memory, and (3) his allusions to 
“the past [being] also what it is not” (Ankersmit, “Historiography” 147) – in more detail.  
 (1) Spiegelman’s anthropomorphic characters themselves are an allegorization of 
historical events, suggesting that they cannot be mimetically (non-allegorically) represented 
unless one wanted to produce a splatter comic applying “the murderers’ measure.”  
Spiegelman does what Fühmann shows by means of the book of Job: like the allegory 
− “Oh that my grief were throughly weighed, and my calamity laid in the balances together! 
For now it would be heavier than the sand of the sea“ − (Job 6:2–3, King James; Fühmann 
193), the allegorical mice and cats capture a truth and evoke an empathy and understanding 
that elude mimetic representations and scientific syllogisms. Mistrusting mimetic 
representations but nevertheless insisting on the representability of the past, Spiegelman 
creates a story-form that is not an exact replica of the referential past, but “lovingly and in 
detail incorporates [its] mode of signification,” turning the past and his representation into 
“fragments of a greater language” (cf. “Task of the Translator” 81).  
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As Richter remarks in his “reading journals,” Maus I illustrates Benjamin’s dictum 
that “all great works of literature either create a genre or dissolve it” (“Proust” 335; qtd. in 
Richter 88; my translation). Benjamin makes this observation about Proust’s Recherche, 
dwelling on the fact that Proust does not describe a lived, but a remembered life. A 
remembered event, Benjamin muses, is limitless, it is “the key to everything that happened 
before and everything that happened after it” (“Proust” 336, my translation). The same holds 
true for Maus as well. The past refuses to stay past but continues shaping both Vladek’s and 
Art’s present lives, constantly disrupting the linear story line on the narrative as well as on the 
visual level and making Maus both a realistic and a postmodern work.  
 (2) Another postmodern trait is Art’s questioning of Vladek’s memory. Well aware 
that “fictions and the fiction-making process are a central constituent of the truth of any life as 
it is lived and of any art devoted to the presentation of that life” (Eakin 5), that is to say that 
human memory is selective and not one hundred percent reliable, Spiegelman authenticates 
Vladek’s story with historical documents and scrupulous research. Among other documents,  
Spiegelman includes a floor plan of a crematorium (Maus II 70), maps of Eastern Europe 
(back cover of Maus I, Maus II 84), and various family photos (the dedication of Maus II to 
Richieu is accompanied by a photo; Maus I 100, Maus II 134).  
The fact that he grants historiography more authority than his father’s memory is 
illustrated in the scene depicting the camp orchestra at Auschwitz (Maus II 54, fig. 4), which 
has also been observed by Ewert. The panel depicting the prisoners on their way to work is 
accompanied by Vladek’s voice-over: “Each day I marched to work and hoped again I’ll see 
Mancie ... She could have more news of Anja.” The panel – illustrating what Vladek’s 
narration makes Art see in his imagination – shows a group of prisoners on the left side of the 
panel, just about to pass the camp orchestra that had to play every morning when the prisoners 
left for work and every evening when they returned.  
The subsequent panel is located in the narrated presence. Art, referring to the image he 
is seeing in his mind’s eye, interrupts Vladek’s narration: “I just read about the camp 
orchestra that played as you marched out the gate ...” “An orchestra?”, Vladek answers in a 
voice-over taking us back into the narrated past of Art’s imagination, “No. I remember only 
marching, not any orchestras ... From the gate guards took us over to the workshop. How 
could it be there an orchestra?” This panel is the visual sequel to the earlier marching scene. 
In the meantime, the prisoners have continued their march from the left to the right side of the 
panel and now fill its entire frame.  
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However, a close look reveals that Art still imagines the orchestra Vladek does not 
remember. In the background, just reaching above the heads of the prisoners, the conductor’s 
head, his baton, the neck of the contrabass and the top of the trumpet are visible. In the panel 
that follows, Art interrupts Vladek’s voice-over again, insisting on the orchestra: “I dunno, 
but it’s very well documented ...” Vladek answers, “No. At the gate I heard only guards 
shouting” (Maus II 54). 
 
 
Fig. 4. From Maus II by Art Spiegelman. Copyright © 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991 by Art Spiegelman.  
Reprinted by permission of Random House, Inc. 
 
 The scene illustrates that the listener will never see exactly the same as the narrator 
who remembers. While Maus I focuses on the question “Who speaks?”, metaphorically 
rendered in Vladek’s projecting his memories on the movie-screen of Art’s imagination, 
Maus II focuses on the question “Who sees?”. It is Art who sees the “film” Vladek’s narration 
is projecting on an imaginary screen, but his imagination is not limited to his father’s 
narration. He adds details he knows must have been there although Vladek leaves them out, 
and it can be assumed that he vice versa fails to accurately imagine other details from 
Vladek’s memory.  
However, unlike Elie Wiesel, who finds himself confronted with the same problem 
and resigns with the words “Deep down, the witness knew [...] that his testimony would not 
be received” (Wiesel ix), Spiegelman finds a way to overcome the question of the 
translatability of the past into words by means of addressing it on a meta-narrative level. The 
answer he finds to the problem is an Eakinian/Benjaminian one. Embracing “[t]he fictive 
nature of selfhood [as] a biographical fact” (Eakin 182) with postmodern boldness rather than 
resigning in contemplation of it, he transcends mere mimetic representation and has Art 
openly address the conflicting dialectics posed by all “translations” of the past into the present. 
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 (3) Another quasi postmodern trait is Spiegelman’s inclusion of what is not said about 
the past into his work. He does not only focus on Vladek’s memories, but also on his mother 
Anja’s silence.  
Like Ankersmit, who insisted that “the past is also what it is not” (“Historiography” 
147), Art, who can only question one of his parents (his mother committed suicide in 1968) 
feels that he is only telling half of the story. In the course of Maus I, he repeatedly asks his 
father for Anja’s diaries. Vladek promises to look for them, but never seems to find them. The 
narrated past in Maus I ends with Vladek and Anja arriving at Auschwitz. Then there is a 
switch to the narrated present, depicting Art and Vladek talking to each other: 
 Vladek: ... and when they opened the truck, they pushed men one way, women to the 
  other way ... Anja and I went each in a different direction, and we couldn’t 
  know if ever we’ll see each other alive again. 
 Art:  This is where Mom’s diaries will be especially useful. They’ll give me some  
  idea of what she went through while you were apart. (Maus I 158) 
When Art suggests looking for Anja’s diaries in the garage, Vladek contritely admits: “No. 
You’ll not find it. Because I remind to myself what happened ... These notebooks, and other 
really nice things of mother ... one time I had a very bad day ... and all of these things I 
destroyed” (Maus I 158).  
Realizing that his mother’s memories will never be regained, Art shouts, “God damn 
you! You – you murderer! How the hell could you do such a thing!!” (Maus I 159). Art knows 
that the story will never be complete without Anja’s memories. In his rage, he accuses his 
father of murdering Anja a second time. As long as her memories were saved in her diaries, 
both Anja and her past remained, as it were, alive and accessible despite her death. With the 
destruction of her memories, her death is final; with no one to remember her life, it is as if she 
had never lived.  
 A different allusion to the past being what is not said can be found in the panels 
depicting Art’s appointment with his shrink described earlier. Saying that “the victims who 
died can never tell their side of the story, so maybe it’s better not to have any more stories” 
(Maus II 45), Pavel suggests that it is not only Art’s story which is facing the problem of 
incompleteness, but any attempt to represent the Holocaust. It is only the survivors – and 
survival, as Pavel stresses, is utterly random – who will ever be able to tell their story. The 
paradigmatic victims, the six million who died, must remain silent.  
In contrast to “mainstream” American Holocaust productions such as Steven 
Spielberg’s 1993 movie Schindler’s List, Spiegelman remains aware of this silence that will 
always foreclose the possibility to tell the entire story. Alluding to the silence throughout his 
work, Spiegelman refuses to smooth out the story by means of a happy ending or a black-and-
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white picture of “good” and “bad” characters, to monumentalize the survivors or to assume a 
“moral lesson” that can be learned from the past. Spiegelman critically observed about 
productions like Schindler’s List that “there is no business like Shoah business” and defines 
himself against the “Holokitsch” productions and their “fatuous attempts to give it a happy 
ending” (qtd. in Staub 41)16.  
 Spiegelman’s inclusion of Anja’s silence, metaphorically represented in the gutters, 
reflects the fact that the story can never be complete and brings him full circle with regard to 
his critique of the culture industry, whose most despicable manifestation for Spiegelman is 
represented by another Spielberg production: the 1986 animated cartoon An American Tail. 
Set in 1885, An American Tail tells the story of a Jewish-Russian mouse family fleeing Russia 
under Tsar Alexander III and emigrating to the US (which, as rumor has it, is a land without 
cats). Before the release of An American Tail, which Spiegelman saw as “an utter 
domestication and trivialization” (qtd. in Richter 107) of the Jewish mouse metaphor, he 
raged:  
 [Spielberg and Bluth] were going to be swathing the story in all this mindless, 
 fashionable, self-congratulatory patriotic fervor ― whereas, if you were being true to 
 the initial metaphor, in depicting the way things actually were in 1940, you would 
 have had to strand my mice people off the coast of Cuba, drowning, because it is 
 precisely the case that at that point, the time of their greatest need, mice people were 
 denied entry into the US.... [...] I just read where they’ve now licensed off doll rights 
 for the Mousekawitzes [Spielberg’s Jewish-Russian mice family] to Sears, and  
 McDonald’s is going to get the beverage-cup rights! (qtd. in Richter 107) 
An American Tail is indeed a domestication, trivialization and fictionalization of the 
historical hardships of émigré life in the 1940s. As Spiegelman observes, it was all but easy to 
emigrate to the US at that time, and the life of Jews in New York tended to be characterized 
by discrimination, long working hours and financial hardships rather than happy-go-lucky 
moments, family reunions, happy endings and the liberty and patriotism evoked in An 
American Tail.  
The fictionalization of history is also reflected in Spielberg’s sloppy research, which 
contrasts with Spiegelman’s own scrupulous fact-checking and background research: The 
Internet Movie Database lists four anachronisms, one error in geography and one factual error 
in An American Tail. Spielberg’s romanticization of the hardships of Jewish emigrants in the 
New York of the 1940s allowed Spielberg to advertise the animated cartoon with a tagline 
that had nothing in common with historical reality: “[A] magical experience. A musical 
                                                 
16 For Spiegelman’s explanation why he considers Schindler’s List “a failure,” see Blume’s interview “Art 
Spiegelman: Lips.” 
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journey. And a story that will live in your heart forever,” and to make his project an even 
greater commercial success by means of fan goods such as dolls and beverage cups. 
 
4 Problematic Texts 
 
 
 HISTORY, n. An account mostly false, of events mostly unimportant, which are 
 brought about by rulers mostly knaves, and soldiers mostly fools. 
 (Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary) 
 
 Spiegelman’s anger at the commercialization and trivialization of history is not 
without reason. That the Jewish people’s history may be diluted, re-written and romanticized 
for a generation of children growing up watching An American Tail, and that Schindler’s List 
or Wiesel’s work may “[make] it possible for [people] to feel that they understand [the 
Holocaust]” (“Saying Goodbye” 44) is only part of the problem posed by “Holokitsch” works. 
Fictionalized Hollywood productions of historical events have long become an integral part of 
the cultural environment most people grow up in. In theory at least, they can be easily 
juxtaposed with a sound historical education that addresses historical inconsistencies and 
invites a critical viewing/reading experience rather than passive consumption.  
However, there is a more complex dimension to the interest the culture industry has 
taken in Holocaust works. On the one hand, both Wiesel’s memoir Night and Schindler’s List 
have been accused of lobbying for Israeli and American Middle East politics, and Wiesel has 
been suspected of writing and speaking in public for the sole reason of promoting Jewish-
American interests. On the other hand, the popularity of “Holokitsch” works has led to the 
emergence of a number of professed Holocaust autobiographies such as Kosinski’s Painted 
Bird, Dössekker-Wilkomirski’s Fragments, and Rosenblat’s Angel at the Fence.  
It is not the publication of professed autobiographies as such that poses the problem. 
Fraud has never been far from the publishing business as long as there is money to make or a 
reputation to gain, and it would be naive to assume that it stops short of history. The problem, 
however, lies in the reactions that such publications have triggered. In his popular book The 
Holocaust Industry, Norman Finkelstein does not make a difference between survivors like 
Wiesel and frauds like Kosinski and Dössekker, and accuses all three of them of exploiting 
“The Holocaust industry.”  
In the next chapters, I shall outline the development of institutionalized memory that 
set the stage for “Holokitsch” works and literary and historiographical fraud, outline Elie 
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Wiesel’s contribution to the culture industry, and focus on the political and cultural dynamics 
of institutionalized memory.  
 
4.1 The Foundations of Institutionalized Memory 
 
 No matter whether one embraces the popularity of mainstream Holocaust movies and 
books like Elie Wiesel does, criticizes them like Art Spiegelman, or is repelled by them like 
Norman Finkelstein, it cannot be denied that in the last decades, Holocaust art has become an 
integral part of Western, and in particular American, “high” and “popular” culture. However, 
there is a peculiar quality about this popularity that sets it apart from literature and art dealing 
with other wars and human catastrophes.  
As Novick observes in The Holocaust in American Life, “[g]enerally speaking, 
historical events are mostly talked about shortly after their occurrence, then they gradually 
move to the margin of the consciousness” (1). He mentions as an example that , in the 1920s 
and ‘30s, “novels, films, and collective consciousness were obsessed” with the World War I 
Battle of Passchendaele, which had taken place in 1917, while by the 1950s and ‘60s, the 
topic had disappeared from literary publications and movies, and from collective 
consciousness (1). The same holds true for the Vietnam War. The public reception of the 
Holocaust, on the other hand, is inconsistent with this tendency: it was “hardly talked about 
for the first twenty years or so after World War II; then, from the 1970s on, [it became] ever 
more central in American public discourse” (Novick 1 f).  
As Mintz points out in his study about the shaping of Holocaust memory in popular 
culture, if we accept that the Holocaust is a “paradigm-shattering tragedy” and that “it is not 
in the conservative nature of cultures to be easily shattered and reconfigured,” it is only 
natural that “cultures [...] resist admitting the Holocaust [...] because of its subversive quality; 
and when the Holocaust is finally let in [...], it enters not on its own terms, but within the 
terms already set out from within the culture’s own dynamic” (Mintz 36 f). A detailed account 
of “the terms set out from within the [American] “culture’s own dynamic” is given by Novick, 
whose observations about the impact of Holocaust memory on American society today can be 
read as a synecdoche for Western society at large.  
However, the paradigm shift in Holocaust memory was caused by a distinctively 
American political and ideological constellation, and a substantial part of the literary and 
cinematic Holocaust representations popular throughout the West today, as well as numerous 
influential subsequent critiques, have their origin in the US. Therefore, I will, like Novick, 
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focus on American society in order to outline the history of collective Holocaust memory and 
its cultural impact. 
 Applying the theories of sociologist Maurice Halwachs, who “explored the ways in 
which present concerns determine what of the past we remember and how we remember it” 
(Novick 3), Novick finds a convincing explanation for the temporal paradox of Holocaust 
consciousness. He distinguishes two factors that have influenced Holocaust reception:  
(1) the construction of (American) identities, and  
(2) the interpretation of political landscapes. 
 
4.4.1 The Construction of (American) Identities 
 
 As the traditional American “integration ethos (which focused on what Americans 
have in common and what unites [them]” was gradually replaced “by a particularist ethos 
(which stresses what differentiates and divides [Americans])” (Novick 6 f), ethnic groups 
began defining themselves through what set them apart from other groups rather than through 
the “Americanness” they all shared. The “integration ethos” had focused American Jewry on 
assimilation and had taught them to regard themselves as Jewish Americans rather than 
American Jews. According to Novick, by the time the “particularist ethos” gained popularity 
among ethnic groups, the attitudes Jews had towards religion, cultural practices, and Zionism 
were extremely diverse. Therefore, “[t]he Holocaust, as virtually the only common 
denominator of American Jewish identity in the late twentieth century, has filled a need for a 
consensual symbol” (Novick 7).  
While the “integration ethos” was replaced by the “particularist ethos,” American 
culture also saw “a change in the attitude toward victimhood from a status all but universally 
shunned and despised to one often eagerly embraced. On the individual level, the cultural icon 
of the strong, silent hero [was] replaced by the vulnerable and verbose antihero. Stoicism [was] 
replaced as a prime value by sensitivity” (Novick 8).  
Resulting from the combination of the particularist factor with the victim factor today, 
“the assertion of [a] group’s historical victimization – on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, 
or sexual orientation – is always central to the group’s assertion of its distinctive identity” 
(Novick 8). Making the Holocaust part of Jewish collective identity (no matter whether an 
individual’s ancestors had been directly affected by this history or not) suggested itself, just as 
the history of slavery became an integral part of collective black American identity.  
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 The new status of antiheroes and victims-as-heroes was reflected in the popularity of 
movies and literature centering on such characters. Novels, memoirs and movies about the 
hardships of social outsiders, minority groups and ethnic groups entered the bestseller lists 
and became box office hits. But why is it that, while the trend towards the “particularist 
ethos” and the hypostatizing of victimhood has generally remained constricted to individual 
ethnic groups, remembering the Holocaust has become an important concern not only for 
Jews, but for Western, and in particular American, society as a whole17? Novick provides a 
demographic answer:  
 We [American Jews] are not just ‘the people of the book,’ but the people of the 
 Hollywood film [Spielberg] and the television series [Gerald Green’s and Marvin 
 Chomsky’s miniseries Holocaust], of the magazine article and the newspaper column, 
 of the comic book [Art Spiegelman] and the academic symposium [Saul Friedländer et 
 al.]. When a high level of concern became widespread in American Jewry, it was, 
 given the important role that Jews play in American media and opinion-making elites, 
 not only natural, but virtually inevitable that it would spread throughout the culture at  
 large.”  (12). 
It is plausible that demographics have contributed to the nationwide 
institutionalization of Holocaust memory (although they have certainly not been its sole 
cause). What makes Novick’s approach more convincing than the one taken by Finkelstein, 
who chooses a similar starting point I shall explore later, is that Novick’s approach is 
analytical rather than judgmental and polemic. Without “the important role that Jews play in 
American media and opinion-making elites,” Novick observes, the second factor could not 
have impacted the culture of collective memory and historical representation the way it did. 
 
4.4.2 The Interpretation of Political Landscapes 
 
 In the 1950s and ‘60s, the Holocaust remained marginalized not only because of the 
then prominent “integration ethos,” but also because evoking it would have undermined the 
American interpretation of the Cold War. This interpretation equated Soviet Russia with Nazi 
Germany, which required “defin[ing] the victims of Nazism in political rather than ethnic 
terms.” (Novick 87). As Novick observes, “any suggestion that the Nazi murder of European 
Jewry was a central, let alone defining, feature of that regime would undermine the argument 
for the essential identity of the two systems” (87).  
                                                 
17 This is reflected, for example, in the fact that “the Nazi holocaust is just about the only historical reference that 
resonates in a[n American] university classroom today. Polls show that many more Americans can identify The 
Holocaust than Pearl Harbor or the atomic bombing of Japan” (Finkelstein 11). 
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 In 1961, the Eichmann trial, followed by the controversial publications of Hannah 
Arendt’s book Eichmann in Jerusalem and Rolf Hochhut’s play The Deputy in 1963, called 
greater public attention to the Holocaust for the first time. Novick suspects that the “shift in 
focus to Jewish victims rather than German perpetrators [...] made [the] discussion [of the 
Holocaust] more palatable in the continuing cold war climate” (144).  
However, Novick assumes that the decisive event that focused Jewish American 
attention on the Holocaust happened only in the 1970s. In 1973, the Yom Kippur War made 
American Jewry aware of the threat posed to the state of Israel by its neighboring countries 
and hence reminded them of their European history. Against the backdrop of the emerging 
“particularist ethos” and the focus on victimhood among ethnic groups, “viewing Israel within 
a Holocaust framework, was the single greatest catalyst of the new centering of the Holocaust 
in American Jewish consciousness” (Novick 168). With Israel being an important American 
ally, an increased Holocaust consciousness was consistent with the general American 
interpretation of the political landscape in the Middle East. Once Israel had become what 
Finkelstein calls “one of the world’s most formidable military powers” (Finkelstein 3) in 
response to threats of wars of extermination from Arab States, Israel’s security was not in 
immediate danger anymore. The political landscape in the Middle East and its general 
American interpretation remained largely the same none the less.  
Furthermore, Novick assumes that by the 1980s and ‘90s, the “institutionalization of 
[Holocaust] memory” (e.g. in the form of the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles, the 
establishment of Holocaust studies as an academic discipline, and its addressing in literature, 
art and film) had already gained “self-perpetuating momentum to the centering of the 
Holocaust” (6). Novick suggests that one reason for the Holocaust becoming an important 
concern not only to American Jews but to Americans as a whole is its political usefulness 
when interpreting Middle East politics, which continues to reinforce the momentum its 
representation and discussion have already gained. 
 
 One question suggesting itself at this point is whether the “institutionalization” of 
Holocaust consciousness and its implications are desirable or not. What impact have they had 
and continue to have historiographically, politically and culturally? Is there someone who 
profits from them or someone who suffers from them on one of these three levels? I doubt that 
it is possible to find an objective political answer to the question; at any rate, I am incapable 
of providing it. As Novick rightly observes regarding objectivity, “[i]ndividuals from every 
point in the political compass can find the lessons they wish in the Holocaust; it has become a 
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moral and ideological Rorschach test” (12). However, while an objective answer appears hard 
to find, Norman Finkelstein’s The Holocaust Industry lends itself to an illustration of the lack 
of objectivity in the political debate.  
 The historiographical and cultural levels, on the other hand, suggest themselves for 
academic analyses. I have already looked at the historiographical aspect in the second chapter. 
Considering that we live in a world which is very much unlike the planet Tlön, I have come to 
the conclusion that the “institutionalization” of Holocaust consciousness is serviceable to the 
task of remaining aware of historical facts and teaching them to future generations.    
 In chapter 3.3, I have explored the potential of literature/art to transcend the limits of 
positivistic historical representation. I shall now look at the downsides of the Holocaust’s 
discovery by the culture industry in order to further explore the cultural impact of Holocaust 
“institutionalization,” and then look at Norman Finkelstein’s abusive re-interpretation of this 
cultural impact as an example for a polemical rather than academic political answer.  
 
4.2 Elie Wiesel and the Culture Industry 
 
 Elie Wiesel has not only accepted, but embraced the terms of the culture industry and 
the fame it has earned him in return. As Kazin points out, Wiesel, turning himself into “the 
‘High Priest’ of a ‘Holocaust cult,’” has “made a successful career out of bearing witness to 
the extermination of European Jewry” (qtd. in Weissman 42). Like Spielberg Schindler’s List, 
Wiesel’s work has not only made the Holocaust approachable to a mass audience, but also 
simplified the historical context by means of opposing “ever-guilty Gentiles” to “ever 
innocent Jews” (Finkelstein 55).  
 Furthermore, Wiesel has used Holocaust consciousness “for ulterior [political, ethical] 
motives” (Mintz 40). This makes him what Mintz calls a “constructivist” – someone who 
believes that “[c]ultures, like individuals, can [...] comprehend historical events only from 
within a set of their own issues and interests; the very willingness to engage in external events 
must be motivated by an internal exigency” (4). Wiesel considers the Holocaust “an 
unprecedented event in human history,” but also subscribes to the constructivist assumption 
that “it is in the nature of individuals and institutions to perceive even unprecedented events 
through categories that already exits” (Mintz 39).  
 Therefore, in order to appeal to the masses, Wiesel frames his memoir Night in a way 
that is likely to appeal to his potential audience. The foreword, written by his mentor, the 
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Catholic Nobel Laureate François Mauriac, mainstreams the book for a Christian mass 
audience. “The child who tells us his story here,” writes Mauriac,  
 is one of God’s chosen. From the time he began to think, he lived only for God, 
 studying the Talmud, eager to be initiated into the Kabbalah, wholly dedicated to the 
 Almighty. Have we ever considered the consequences of a less visible, less striking 
 abomination, yet the worst of all, for those of us who have faith: the death of God in  
 the soul of a child who suddenly faces absolute evil? (xix) 
Mauriac anticipates Wiesel’s personal tragedy (“the death of God in the soul of a child”) 
before Wiesel’s readers have come to learn about it themselves in Wiesel’s voice, Wiesel’s 
words and Wiesel’s memories. The foreword is suggestive of a certain lust to engage in 
someone else’s personal catastrophe on the side of the reader. Advertising the tragic “death of 
God in the soul of a child” to a mass audience as if it were a Hollywood movie, it turns Night 
into “Holokitsch.”  
Mauriac’s ultimate paragraph recounts a personal encounter with Wiesel and is 
concerned with religion again, diametrically opposing Mauriac’s own Christian faith to 
Wiesel’s and investing the author’s experience with Mauriac’s interpretation: 
 And I, who believe that God is love, what answer was there to give my young 
 interlocutor whose dark eyes still held the reflection of the angelic sadness that had 
 appeared one day on the face of a hanged child? [...] Did I speak to him of that other 
 Jew, this crucified brother who perhaps resembled him and whose cross conquered the 
 world? Did I explain to him that what had been a stumbling block for his faith had 
 become a cornerstone for mine? And that the connection between the cross and human 
 suffering remains, in my view, the key to the unfathomable mystery in which the faith  
 of his childhood was lost? (xxi) 
Describing the young Wiesel’s eyes as “still [holding] the reflection of the angelic sadness 
that had appeared one day on the face of a hanged child,” Mauriac alludes to the hanging of a 
pipel (young inmate who is granted privileges in exchange for maintaining a homosexual 
relationship with a Kapo) in Night (Wiesel 64 f). The pipel, described by Wiesel as a “sad-
eyed angel” (54), is hanged together with two men. While the men immediately die, the boy, 
who is too light to be strangled by the rope, remains alive for a long time:  
 And so he remained for more than half an hour, lingering between life and death, 
 writhing before our eyes. [...]  
  Behind me, I heard [a] man asking: 
  “For God’s sake, where is God?” 
  And from within me, I heard a voice answer: 
  “Where He is? This is where ― hanging from this gallows . . .” (Wiesel 65) 
Speaking of Wiesel’s eyes still “[holding] the reflection [...],” Wiesel connects the hanging of 
the pipel with an image evoked in the opening lines of the original Yiddish manuscript of 
Night, which were not included in the French and English editions that won Wiesel the Nobel 
Peace Prize:  
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 In the beginning there was faith ― which is childish; trust ― which is vain; and 
 illusion ― which is dangerous. 
  We believed in God, trusted in man, and lived with the illusion that every one 
 of us has been entrusted with a sacred spark from the Shekhinah’s flame; that every  
 one of us carries in his eyes and in his soul a reflection of God’s image. (Wiesel x f) 
Mauriac connects the three hanged inmates with the crucifixion of Jesus, which is said 
to also have taken place alongside two other men. For Mauriac, the pipel becomes an allegory 
for Jesus, and his “angelic sadness” makes him the epitome of innocent suffering. The 
reflection of God’s image has been replaced by a reflection of the pipel’s image. In Night, the 
moment Wiesel hears the voice within him answer that God is “hanging from this gallows” is 
the moment he loses his faith. Mauriac, however, draws another parallel to his own (Catholic) 
faith: “Did I explain to [Elie Wiesel] that what had been a stumbling block for his faith had 
become a cornerstone for mine?” (xxi). The cornerstone of Mauriac’s faith is the image of the 
crucified Jesus. Mauriac presumably believes that every Catholic carries “in his soul” a 
reflection of Jesus’ image ever since the death of “that other Jew, this crucified brother who 
perhaps resembled [Wiesel] and whose cross conquered the world” (xxi). The “stumbling 
block” of Wiesel’s faith – the hanged pipel – reminds him of this image. Again, three men are 
executed, one of whom looks like a “sad-eyed angel,” just like the Jesus of Mauriac’s 
imagination, and again, “the reflection of God’s image” is replaced by the reflection of an 
innocent sufferer. Reading striking parallels to Christian imagery into the scene, Mauriac 
makes it fit into the schematic grid the majority of the readership is likely to have.  
 The passage in Night that Mauriac refers to is a very powerful one. The pipel’s 
hanging shows the young Wiesel’s bitterness and frustration with God. From now on, he will 
not join in the other inmates’ prayers. Allegorical and straightforward at the same time, it is 
not a passage that needs to be explained to the reader. However, most importantly, it is a 
passage relating to a specific situation and its impact on a specific person: it describes a 
moment at Auschwitz, and how the young author-narrator experiences it. Night is not one of 
Wiesel’s novels that the anecdote I have used as an opening quote of part 3 refers to. It is not 
a book “about things that happened or could have happened” (qtd. in Weissman 67, my 
emphasis). It is, as Wiesel stresses, “his ‘deposition,’ the written testimony of a witness who 
is under oath” (qtd. in Weissman 67). In the scene describing the hanging of the pipel, Wiesel 
is not making an allegorical allusion to Jesus, he is simply bearing witness to what he saw.  
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However, as Mintz observes, “different interpretive communities18 will construe the 
[Holocaust] in different ways” “in order to reinforce different values” (174). Mauriac, 
assuming the role of a cross-cultural mediator between the Jewish writer and his 
predominantly Christian audience, renders Night accessible through a set of schemas familiar 
to the anticipated “interpretive community.” This inevitably causes a certain falsification of 
Wiesel’s original testimony, as has been anticipated by Wiesel: “Deep down, the witness 
knew [...] that his testimony would not be received. After all, it deals with an event that 
sprang from the darkest zone of man. Only those who experienced Auschwitz know what it 
was. Others will never know” (Wiesel ix). However, Wiesel chooses a distorted testimony 
over not being heard at all. As a constructivist, he assumes that the audience “can [...] 
comprehend historical events only from within the set of their own issues and interests” 
(Mintz 40). Wiesel accepts these terms, although he knows that they involve a distortion of 
his testimony. 
 Mauriac’s last paragraph goes one step further and imposes a conclusion on the 
hanging of the pipel that does not appear in Wiesel’s memoir at all. “We do not know the 
worth of one single drop of blood, one single tear”: Mauriac ponders what he should have told 
the young Wiesel, “All is grace. If the Almighty is the Almighty, the last word for each of us 
belongs to Him. That is what I should have said to the Jewish child. But all I could do was 
embrace him and weep” (Wiesel xxi).  
While the scene in Night goes hand in hand with the author-narrator’s loss of faith, it 
illustrates God’s mysterious ways for Mauriac and hence affirms Mauriac’s faith. Lost for 
words, however, “all [Mauriac] [can] do is embrace [the Jewish child] and weep.” Having 
insisted on the difference of their faith and on the different message the scene holds for them, 
Mauriac does not describe one human embracing another, it describes a Catholic adult 
embracing a Jewish child. Mauriac weeps for Wiesel’s lost faith, yet he himself believes to 
know what Wiesel does not know: “All is grace. If the Almighty is the Almighty, the last 
word for each of us belongs to Him.” Mauriac does not say this to Wiesel, but he says it to the 
Christian mass readership. His interpretation provides an “answer” that is potentially 
comforting in that it proposes a reading of Night consistent with the readership’s schemas.  
For the same reason, the interpretation detracts from the questions posed by the text 
itself. For instance, in the last but one chapter, the author-narrator witnesses his father die in 
the bunk below him. “I did not weep, and it pained me that I could not weep,” he writes, “But 
                                                 
18 Mintz borrows the term interpretive community from Stanley Fish (Is There a Text in This Class? The 
Authority of Interpretive Communities), who has developed it “as a way to mediate between subjectivism and the 
presumption of objective meaning” in literary theory (cf. Mintz 172, 200). 
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I was out of tears. And deep inside me [...], I might have found something like: Free at 
last! . . .” (112). If left to speak for themselves, scenes like this one are potentially disturbing 
and may rupture or broaden the readership’s schematic horizon. Contextualized with 
Mauriac’s approach, on the other hand, they may be dismissed as “God’s mysterious ways,” 
since we may rest assured that, as Mauriac has it, “[a]ll is grace” and “the last word for each 
of us belongs to Him.” Mauriac does to Wiesel’s book what Spiegelman was afraid would 
also happen to Maus: he “give[s] people an easy way to deal with the Holocaust” and “makes 
it possible for them to feel that they understand it” (“Saying Goodbye” 45).  
 Referring to Wiesel as “the Jewish child,” Mauriac further distorts the events. When 
Wiesel wrote Night, he was in his late twenties, hence he had long ceased to be a child. 
Making him appear younger than he is, Mauriac again betrays Wiesel’s “deposition [...] under 
oath” (qtd. in Weissman 67). This is just what Wiesel, “[knowing] [...] that his testimony 
would not be received” (Wiesel ix), has anticipated. Being reduced to “Holokitsch” that 
insists it is approachable and can be directly related to everyone’s life, just as Mauriac relates 
it to his life, appears to be the price paid for participating in the culture industry. Participating 
in the culture industry in turn appears to be the precondition of being allowed a voice as a 
witness. At the time Wiesel wrote Night, he did not necessarily approve of these terms, but 
saw no way of avoiding them and accepted them in order to live up to his “moral obligation to 
try and prevent the enemy from enjoying one last victory by allowing his crimes to be erased 
from human memory” (Wiesel viii).  
 However, along with his growing fame and influence, Wiesel came to eventually 
embrace the terms of his commercial success. Having been advertised as the one “emblematic 
survivor” and “a living icon of that catastrophe” (Young qtd. in Weissman 47), Wiesel 
gradually started regarding himself “as the Holocaust personified” (47). Once “his presence as 
a featured speaker at prominent national and international Holocaust ceremonies ha[d] come 
to seem mandatory” (Weissman 47), Wiesel used his appearances to promote his own politics 
of memory: “[u]niqueness of Jewish suffering/uniqueness of the Jews, ever-guilty 
Gentiles/ever innocent Jews, unconditional defense of Israel/unconditional defense of Jewish 
interests” (Finkelstein 55).  
The fact that “[h]is words are received as if the Holocaust has endowed this single 
survivor with hallowed wisdom and moral authority” (Weissman 47) makes an open and 
critical debate about the politics of memory and Holocaust literature difficult. As Finkelstein 
observes, Wiesel tends to fend off any criticism, no matter if legitimate or not, of Jews, 
Holocaust literature, and Israeli politics with the argument that it is uninformed or anti-
  
82 
 
Semitic. Critics disagreeing with him are regarded as “unworthy,” as Wiesel implies in an 
interview with Harry James Cargas: “Not anyone ― and not everyone ― has the right [...] to 
say, ‘I became a Holocaust scholar,’ or ‘Holocaust historian,’ or ‘Holocaust writer.’ It’s not 
given to everyone. You must be worthy of it. Unfortunately, these days, [...] all kinds of 
people have entered the field and they desecrate the Temple” (qtd. in Weissman 49).  
An approach like this is exactly what Mintz, who otherwise welcomes a free exchange 
of visions, arguments and positions concerning Holocaust memory, disapproves of: “let no 
group, not even survivors, claim that only they guard the sanctity of Holocaust memory and 
only their motives are free from taint. For if the purity of Holocaust memory is cordoned off 
and protected [...] and if it is not admixed with other values and aspirations, then it will wither 
to the point of becoming little more than a museum artifact” (Mintz 178).  
 On the one hand, successfully appealing to the broadest possible audience, Wiesel, 
like Spielberg, has doubtless contributed to the historical education of the masses. The 
ideological coloring of his appearances and the simplification of the historical context that is a 
precondition of the constructivist approach do not change this mass educational impact. On 
the other hand, implying that he holds the key to the sole “Holocaust truth,” and insisting that 
this truth result in a dogmatic code of conduct towards Jews, Israel and Holocaust literature 
(an implication Spielberg has never made), Wiesel is anything but an unproblematic mediator 
of the past. Furthermore, his commercial success has inspired a number of copycats to 
fabricate their own Holocaust memoirs.  
 
4.3 A History of Literary Fraud and “Holokitsch” 
  
 The tradition of professed autobiographies dates back far beyond the Holocaust. It is 
assumed, for example, that a number of Daniel Defoe’s fictional works were considered 
factual life stories by his contemporary (17th century) readership (Löschnigg 66). In 1863, the 
make-believe former slave Archy Moore published The Slave: or Memoir of Archy Moore, 
which was later exposed to be a work of fiction written by the white historian Richard 
Hildreth. In 1929, actress Joan Lowell wrote Cradle of the Deep, a sensationalist memoir 
about her childhood spent aboard a ship. It turned out that she had grown up in California and 
never lived at sea. In 1972, Clifford Irving sold a manuscript of the fake Autobiography of 
Howard Hughes, which Irving claimed was written on Hughes’ commission and based on 
interviews he conducted with the billionaire. More recent frauds not related to historical 
events include Sarah (2000), the “memoir” of the transgender teenage prostitute JT LeRoy. In 
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fact, the book was written by Laura Albert, who had not had any of the experiences JT LeRoy 
describes. 2003 saw the publication of A Million Little Pieces, the bestselling “memoir” of 
James Frey, who recalls his fabricated past as a drug addict (cf. Rich). 
 The first professed Holocaust autobiography shooting to fame was Jerzy Kosinski’s 
The Painted Bird, published in 1965, after Kosinski’s family had emigrated from Poland to 
the US. The book describes a six-year-old’s flight through rural Eastern Europe, where he 
encounters physical brutality, sexual violence, exploitation, anti-Semitism and witchcraft 
rituals. It contains scenes of shattering brutality and mainly focuses on the atrocities the 
narrator experiences from Polish peasants.  
Written in short, simple sentences from the perspective of an observer who can only 
describe what he encounters, but is too young and ignorant to relate it to its larger historical 
and social context, the story is as gripping as it is disturbing. The emotional distance and the 
lack of introspection, reflection and processing of the events appear to be the disturbed boy’s 
only way to deal with (or, rather, avoid dealing with) what he encounters and evoke the 
impression of authenticity. A representative example of Kosinski’s plot and style is the death 
of the outcast “Stupid Ludmila,” who has been beaten by the other village women: 
 To the accompaniment of raucous laughter and loud encouragements from the others, 
 [one of the women] kneeled between Ludmila’s legs and rammed the entire bottle 
 inside her abused, assaulted slit, while she began to moan and howl like a beast. The 
 other women looked on calmly. Suddenly with all her strength one of them kicked the 
 bottom of the bottle sticking out of Stupid Ludmila’s groin. There was the muffled 
 noise of glass shattering inside. Now all the women began to kick Ludmila; the blood 
 spurted round  their boots and calves. When the last woman had finished kicking,  
 Ludmila was dead. (Kosinski 48) 
The narrator witnesses the scene, yet there is no introspection at all. Only describing his 
physical reaction – “I sat, huddled and chilled, on the cemetery wall, not daring to move.” –, 
the narrator appears to be observing himself from the same “emotionally safe” distance with 
which he describes the surrounding events. 
 There are hardly any connecting passages between the chapters, since the narrator 
never knows exactly where he is, and sometimes does not seem to know how he got there. 
With seamless transitions from one brutal episode to the next, Kosinski evokes the impression 
of free association. The narrator seems to follow an urgent need to bear witness to his 
experiences as uncensored and fragmented as they come to mind. Rather than approaching the 
past through the adult “author-narrator’s” historical knowledge, the “autobiographer” 
Kosinski turns back time and once again slips into the mind of the desperate eight-year-old he 
claims to have been. The abundance of violence and lack of quiet scenes seem only natural; 
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the reader assumes the traumatized boy only remembers the experiences that frightened him 
most. 
 Soon after its publication, The Painted Bird became a bestseller and was taught in high 
school and college classes, it was critically acclaimed by Holocaust writers like Elie Wiesel 
and Ruth Klüger, translated into numerous languages, voted one of “the 100 best English-
language novels from 1923 to the present” by the Time magazine, and won the Prix du 
Meilleur Livre Etranger in France.  
 Although there were voices calling the book sensational and “a pornography of 
violence” (Finkelstein 55), its authenticity was not questioned. Since there had been no 
previous Holocaust fraud, the critics saw no reason to be weary of Nazi era autobiographies. 
Furthermore, why would a Jewish author who had survived the Holocaust want to invent 
experiences as traumatizing as the death of Ludmila? It simply did not seem likely.  
Only in 1982, seventeen years after the publication of Kosinski’s first novel, did The 
Village Voice publish an article claiming that The Painted Bird and Kosinski’s seven 
subsequent novels – if Kosinski had written them himself at all – had originally been written 
in Polish, without Kosinski acknowledging his English translator. It was also suggested that 
he might have plagiarized his works or paid a ghost-writer.  
Finally, when Poland lifted its ban on The Painted Bird twenty-three years after the 
publication and the book was translated into Polish, the Polish readership were outraged about 
their depiction in the novel. It turned out that Kosinski, who “had always insisted – at parties, 
in interviews, in writing – that he was the boy in The Painted Bird (which, he said, was not 
strictly a novel but ‘auto-fiction’)” (Routh), was not the narrator he claimed to be. Polish 
researchers found proof that Kosinski had never been tormented and exploited by peasants, 
but that he and his parents had been hidden and protected by Poles throughout the war. Routh 
writes: 
  [T]he Jewish Lewinkopf family, to escape the Nazis, moved from Lodz [...] and 
 changed their name to Kosinski, a common Polish one. They lived in the homes of 
 Poles and their true identity was concealed by Poles. They carried on their lives as 
 Catholics. Jerzy was baptized and received Holy Communion; he served as an altar 
 boy. The Lewinkopf/Kosinski family was in fearful hiding, but not in a potato cellar or  
 barn. They even employed a maid. 
The article in the Village Voice, although the scale and exact nature of Kosinski’s 
fraud remain disputed until today, put an end to Kosinski’s career as a writer. However, in 
1995, The Painted Bird became an inspiration for another writer, who faked an autobiography 
that was remarkably similar in style: Bruno Dössekker’s Fragments: Memories of a Wartime 
Childhood, published under the name Binjamin Wilkomirski.  
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Like The Painted Bird, Fragments is told from the perspective of a young boy unable 
to make sense of his experiences or relate them to their broader historical context. Like in 
Kosinski’s work, one disturbingly violent episode is followed by another. Like Kosinski, 
Dössekker-Wilkomirski claims to only remember “fragments” of his childhood, which is 
reflected in the lack of connecting passages between the individual episodes. Dössekker-
Wilkomirski’s style also resembles Kosinski’s in the use of short, simple sentences and the 
uninvolved prose of a boy resorting to emotional distance for psychological self-protection. 
Both works evoke the impression of the narrators’ urgent need to confront the past by means 
of bearing witness at last through free association.  
Although Fragments is set in the concentration camps of Auschwitz and Majdanek 
and The Painted Bird is set in rural Poland, the plots are strikingly parallel as well. Both 
books contain a disturbing scene of a body being devoured by rats (Kosinski 53, Dössekker-
Wilkomirski 81), both narrators are committed to an orphanage after the war and have trouble 
adjusting, and both narrators do not realize that their ordeal has ended until much later.  
As Finkelstein observes, Kosinski and Wilkomirski have even described their books 
similarly. “Kosinski represented The Painted Bird as ‘the slow unfreezing of the mind’; 
Wilkomirski represents Fragments as ‘recovered memory’” (Finkelstein 57). Comparing two 
strikingly similar passages taken from Wiesel’s The Jews of Silence (1966) and Fragments, 
Finkelstein shows that Dössekker-Wilkomirski borrows ideas not only from Kosinski, but 
also from Wiesel’s writings (cf. Finkelstein 57 f).  
 Like The Painted Bird, Dössekker-Wilkomirski’s “autobiography” was critically 
acclaimed by Holocaust scholars like Elie Wiesel and Ruth Klüger, won literary prices, and 
was translated into numerous languages and put on high school and college reading lists.  
 The latest Holocaust memoir exposed to be a fraud was Herman Rosenblat’s Angel at 
the Fence: The True Story of a Love that Survived. Rosenblat writes about his experiences as 
an inmate of the concentration camp of Buchenwald (he was detained at Buchenwald indeed, 
however, apart from this fact, Angel is pure romance fiction). In Angel at the Fence, 
Rosenblat claims that a Jewish girl living in hiding on a nearby farm regularly comes to see 
him and toss him apples over the fence. Years later, the story goes, the “author-narrator,” who 
has emigrated to the US after the war, meets the same girl on a blind date in New York. Upon 
discovering their shared past, they decide to get married. In fact, as Rosenblat later admitted, 
he never met an angel girl at Buchenwald. As scholars have pointed out, even if someone on 
the other side of the fence had attempted to help an inmate, the layout of the camp would have 
made it impossible to throw food over the fence without being spotted by the SS.  
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 As early as 1995, long before the publication of Angel, Rosenblat and his wife (who 
acted the role of the Angel girl) appeared on “The Oprah Winfrey Show,” where, after telling 
the same story, Rosenblat “got down on his knees to give his wife a new ring. Ms. Winfrey 
called it ‘the single greatest love story, in 22 years of doing this show, we’ve ever told on the 
air’” (Rich and Stelter). Subsequently, the Rosenblats’ love story was included in the Chicken 
Soup for the Soul anthology, and Laurie Friedman based her children’s book Angel Girl on it.  
Rosenblat’s “autobiography” was scheduled for publication in February 2009, but the 
manuscript of the implausible story was exposed to be a fraud by Jewish studies scholar 
Kenneth Waltzer, and the publication was cancelled. Producer Harris Salomon, on the other 
hand, having already secured the movie rights, is thinking of turning the fictionalized 
manuscript into a movie all the same. As the New York Times reports, Salomon holds that 
“whether the portion about Mr. and Mrs. Rosenblat’s meetings at the concentration camp was 
strictly true [is] almost irrelevant” (Rich and Stelter).  
Salomon’s take on the subject indicates that for those who see culture as a business 
and history as just another topic that lends itself to financial exploitation, it does not matter 
whether historical truths are fictionalized and trivialized in publications geared to a mass 
audience. But is it really “almost irrelevant” whether Rosenblat’s story is “strictly true”?  
In his essay about “Shoah romances” (a term that equals Spiegelman’s “Holokitsch”), 
Doron Rabinovici comments on the recent rise in fictionalized autobiographies and fiction 
centering around romantic love stories set against the “backdrop” of the concentration camps. 
“The further the past dates back, the greater the fear that the broad audience could regard it as 
[...] pale and dull,” Rabinovici concludes, and the more “the darkness of the atrocities is dyed 
and brightened with sentimentalities” (Rabinovici, “Shoah Romances,” my translation). 
Rabinovici believes this “tendency to kitschify the past” may indicate that engaging in the 
past is still experienced as disturbing (hence the attempt to trivialize the atrocities). In the case 
of Rosenblat, this may indeed be the case, if Rosenblat was honest in his statement issued 
upon discovery of the fraud: “I wanted to bring happiness to people, to remind them not to 
hate, but to love and tolerate all people,” the New York Times quotes him, “[...] My motivation 
was to make good in this world. In my dreams, Roma [his wife] will always throw me an 
apple [...]” (Rich and Berger). 
 However, I believe Rabinovici’s explanation for the growing body of “Shoah 
romances” is more likely: “The calculations of the publishers may be even more cynical. Does 
the Shoah merely serve as the depressingly dramatic backdrop [dramatisch düstere 
Todeskulisse] for a love that outshines everything? Is it all about selling palatable romances?” 
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(“Shoah Romances” 4; my translation). It probably is about “selling palatable romances” with 
a dramatic twist indeed, simply because stories like Angel at the Fence are bound to be a 
commercial success. When I asked Rabinovici what he thought about the cancelled 
publication of Rosenblat’s book, he said in his opinion, “Rosenblat’s story would be no less 
of a fraud if it were true,” for couples’ reunions after Auschwitz were mere accidents. Not 
only did they rarely happen, but in view of the death of six million people, they become 
utterly meaningless. Therefore, romances like Angel at the Fence neither tell us anything 
significant about the past nor anything relevant for the present. “It’s not necessary to go to 
Florence”, Rabinovici added cryptically, “and repaint Michael Angelo.” The point to be taken 
is that the historical events are neither in need of fictionalization nor of an accentuation of 
unlikely details. They do speak for themselves. “Shoah romances”/“Holokitsch” works 
trivialize history. To foreground elements of humanity and hope is to rewrite a (hi)story of 
violence and hopelessness into one of hope and humanity surviving against all odds. Authors 
like Rosenblat are reading a “heartwarming” message into a historical event that was anything 
but heartwarming.  
 The problem posed by “Shoah romances”/“Holokitsch” works goes beyond a simple 
misrepresentation and trivialization of history. As they are reproduced and written about, and 
new works continue to be based on them due to their popularity – Angel at the Fence, which 
has already appeared as a short story in the Chicken Soup for the Soul anthology and as the 
children’s book Angel Girl, and may soon become a movie, is a good example –, their 
message of hope and love potentially turns into a self-perpetuating motif. As Bathrick 
observes, “recycled fictions and documentary illustrations of prior visual representations 
continue to circulate as powerful signifiers that are a part of the collective unconscious 
archive by which societies have come to know and even remember the Holocaust” (51).  
Western societies today tend to subscribe to an individualist philosophy. They hold 
that economic and personal success (and the lack of them respectively) are the individual’s 
responsibility, rather than thinking in terms of economic, material and social determinism. 
Together with the victim-as-hero concept, Western individualism conditions a mass audience 
to embrace “Shoah romances”/“Holokitsch” rather than less fictionalized representations of 
the Holocaust. “Shoah romances” perpetuate the message that an individual may heroically 
survive and succeed, “rise in the world” and find personal happiness even under the most 
unlikely circumstances. Suggesting that good will win over evil, the Angel at the Fence story 
is, similar to Schindler’s List, comforting rather than thought-provoking, for it reassures the 
mass audience of what it wants to believe in.  
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A less fictionalized representation of the Holocaust, that is, a representation that (1) 
refuses to make sense of the past or read a “message” into it and (2) “work[s] against the 
fetishization of representation and its claim for authenticity” (Bathrick 51) is less palatable 
and potentially discomforting, but certainly thought-provoking. In the light of the values 
dominating Western societies today, these attributes make such a work less likely to become 
“a part of the collective unconscious archive by which societies have come to know and even 
remember the Holocaust” (Bathrick 51) than a “Shoah romance.” While the audience of 
“Shoah romances” still know about the historical atrocities, the first image to surface from the 
“collective unconscious achieve” may eventually become the heartwarming scene of a girl 
throwing an apple over a fence.  
 However, while “Shoah romances” potentially inscribe self-perpetuating motifs in the 
“collective unconscious archive,” the reception of The Painted Bird and Fragments suggests 
that Holocaust frauds are likely to become powerful signifiers on yet another level of 
Holocaust discourse.  
 
4.4 The Reception of Holocaust Fraud 
 
 The Painted Bird and Fragments are not the earliest fictional stories being passed off 
for truth, and Angel at the Fence will probably not be the last one. Yet the reactions to their 
exposure have drawn attention to the problematic nature of Holocaust memoirs and have 
caused a greater stir than Defoe’s fictional autobiographies or James Frey’s make-believe 
memoir A Million Little Pieces. One could argue that it does not make much of a difference 
whether Defoe’s novels were read as biographical or fictional works by his contemporary 
audience, and that media interest in the “scandals” caused by the likes of Laura Albert and 
James Frey wore off fast.  
Since the Holocaust is not only a sensitive subject but also, as Novick has observed, “a 
moral and ideological Rorschach test,” Holocaust frauds tend to cause greater unrest. Ruth 
Klüger, who in her observations about the fraud does not reveal her own opinion but merely 
concludes that “kitsch is always possible,” sums up the different responses triggered by 
Ganzfried’s exposure of Fragments: 
 And now minds part way; there are those who think that the disclosure should best not 
 have happened because it abets the Auschwitz lie19 [...]; those who [...] think that the 
 memory of the Holocaust must not be contaminated by fraud; those who are 
 simply outraged at having been lied to; those who are ashamed of not having 
                                                 
19 I.e., the lies spread by Holocaust deniers like David Irving and Robert Faurisson.  
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 condemned earlier what they now perceive to be kitsch; and those who think that the 
 text, if it was good as an autobiography, should also be good as fiction, that is, those 
 who insist on the literary merits of the book [...] independent of the genre [it] purports 
 to be” (Klüger qtd. in Ganzfried 225; my translation and footnote).  
The number of Holocaust scholars and literary critics “insist[ing] on the literary merits 
of the book [...] independent of the genre [it] purports to be,” and believing that “the text, if it 
was good as an autobiography, should also be good as fiction,” as Klüger has it, is 
surprisingly high. Both Elie Wiesel and Deborah Lipstadt continued praising Fragments after 
its exposure, and Lipstadt, who is a professor of Jewish and Holocaust Studies at Emory 
University, kept it on her syllabi. Publisher Arthur Samuelson described Fragments as “a 
pretty cool book” which is “only a fraud if you call it non-fiction. I would then reissue it, in 
the fiction category. Maybe it’s not true – then [Wilkomirski]’s a better writer!” (qtd. in 
Finkelstein 60). For Israel Gutman, the director of Jerusalem’s Holocaust museum Yad 
Vashem, it is “not that important” whether Dössekker-Wilkomirski physically had the 
experiences he recounts in Fragments: “Wilkomirski has written a story which he has 
experienced deeply; that’s for sure. . . . He is not a fake. He is someone who lives this story 
very deeply in his soul. The pain is authentic” (qtd. in Finkelstein 61).  
 Why was it that Holocaust scholars and critics continued praising a literary fraud? 
Samuelson, as a publisher, may have realized that the story would sell well, no matter whether 
it was fact or fiction: due to its simple sentences, the child’s perspective and the 
straightforward plot, it is easily accessible to a broad audience. Drawing a clear line between 
good and evil, containing violent passages and being adorned with a happy ending for the 
victim-hero, it caters to the taste of the masses. Why Holocaust scholars like Lipstadt and 
Gutman, and survivors like Wiesel kept praising the book is harder to understand. Did they 
not want to discredit the positive reviews they themselves had issued while the book was still 
believed to be autobiographical? Were they afraid that their own critical opinion would 
provide new grist to the revisionist mill? Did they simply believe that the “message” of The 
Painted Bird and Fragments should reach as broad an audience as possible, no matter whether 
it was embedded in fictional or factual stories?  
Whatever is the case, I believe that every literary genre as well as every field of 
scholarly discourse can tolerate, if not profit from, legitimate criticism. Facing open debate 
and publicly dissociating themselves from hoaxes, the genre of Holocaust literature, and 
Holocaust studies as a whole, will gain a credibility they lack as long as hoaxers are defended 
with flimsy arguments. The scholarly reactions to Angel at the Fence indicate that a paradigm 
shift towards a more open and outspoken academic response may already be in the process of 
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taking place. Deborah Lipstadt, who a decade earlier continued defending Fragments after its 
exposure, has questioned the veracity of Angel the same time as Waltzer did, and has publicly 
criticized the book for “insult[ing] [...] the survivors,” “giv[ing] ammunition to Holocaust 
deniers,” and being “inimical to the pursuit of historical truth” (cf. Lipstadt, “Holocaust love 
story”). Although a conclusive empirical evaluation of this trend will be possible after another 
decade at the earliest, the academic approach to fraudsters appears to gradually be developing 
into the critical and open debate desirable for all scholarly discourse.  
 A different group of critics of the Dössekker-Wilkomirski affair concluded that 
Fragments proves the textual indistinguishability of fictional and historical narration. Günter 
Jacob, for example, holds that Dössekker-Wilkomirski has made the difference of fiction and 
testimonial literature (Zeugnisliteratur) “invisible to his audience” (qtd. in Küntzel; my 
translation).  
This approach, while aiming to re-establish the innocence of the readership misled by 
the fabricated autobiography, does not reach new conclusions. Fragments and The Painted 
Bird do indeed illustrate that a well-forged autobiography is textually indistinguishably from a 
factual one, and, being supported by the alleged testimonial status of the text and a trusting 
readership, may be mistaken for history. However, this finding is not as new as Jacob passes it 
off for in 1998. Logico-linguistic narratologists analyzed the difference of fact and fiction 
earlier, and have discovered factual and fictional tendencies rather than unambiguous 
indicators. Similarly, postmodernist philosophers pointed out the textual indistinguishability 
of a skilful fraud and a factual text as early as in the 1970s.  
While dwelling on this indistinguishability when criticizing Holocaust fraud is a mere 
revival of an old discussion, it also dismisses a crucial point. As Matthias Küntzel remarks, 
what is at stake in the Fragments debate is not the suggestive power of literature but the 
veracity of the author. In an interview Dössekker-Wilkomirski gave after his exposure, he said 
that it had always been up to the audience to read his book as “literature” (i.e., fiction) or as “a 
personal document” (qtd. in Küntzel). Küntzel points out that Dössekker’s statement spreads 
“the cynically relaxed position of the modern revisionists who have learned the lesson of 
postmodern epistemology” (Lau qtd. in Küntzel). Both literary criticism and narrative theory 
have extensively engaged in the problem of (un)reliability of the narrator, but largely ignored 
the (un)reliability of the author. An unreliable author is an author falsely claiming to adhere 
to the laws of (non-pretense) illocutionary speech acts, that is, an author passing his fictional 
narration off as a factual one.  
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Since biographical veracity is not a question of narrative strategies but of historical 
verifiability, the reliability or unreliability of an autobiographer is not opaque. As Polish 
researchers have shown for The Painted Bird, Ganzfried and Mächler have shown for 
Fragments and Waltzer has shown for Angle at the Fence, it can be verified or falsified 
straightforwardly. These three examples do not only show that literary fraud has flourished 
for a long time and is likely to continue its popularity. They also illustrate a gradually 
increasing “fraud awareness” on the part of publishers, journalists and Holocaust scholars. 
While The Painted Bird was only recognized as a fraud seventeen years after its publication, 
Fragments was exposed three years after its publication, and Angel at the Fence even before it 
appeared in print. It can be concluded that, while the culture industry has certainly furthered 
the production of literary fraud, this development has not been ignored by scholars and 
journalists. It is much harder to publish a literary fraud today than it was fifty years ago, 
because fact-checking has become a matter of course when it comes to unlikely stories. While 
this does not unwrite the fraud already published and cannot prevent the publication and film 
adaptation of “Shoah romances” like Angel under the label of fiction, it does effectively 
prevent untruths to be passed off as historically verifiable facts.   
 “Fraud awareness” is certainly a step in the right direction when it comes to a 
responsible handling of historical memory. However, it should be noted that fact-checking 
and an open debate will have little, if any, influence on a different after-effect of the 
institutionalization of memory: the deliberate re-interpretation and misrepresentation of 
cultural artifacts and their critical reception in the service of an ideological agenda.  
 
4.5 Norman Finkelstein and “‘The’ Holocaust Industry” 
 
 As opposed to Wiesel’s constructivist position, Norman Finkelstein positions himself 
on the “exceptionalist” extreme of Mintz’ heuristic scale of Holocaust representation. As an 
“exceptionalist,” Finkelstein holds that “[w]hen it comes to cultural refractions of the 
Holocaust [...], the norm is [...] vulgarization, especially in works of popular culture. Most 
disturbing and most prevalent [...] is the way the Holocaust is traduced by being appropriated 
to serve purposes ― national interests, universalist ethics, personal identity ― that are not 
only unrelated to the Holocaust but often antithetical to its memory” (Mintz 39). Finkelstein 
only credits a slim body of early historical (Raul Hilberg’s The Destruction of the European 
Jews) and artistic (Stanley Kramer’s movie Judgment at Nuremberg) works with having 
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accurately represented the past, and holds that new representations tend to be corrupted by the 
culture industry, and improperly appropriate the Holocaust for ulterior motives.  
 Holocaust fraud is one of Finkelstein’s main points in his case against “‘The’ 
Holocaust industry.” In the course of his argument, Finkelstein illustrates Bathrick’s thesis 
that “recycled fictions [...] continue to circulate as powerful signifiers” (51) long after their 
initial publication, and that these signifiers may come to mean something bearing little 
resemblance to the original signifieds.  
Finkelstein is not a disinterested scholar, but has a strong ideological agenda, which 
brings him to do what Hayden White criticizes historians for. Relying mainly on the factual 
observations Novick makes in The Holocaust in American Life, Finkelstein re-arranges 
Novick’s findings “into a hierarchy of significance by assigning events different functions as 
story elements in such a way as to disclose the formal coherence of a whole set of events 
considered as a comprehensible process with a discernible beginning, middle, and end” 
(White, Metahistory 7). Novick does not try to answer the question of how the Holocaust 
should be remembered and represented, but merely illustrates the complex processes that have 
turned it into the important cultural signifier it is today. He concludes that “[i]n the future, as 
in the past, changing circumstances will influence the choices we make about remembering 
the Holocaust. But while circumstances will influence our choices, we ourselves are 
ultimately responsible for those choices – with all their consequences, intended or 
unintended” (Novick 281). Finkelstein, on the other hand, does have a definite answer to the 
question of how the Holocaust should be represented: if possible, it should not be represented 
at all. He quotes Novick’s sociological observations, but deduces his own conclusions and 
presents them as self-evident. As a result, The Holocaust Industry and The Holocaust in 
American Life are two strikingly different books about the same topic. Although Novick’s and 
Finkelstein’s conclusions differ, the historical facts they rely on are the same. It is their 
distinct intentions rather than their distinct source material that results in their diverging 
conclusions.  
 The polemic agenda Finkelstein adds to Novick’s facts, although it is skillfully 
interwoven with historical evidence, cannot be upheld upon a close reading. Many of 
Finkelstein’s conclusions can be identified as unsupported opinions rather than self-evident 
results. Therefore, Finkelstein’s mixing of facts and imagination does not prove Ankersmit 
right, who says that “the evidence available to historians [permits] them to write many more 
true statements about the past than we actually find in their texts” (“Reply” 277, my 
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emphasis). While Novick’s book bears up under academic scrutiny, Finkelstein’s work is 
neither objective nor disinterested, but highly subjective.  
Finkelstein’s agenda becomes clear from the introductory paragraph of The Holocaust 
Industry: 
 In the pages that follow, I will argue that ‘The Holocaust’ is an ideological 
 representation of the Nazi holocaust20. Like most ideologies, it bears a connection, if 
 tenuous, with reality. [...] Its central dogmas sustain significant political and class 
 interests. Indeed, The Holocaust has proven to be an indispensable ideological weapon. 
 Through its deployment, one of the world’s most formidable military powers, with a 
 horrendous human rights record, has cast itself a “victim” state, and the most 
 successful ethnic group in the United States has likewise acquired victim status.  
 (Finkelstein 3) 
The paragraph shows how Finkelstein invests factual observations with subjective opinion not 
only in his interpretations of the facts, but also on the semiotic level. In his first sentence, 
Finkelstein introduces the different signifieds of “‘The’ Holocaust” (capital T and H) and “the 
Nazi holocaust” (lower case). The choice of upper and lower case already is a semiotic sign of 
Finkelstein’s ideological bias that may, albeit on an unconscious level, tempt his readers to 
subscribe to this bias as well. Why does Finkelstein choose to capitalize the term for the 
“ideological representation of the holocaust” rather than the one for the historical Holocaust? 
The Oxford English Dictionary suggests the opposite procedure: in contrast to the general 
meaning of the noun “holocaust” − “[a] sacrifice wholly consumed by fire; a whole burnt 
offering” −, the entry for “the mass murder of the Jews by the Nazis in the war of 1939–
1945” reads “the Holocaust” (capital H). By means of capitalizing the term for “The 
Holocaust,” Finkelstein attacks the attention received by ideologies based on “the Nazi 
holocaust”.  
 Finkelstein’s ideological disposition is spelt out in the second sentence, suggesting that 
[ideological] representations of the Holocaust have little to do with historical events. It is 
implied that they systematically distort “truth” rather than document the past. The last 
sentence seamlessly ties “‘The’ Holocaust industry” to Israeli politics. Finkelstein’s anti-
Zionist disposition becomes clear without him ever using the words “Israel,” “Zionism” and 
“Jewish”. Omitting direct reference, he creates the feeling of a formidable military power 
indeed: if we immediately know what he is talking about although he does not directly refer to 
it, the impression arises that Israel must in fact be quite a threat. Putting the “victim” in 
“‘victim’ state” in inverted commas, Finkelstein ironically suggests the absurdity of “one of 
the world’s most formidable military powers, with a horrendous human rights record” getting 
                                                 
20 Finkelstein uses the capitalized term “The Holocaust” to refer to the “ideological representation” of the 
historical, or, as he calls it, the “Nazi holocaust.” 
  
94 
 
away as a victim state, a notion of absurdity that subsequently is extended to “the most 
successful ethnic group in the United States.” 
 Finkelstein does not say anything that is historically untrue: Israel is “one of the most 
formidable military powers,” and today, Jews are probably “the most successful ethnic group 
in the United States” (Finkelstein points out that “per capita Jewish income is almost double 
that of non-Jews; sixteen of the forty wealthiest Americans are Jews; 40 percent of American 
Nobel Prize winners in science and economics are Jewish, as are 20 percent of professors at 
major universities; and 40 percent of leading law firms in New York and Washington” [32]). 
As Novick explains, the “ideological representation of the Nazi holocaust” does in fact sustain 
certain “political and class interests.”  
However, Novick argues that the choices people make when it comes to collective 
memory tend to be unconscious and frequently arbitrary. Hence, representations of the 
Holocaust and their implications tend to be related to personal concern with Jewish history 
and identity rather than class interest or calculations. Novick does not reproach society for the 
way the Holocaust is remembered, but wants to make his readership realize that when it 
comes to “the memory [...] of terrible events of human history whose scars do the work of the 
wound, the role of that wound in group consciousness has to be carefully considered” (281). 
Finkelstein, on the other hand, concludes that the way the Holocaust is represented is always 
the result of “political and class interests,” and that the Holocaust is consciously used as an 
“ideological weapon.” In order to prove his point, Finkelstein skillfully blends facts and 
polemics, invests his source texts with new meaning, leaves out the facts that detract from his 
argument, and stresses those that support it.  
 Finkelstein is an anti-Zionist and a harsh critic of Israeli politics and American-Israeli 
foreign relations, which are perfectly legitimate opinions. However, blending facts and 
interpretation, he passes opinion off as fact.  
This practice makes The Holocaust Industry a textbook example of a postmodern 
history book as White, Ankersmit and Jenkins would define it. Finkelstein’s preconceived 
opinion determines the “form” (White) his investigation and argumentation take rather than 
the other way around. Out of the pool of facts, Finkelstein chooses only those that strengthen 
his point, and he connects them with his own ideology in order to create “a whole of a 
particular [...] kind” (White, Metahistory 7).  
Furthermore, throughout the book, Finkelstein’s references are not to the historical 
Holocaust, but rather to texts that have previously been written about it: among others, 
Novick’s The Holocaust in American Life, historical works by Raul Hilberg, Hannah Arendt, 
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Daniel Goldhagen and Benny Morris, political works published by Noam Chomsky and 
Finkelstein himself, and literary works like Kosinski’s The Painted Bird as well as various 
books by Elie Wiesel. For example, Finkelstein points out that his “initial stimulus for 
[writing] this book” was not his interest in the historical event itself, but “Peter Novick’s 
seminal study, The Holocaust in American Life” (4). Finkelstein himself is the son of 
survivors, but he stresses that he “[does] not remember the Nazi holocaust ever intruding on 
[his] childhood.” Instead, his “earliest memory [...] of the Nazi holocaust is [his] mother glued 
in front of the television watching the trial of Adolf Eichmann” (5; my emphasis), and his 
“reading [... of] John Heresey’s The Wall and Leon Uris’ Mila 18, both fictionalized accounts 
of the Warshow Ghetto” (6; my emphasis).  
 It is, of course, perfectly legitimate for an author to investigate the representation of 
historical events in secondary literature. Claiming otherwise would be to dismiss an entire 
field of sociological and literary research, including my own approach to the topic. Novick 
and Mintz shed light on the politics of meaning-making and collective memory precisely 
because they view the historical events against a backdrop of historiographical, literary and 
cinematic representations.  
However, Finkelstein’s version of a secondary-literature based investigation poses a 
number of problems. His research is imbued with ideological biases, leading him to 
strategically avoid references to the historical Holocaust and misinterpret the secondary 
literature his arguments are based on. 
In The Holocaust Industry, what Ankersmit observes for postmodern texts is taken to 
an extreme: direct references to the past are substituted by references to texts about the past, 
and the Holocaust is effectively “replaced” by its representations.  
This narrative strategy creates the emotional distance essential to Finkelstein’s 
argument that the historical Holocaust is ideologically over-represented and that “American 
Jewry ‘discovering’ the Nazi holocaust was worse than its having been forgotten” (6). Never 
referring to the atrocities as such, Finkelstein diminishes the significance of the historical 
event. The reference to his parents’ past seems to legitimize his doing so. While The 
Holocaust Industry is characterized by a lack of direct references to the historical Holocaust, 
there are numerous direct references to Israeli politics, to the way Finkelstein believes 
American and Israeli Jews collectively profit from the (“ideological representation” of “The”) 
Holocaust, to the corruption of America’s foreign politics, and to the way Finkelstein believes 
Jewish claims for compensation money have wronged Germany and Switzerland. For 
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example, Finkelstein juxtaposes his defense of post-World War II Germany with his 
indictment of the US:  
 With little if any external pressure, [Germany] has paid out to date some $60 billion 
 [of compensation for Jewish victims]. 
 Compare the first American record. Some 4–5 million men, women and children died 
 as a result of the US wars in Indochina. After the American withdrawal, a historian 
 recalls, Vietnam desperately needed aid. “[...] [T]here were an estimated 200,000 
 prostitutes, 879,000 orphans, 181,000 disabled people, and 1 million widows; all six of 
 the industrial cities in the North had been badly damaged, as were provincial and 
 district towns, and 4,000 out of 5,800 agricultural communes.” Refusing, however, to 
 pay any reparations, President Carter explained that “the destruction was mutual.” 
 [President Clinton’s defense secretary, William Cohen,] declar[ed] that he saw “no  
 need for any apologies, certainly, for the war itself.”  (84) 
Unlike the Holocaust, whose historical atrocities Finkelstein never refers to or 
describes in terms of numbers, the damage caused by the Vietnam War is documented in 
detail and presented as an urgent concern to both writer and reader. When Finkelstein talks 
about the Nazi Holocaust, he evokes the impression of disproportionate claims of victimhood 
made by Jews trying to enrich themselves. Nevertheless, as Finkelstein stresses, “[t]he 
German government sought to compensate Jewish victims with three different agreements 
signed in 1952” (84) and “negotiated at the same time a financial settlement with the 
Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany” (85). The numbers illustrating the 
Vietnam War, on the other hand, are presented as indisputable facts that have been ignored by 
the corrupt Carter administration.  
The factual information Finkelstein gives on the Vietnam War is certainly correct, but 
I do not agree with the implied conclusion. Finkelstein undermines what he himself says in 
the beginning of his book: “To make out moral distinctions between ‘our’ [Jewish] suffering 
and ‘theirs’ is itself a moral travesty. ‘You can’t compare any two miserable people,’ Plato 
humanely observed, ‘and say that one is happier than the other’” (8). Finkelstein compares the 
lack of Vietnam War compensations to the supposed abundance of German compensations in 
order to accuse Jewish help organizations and individuals of corruption: “Many Jews 
fabricated their pasts to meet this [compensation] eligibility requirement” (82). Trying to 
“measure” suffering in terms of money is in itself a hopeless endeavor, and Plato is certainly 
right. Human suffering can only be accurately expressed in an allegorical sense. Similarly, 
guilt can only be “paid off” allegorically because guilt cannot be undone. Therefore, 
compensation moneys are nothing but a helpless attempt to allegorically compensate victims 
for what they have endured. Arguing that Holocaust victims have received more 
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compensation than they “deserve” is like claiming that Fühmann’s allegory21 is “wrong” 
because grief is only half as heavy as the sand of the sea. Rather than deducing from the 
juxtaposition of the lack of Vietnam War compensations and the professed abundance of 
Germany’s compensations that Holocaust victims have received more than enough money and 
attention, as Finkelstein argues, I suggest deducing that the victims of the Vietnam War have 
not received the allegorical money and attention they are entitled to.  
 An example of Finkelstein’s interweaving of factual information and subjective 
opinion is his definition of “‘The’ Holocaust industry,” and his circular arguments “explaining 
what [it is] by representing [it]” (White, Metahistory 2). Finkelstein quotes statistics 
illustrating that Jews are “the most successful ethnic group in the United States” (3, 32) and 
Novick’s observations of how the Holocaust has become an important cultural signifier, both 
of which are indisputable, but independent facts. Then he links them together by attributing 
Jewish success to nothing but “‘The’ Holocaust industry”: According to Finkelstein, 
“[i]nvoking The Holocaust [is] [...] a ploy to delegitimize all criticism of Jews” (37), and 
“Israel [can] act with impunity because ‘we have the Anti-Defamation League . . . and Yad 
Vashem and the Holocaust Museum’” (Chomsky qtd. in Finkelstein 78). 
 For Finkelstein, “The” Holocaust as an “indispensable ideological weapon” and the 
perpetuation of Jewish victimhood are personified by Elie Wiesel: “Wiesel’s prominence is a 
function of his ideological utility. Uniqueness of Jewish suffering/uniqueness of the Jews, 
ever-guilty Gentiles/ever innocent Jews, unconditional defense of Israel/unconditional defense 
of Jewish interests: Elie Wiesel is The Holocaust” (55). In his public appearances, Wiesel has 
frequently stressed what Finkelstein criticizes about “‘The’ Holocaust industry”:  
“(1) [that] The Holocaust marks a categorically unique historical event;  
(2) [that] The Holocaust marks the climax of an irrational, eternal Gentile hatred of  
Jews” (42).  
Finkelstein observes that Wiesel has lectured that “the Holocaust ‘leads into darkness,’ 
‘negates all answers,’ ‘lies outside, if not beyond, history,’ ‘defies both knowledge and 
description,’ ‘cannot be explained nor visualized’ [...], ‘marks a destruction of history’ and a 
‘mutation on a cosmic scale’” (45). Wiesel is also known to have reproached individuals and 
the media for referring to other events as a “holocaust,” as he did when “the parody of a New 
York tabloid was headlined: ‘Michael Jackson, 60 Million Others, Die in Nuclear Holocaust’” 
(Finkelstein 45) and when Shimon Peres called Auschwitz and Hiroshima “‘the two 
holocausts’ of the twentieth century” (Finkelstein 46). Finkelstein reproaches Wiesel for his 
                                                 
21 “Oh that my grief were thoroughly weighed, and my calamity laid in the balances together! For now it would 
be heavier than the sand of the sea“ (Job 6:2–3, King James); cf. Fühmann 193. 
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dogma of “Holocaust uniqueness,” and for the material wealth he has gained by means of 
promoting this dogma “for his standard fee of $25,000 (plus chauffeured limousine)” (45).  
That is not to say that Finkelstein attributes the growing concern with Holocaust 
memory starting in the 1970s to Wiesel alone. He agrees with Novick that changes in the 
political landscape and changing parameters of identity construction have manifested 
themselves in an increased awareness of the Jewish past. However, Finkelstein does make 
Wiesel his scapegoat for introducing “The” Holocaust to the culture industry and “corrupting” 
its memory by insisting on its uniqueness and categorical irrationality, and thereby turning it 
into a popular literary and cinematographic motif, a topic of exhibitions and academic 
conferences, and an “ideological weapon” to promote Jewish and Israeli interests. He 
reproaches Wiesel for having interfered with the “natural” fluctuation of interest in historical 
events until “The” Holocaust had become a “powerful signifier in the collective unconscious 
archive,” and its representation was “not about justice, [... but] a fight for money” and power 
(Hertzberg qtd. in Finkelstein 87). 
 As I have argued in chapter 4.2, I agree that Wiesel’s claims and public appearances 
entail a number of problems. As a constructivist (cf. Mintz 4) with a political, ideological and 
mass-educational agenda, Wiesel has used his status as the “single survivor with hallowed 
wisdom and moral authority” (Weissman 47) to lobby for his own political disposition. 
However, Finkelstein’s claim that Wiesel alone is responsible for the commercialization of 
the Holocaust seems a rather bold, if not to say absurd, hypothesis. While Elie Wiesel has 
doubtlessly shaped Holocaust interpretation to a significant extent, Finkelstein credits him 
with and implicates him for more influence than he is likely to have.  
Finkelstein rightly states the obvious − since the culture industry discovered the 
Holocaust, its representations have also (but by no means exclusively [cf. Finkelstein 87]) 
been about money. However, Finkelstein’s allusion to Wiesel’s “standard fee of $25,000” (45) 
and the underlying implication that Wiesel is solely concerned with the “fight for money,” but 
not with “justice” (87), seems hardly fair. 
 For Finkelstein, this “fight for money” and power encompasses everything from 
Jewish-American academic and business success, and representations of the Holocaust in 
popular culture, to the “extortion racket” (Finkelstein 89) claiming compensation money from 
European countries, and positive American-Israeli political relations.  
Criticizing Wiesel’s books and public appearances, and analyzing literary fraud, 
Finkelstein condemns “the cultural milieu that nurtures this Holocaust literature” and the 
Jewish organizations and individuals he believes are maintaining this milieu (Finkelstein 55). 
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His premise is that “much of the literature on Hitler’s Final Solution is worthless as 
scholarship,” and that “the field of Holocaust studies is replete with nonsense, if not sheer 
fraud” (55).  
Finkelstein conducts a close reading of The Painted Bird and Fragments, both of 
which were published after Wiesel’s Night. He reviews their reception and focuses on critics 
like Arthur Samuelson, Carol Brown Janeway, and Israel Gutman – those critics who “think 
that the text, if it was good as an autobiography, should also be good as fiction” and “insist on 
the literary merits of the book, which they regard to be independent from the genre the book 
purports to be” (Klüger qtd. in Ganzfried 225). Rather than giving an overview over the 
different reactions, Finkelstein evokes the impression that with the exception of few 
“knowledgeable historians like Raul Hilberg” (60), Jewish academics, historians and 
pressmen have as a rule defended Holocaust frauds against their better judgment in order to 
further Jewish interests. “True”, Finkelstein writes, “Wilkomirski fabricated his Holocaust 
past, but the larger truth is that the Holocaust industry, built on a fraudulent misappropriation 
of history for ideological purposes, was primed to celebrate the Wilkomirski fabrication. He 
was a Holocaust ‘survivor’ waiting to be discovered” (61).  
 Interestingly, Finkelstein also quotes one critical reaction to the Wilkomirski scandal 
and the culture industry, a reportage Philip Gourevitch wrote for The New Yorker. Rather than 
admitting that Gourevitch shares his own critical stance to a certain degree, Finkelstein uses 
the reportage as evidence for the perpetuation of the second characteristic trait he attributes to 
“‘The’ Holocaust industry”: within “‘the’ Holocaust industry,” the Holocaust is represented as 
“the climax of an irrational, eternal Gentile hatred of Jews” (42) (a politics of representation 
Finkelstein disagrees with). Even though Gourevitch’s article is highly critical, Finkelstein 
deduces from it that the author and The New Yorker are part of “‘The’ Holocaust industry” 
themselves: “The New Yorker titled its exposé of the Wilkomirski fraud “Stealing the 
Holocaust22.” Yesterday Wilkomirski was feted for his tales of Gentile evil; today he is 
chastised as yet another evil Gentile. It’s always the Gentile’s fault” (Finkelstein 61).  
Finkelstein ignores the main points made by Gourevitch, but reads an indictment of 
“Gentile evilness” into the text. In the article itself, Gourevitch first documents Dössekker-
Wilkomirski’s life and the exposure of Fragments, and then concludes that the book has a 
“carefully engineered structure” (Gourevitch 54) constructed to evoke the impression of 
authenticity, that Dössekker-Wilkomirski’s “groping recitations of his memories” are tailored 
to an audience that knows “how a ‘rememberer’ looks in a movie” (61), that Fragments 
                                                 
22 Finkelstein misquotes the title of Philip Gourevitch’s article in The New Yorker (June 14,1999). The original 
title is “The Memory Thief.” 
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contains scenes that are “almost too silly to be called kitsch” (68) and that “[i]f one bothers to 
read, rather than to ‘experience,’ Wilkomirski’s book, it is difficult to understand how it was 
ever taken seriously” (67).  
Furthermore, Gourevitch’s second major argument  is in line with Finkelstein’s 
criticism of “the cultural milieu that nurtures this Holocaust literature” (Finkelstein 55): 
Gourevitch believes that Dössekker-Wilkomirski consciously “stole” other people’s memories 
and pretended that they were his own, but his major concern is more complex: “I am more 
fearful for and depressed by the culture that received [Wilkomirski] as an apostle of memory 
than I am for the man himself, whoever he thinks he is” (Gourevitch 68). “[H]ere, in the 
Washington Times”, Gourevitch wonders,  
 is the writer Arnost Lustig, himself a camp survivor, comparing “Fragments” to the 
 works of Homer, Cervantes, and Shakespeare; and here, in the Guardian, is Anne 
 Karpf, a daughter of survivors, proclaiming that Wilkomirski, having written “one of  
 the great works about the Holocaust ... ranks with Primo Levi.” (68)  
Gourevitch criticizes Dössekker-Wilkomirski and also mentions that the author was 
found out to be “neither a Jew nor a Latvian but the Swiss-born son of an unwed Protestant 
woman” (51). However, this biographical fact is only mentioned in passing. Gourevitch does 
not dwell on Dössekker-Wilkomirski’s ethnicity long enough to justify Finkelstein’s 
interpretation of The New Yorker depicting him as “yet another evil gentile” (Finkelstein 61). 
Gourevitch rather makes the point that it alarms him that not only the general public, but also 
Jewish camp survivors like Lustig and survivors’ children like Karpf have uncritically 
embraced Fragments, and that the culture of memory at the end of the 20th century seems to 
have conditioned literary critics to base their judgment of Holocaust literature not on its actual 
literary merits, but on its message, plot and motifs without being aware of the affirmative 
biases that inform their judgments.  
 Gourevitch’s arguments would have suggested themselves as a reinforcement of 
Finkelstein’s own opinion. However, reinterpreting the text as a piece of evidence for the 
representation of “Gentile evil” instead, he uses it to underline the omnipresence of “‘The’ 
Holocaust industry” and claims the monopoly on elaborated arguments against this aspect of 
capitalist consumer culture for himself23, rather than sharing it with a potentially like-minded 
critic like Gourevitch.  
 Ankersmit has pointed out that “the evidence available to historians would have 
permitted them to write many more true statements about the past than we actually find in 
their texts” (“Reply” 277). The way Finkelstein uses Gourevitch’s article as a building block 
                                                 
23 Novick is not given much credit for his research either. Finkelstein relies on his findings, but calls him a 
muckraker (4) and criticizes that Novick’s work is “not a radical [enough] critique” (5). 
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in his argument seems to illustrate this thesis. However, the accuracy of Ankersmit’s dictum 
hinges on the definition of “true statements.” The available evidence certainly permits a 
writer to base a number of different interpretations on it. Interpretations can be convincing or 
unconvincing – they can be more or less “effective,” as White would say – but they cannot be 
“true” or “untrue” in the strict sense. It is only the “available evidence” itself that is either true 
or fabricated. The “true” (i.e., concrete, verifiable) available evidence in this case is 
Gourevitch’s article. What Finkelstein has to say about it – that it perpetuates the motif of 
Gentile evilness – is not supported by additional evidence. The conclusion is neither a “true” 
nor an “untrue” statement, it is rather Finkelstein’s chosen interpretation. Finkelstein could 
just as well have deduced something different and less far-fetched from the article: he could 
have used it to challenge his own assumption that almost everything that is being written 
about the Holocaust either glorifies Jews and Jewish history or condemns Gentile malice.  
 Any non-fiction book will, as Eakin has pointed out, involve a certain degree of 
fictionalization. In a work like The Holocaust Industry, i.e., a book designed to convince 
rather than to inform, the amount of subjective conclusions drawn from verifiable facts can be 
expected to be higher than in a work like The Holocaust in American Life, whose author 
wants to inform about different aspects of a given topic.  
When judging the “truth value” of a text, factual evidence and its interpretation have to 
be disentangled, and the plausibility and conclusiveness of the interpretations should be 
considered. Finkelstein skillfully interweaves Novick’s objective observations and references 
to other literary and academic texts with his own subjective interpretation. In various 
instances, such as Gourevitch’s article, Finkelstein’s interpretations are rather far-fetched and 
indicate his own ideological bias, which makes him susceptible to only seeing what he wants 
to see in the texts and cultural phenomena he is investigating. 
 Finkelstein’s ideological bias against “‘The’ Holocaust industry” is reflected in his 
weakly supported belief in a conspiracy connecting literature, historiography and scholarship, 
and his belief that it is but a few influential Jewish individuals who pull the strings behind the 
scenes of “‘The’ Holocaust industry.” After his passionate manifesto against literary frauds 
like Kosinski and Dössekker-Wilkomirski, Finkelstein proceeds to review Holocaust 
historiography. He discredits the work of Daniel Goldhagen (Hitler’s Willing Executioners), 
but defends the academic contributions made by Holocaust denier David Irving. “Although 
bearing the apparatus of an academic study,” Finkelstein writes about Goldhagen, “Hitler’s 
Willing Executioners amounts to little more than a compendium of sadistic violence. Small 
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wonder that Goldhagen vigorously championed Wilkomirski: Hitler’s Willing Executioners is 
Fragments plus footnotes” (64).  
Picking up the loose threads of his earlier critiques of individual “Holocaust 
exploiters,” Finkelstein reveals the larger pattern he wants his readers to see: “Consider, 
finally, the pattern: Wiesel and Gutman supported Goldhagen; Wiesel supported Kosinski; 
Gutman and Goldhagen supported Wilkomirski. Connect the players: this is Holocaust 
literature” (67).  
The concluding statement about Holocaust literature is bound to surprise the reader 
because Finkelstein’s earlier remarks about Wiesel, Gutman, Kosinski and Wilkomirski, each 
case thought through and brought to its own conclusion, do not anticipate a connection 
between all of them. Finkelstein does not simply want to present his theses, he wants to 
astonish the reader like a conjurer pulling a rabbit out of his hat. It is narrative twists like this 
that make his book a riveting page-turner, as opposed to Novick’s less entertaining style in 
The Holocaust in American Life. It is likely that the greater popularity of The Holocaust 
Industry does not only rely on its more radical (hence more intriguing) theses, but also on 
Finkelstein’s narrative strategies.  
At the same time, Finkelstein’s conjurer’s style also marks an academic weakness of 
the book. Just like a conjurer will refuse to explain how the rabbit got into the hat, Finkelstein 
gives his arguments surprising twists without backing them up with concrete evidence or 
academic explanations. How exactly are Wiesel, Gutman, Goldhagen, Kosinski and 
Wilkomirski connected? Have they ever personally met? How have they received each other’s 
publications? Have there been situations where they did not support, but criticize each other? 
Finkelstein’s withholding the answers to these questions makes for a surprising conclusion 
and an entertaining reading experience, but it also proves his argument speculative and 
academically weak. 
 Having made clear his stance on historians like Goldhagen, Finkelstein proceeds to 
talk about Holocaust denial. He holds that although “Holocaust exploiters” claim that 
Holocaust denial poses a threat to memory, “there is no evidence that Holocaust deniers exert 
any more influence in the United States than the flat-earth society does” (68). Finkelstein 
suggests that Holocaust scholars have a well-calculated reason for spreading unsubstantiated 
fear of Holocaust denial: “In a society saturated with The Holocaust, how else to justify yet 
more museums, books, curricula, films and programs than to conjure up the bogy of 
Holocaust denial?” (68).  
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Finkelstein’s circular argument for this suspicion is that “Deborah Lipstadt’s 
acclaimed book, Denying the Holocaust, as well as the results of an ineptly worded American 
Jewish Committee poll alleging pervasive Holocaust denial, were released just as the 
Washington Holocaust Museum opened” (68). Finkelstein juxtaposes Lipstadt, who he 
condemns for “conjur[ing] up the bogy of Holocaust denial,” with Holocaust denier David 
Irving, who Finkelstein thinks has been judged too harshly: “Lipstadt brands David Irving 
‘one of the most dangerous spokespersons for Holocaust denial’ [...]. But Irving [...] has 
nevertheless, as Gordon Craig points out, made an ‘indispensable’ contribution to our 
knowledge of World War II” (71).  
As has also been acknowledged by Irving’s critics like Richard Evans and Eva 
Menasse, Irving does indeed have the substantial knowledge about the “Third Reich” he takes 
pride in. As Evans points out, it is precisely this historical knowledge that makes Irving a 
denier, because it proves that the “numerous, enormous mistakes” he makes in his historical 
texts are deliberately calculated, and not the result of ignorance or sloppy research (Evans qtd. 
in Menasse 93). There certainly is a grain of truth in Irving’s Hitler’s War (if there were none, 
he could not have passed it off as a non-fiction book), but it is merely used to conceal the 
degree of Irving’s distortion of history. Irving calls himself Hitler’s biographer, but in fact, as 
Eva Menasse points out, he is not a disinterested biographer, but rather an “advocatus diaboli” 
(Menasse 24) who wants to see Hitler innocent despite better knowledge. Irving’s motivation 
is that he himself, as even Finkelstein admits, is “an admirer of Hitler and sympathizer with 
German national socialism” (Finkelstein 71): Irving knows that Hitler is guilty before “the 
court of world opinion,” but he believes that, although the practical implementation had its 
flaws, national socialism qua national socialism was right. Hence, as Menasse points out, 
“when it comes to evaluations and interpretations, [Irving], the ‘Hitler partisan wearing 
blinkers’ [Lipstadt’s nickname for Irving], enters his own brown cosmos” (Menasse 27; my 
translation). 
 Prima facie, the result is that Hitler’s War seems to illustrate the postmodern dogma of 
historical evidence inspiring historians to come up with an endless number of different 
“interpretations.” Irving’s “interpretation” – just one in many competing possible 
“histories” – comes down to the conclusion that the Holocaust never happened. In fact, 
however, Hitler’s War does not at all prove that “the evidence available to historians [permits] 
them to write many more true statements about the past than we actually find in their texts” 
(Ankersmit, “Reply” 277, my emphasis). Held up against “the [available historical] 
evidence,” Irving’s works and their reception only show that “he appears to be engaging in 
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deliberate distortion. Worse, he is a sneak; the uncautioned reader will absorb a version of 
history exonerating Hitler and minimizing the evil of the Holocaust without knowing it.” 
(Rosenberg qtd. in Menasse 59).  
 A critical engagement in “revisionist” literature clearly disproves Finkelstein’s 
assumption that Irving has made “an ‘indispensable’ contribution to our knowledge of World 
War II” (Finkelstein 71). Irving’s historical distortions have at best contributed to our 
knowledge of what World War II was not like – which is arguably a dispensable contribution. 
Distorting and denying the past, Irving’s text sheds light on his revisionist agenda rather than 
on historical events.  
 The way Finkelstein implements Irving and Gourevitch in his case against “‘The’ 
Holocaust industry” may be convincing (or, in White’s words, “effective”) as long as a reader 
only looks at The Holocaust Industry itself, but not at Finkelstein’s source texts. When taking 
a close look at the textual background Finkelstein’s arguments rely on, it becomes clear that 
he neither offers new facts nor convincing arguments to the debate about how representations 
of the Holocaust are affected by the culture industry. The references in The Holocaust 
Industry constitute a treasury of representative texts and critical reflections that have 
developed within the culture industry over the last fifty years. On the one hand, Finkelstein’s 
eclectic use of quotations and his academically weak inferences based on them tell us more 
about the author’s ideological agenda than about the inner mechanisms of the culture industry.  
At the same time, Finkelstein’s Holocaust Industry itself forms another fragment of 
the politics of memory the author seeks to reveal. To some extent, Finkelstein does precisely 
what he criticizes in others: he makes a living writing and lecturing about (“The”) Holocaust, 
while (somewhat hypocritically, I dare venture) demanding that it be neither written nor 
lectured about. Borrowing Benjamin’s metaphor once more, I would say that Finkelstein, 
misrepresenting the implications of various source texts, does not succeed in “translating” his 
observations about contemporary representations of the Holocaust into “a greater language [of 
truth]” that explains the politics of representation and memory in a nutshell. He does, however, 
pull another interesting original (rather than a work of secondary literature that investigates 
“interesting originals”) out of his conjurer’s hat and adds one more primary text to the diverse 
body of cultural artifacts addressing the Holocaust. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
 An analysis of past representations suggests that the body of fiction and nonfiction, 
“Shoah romances”/“Holokitsch,” revisionist “historiography” and autobiographical fraud 
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addressing the Holocaust will continue to grow. As is reflected in the success of works 
dealing with the past, the institutionalized market for Holocaust memory is far from saturated. 
As a consequence, the next years can be expected to also see further interpretations of the 
underlying politics of memory – either positioning themselves in relation to Novick, 
Finkelstein and Mintz, or reading these earlier interpretations as part of the cultural material to 
be analyzed. “[P]eople,” as Fredric Jameson remarks, “become aware of the dynamics of 
some new system, in which they are themselves seized, only later on and gradually” (xix).  
The reception of early works, from autobiographies to historiography and from 
“Holokitsch” to literary fraud, shows that writers, critics, scholars, journalists and historians 
used to concentrate on the implications of single works. With later writers like Spiegelman, 
journalists like Gourevitch and critics like Novick, Finkelstein and Mintz, the shift from a 
focus on the publication and reception of individual works to a focus on critical interpretations 
of Holocaust representations as a genre, and a growing interest in larger patterns and in the 
cultural background that brought forth this genre can be observed. Two factors contributing to 
the growing awareness of “the dynamics of [the] system [of Holocaust representation], in 
which [its critics] are themselves seized,” are  
(1) the paradigm shift from a positivistic (logico-linguistic and semantic) 
understanding of fact and fiction to a pragmatic one, and  
(2) postmodernism’s taking the positivistic blinkers off traditional historiography.  
Acknowledging their own limitations, negating the absolutization of one positivistic 
truth, questioning mimetic representability, and transcending genre boundaries, postmodern 
approaches lend themselves to representations of the past in the tradition of Eakin and 
Benjamin − that is, approaches like the one taken by Art Spiegelman in Maus that 
“approximate a truth exceeding all reality without betraying it” (Rabinovici, “Wie es war”).  
 However, postmodernist approaches to history will only prove fruitful if “the correct 
insight that no certain knowledge is possible” is taken to its “correct conclusion that all 
knowledge is fallible” rather than “the unjustified conclusion that no knowledge at all is 
possible” (Lorenz qtd. in Anchor 109). As Spiegelman put it, a meaningful postmodern 
contribution to the study of the past must not “[eschew] morality” (qtd. in Blume). Like any 
earlier historical period, the postmodern age has seen both “moral” and “immoral” approaches 
to the past. “Immorality,” as critics like Spiegelman and Rabinovici would define it, includes 
not only professed autobiographies and revisionist literature, but also “Shoah 
romances”/“Holokitsch” works.  
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However, “immoral” works tend to enjoy not only commercial success, but are also 
subject to “moral” criticism. Furthermore, the growing body of autobiographical fraud has led 
to an increased sensibility and awareness on the side of scholars, publishers and journalists, 
who have come to constitute a moral control entity. The increasing effectiveness of this entity 
is reflected in its fact-checking speed and reaction time regarding literary fraud, as can be 
observed in the exposure of Angel at the Fence, the latest fabricated Holocaust autobiography, 
before its publication. Producer Harris Salomon’s plans to make an Angel at the Fence movie 
in the “Shoah romance”/“Holokitsch” tradition all the same, on the other hand, consciously 
takes an approach that “[eschews] morality.” Not unlike Schindler’s List, Salomon’s movie is 
likely to earn him substantial commercial success. At the same time, it can be expected that 
the movie will, due to the scholarly debate about representations of the Holocaust gradually 
becoming more open and critical, be counterbalanced by stronger critical reactions and 
“moral” reproaches on the part of scholars and historians. 
 The institutionalization of memory has indisputably brought forth a growing body of 
“Holokitsch” and fictionalized versions of the past in danger of trivializing history. Yet, 
lacking as these popular cultural artifacts may be in terms of faithful representation, they are 
bound to reach a much broader audience than academic texts and works of “high” culture. It is 
only through works appealing to the masses that culture’s all-embracing educational mandate 
can be met full circle. In the light of revisionist “historiography” spread by Holocaust deniers, 
it is essential that this mandate be fulfilled: as long as deniers may plead the right for freedom 
of opinion, the only effective measure to immunize society to revisionism is to educate all its 
members.  
 What direction the politics of memory and representation will take in the long run, as 
there are fewer and fewer living eyewitnesses, is hard to tell. “In the future, as in the past, 
changing circumstances will influence the choices we make about remembering the 
Holocaust”, Novick muses at the end of his book, “But while circumstances will influence our 
choices, we ourselves are ultimately responsible for those choices – with all their 
consequences, intended and unintended” (Novick 281). How future scholars, writers, 
publishers, directors, and their respective audiences will define their responsibilities, and if 
they will choose to meet or ignore them, cannot be predicted. In some respect, the 
publications by and reception of White, Ankersmit and Jenkins, Finkelstein and Irving, 
Spiegelman and Wiesel, Spielberg and Rosenblat, Dössekker-Wilkomirski and Kosinski tell 
us not so much about the past as about their author’s intentions and agendas, the politics of 
collective memory, and the cultural environment that brought them forth. The same can be 
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predicted about books and movies that are yet to be written: as there are fewer and fewer new 
historical insights to be gained, the historical discourse is likely to become less about the past 
and more of a “moral and ideological Rorschach test” for present societies.  
 Since the referential past itself can neither be unlived nor rewritten, and new texts are 
bound to increasingly be variations on old motifs, Samuel Beckett may have been right: 
“Every word is like an unnecessary stain on silence and nothingness” (qtd. in Maus II 45). On 
the other hand, what would our non-Tlönian society turn into if the morality of its members 
were not reinforced every once in a while? I suspect that Beckett was both right and wrong. 
True, words are but stains on silence and nothingness. But we do need these stains. They may 
be all the meaning there is.  
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Appendix A: German abstract 
 
 Die Diplomarbeit hinterfragt die Darstellung und Darstellbarkeit historischer 
Ereignisse in Belletristik, Autobiographie, Film und Geschichtsschreibung unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung des Holocaust.  
 
Der erste Teil konzentriert sich auf erzähltheoretische Ansätze zur Abgrenzung von 
Fakt und Fiktion. Anhand von Martin Löschniggs Unterscheidung von sprachlogischen, 
semantischen und pragmatischen Ansätzen werden die Stärken und Schwächen verschiedener 
erzähltheoretischer Modelle untersucht.  
Der zweite Teil setzt sich mit der Problematik postmoderner Geschichtsphilosophie 
nach Hayden White, Frank Ankersmit und Keith Jenkins auseinander.  
Danach wird anhand konkreter Beispiele das Potential von Literatur und Film als 
Vermittler zwischen Gegenwart und Vergangenheit erörtert. Art Spiegelmans Maus wird als 
gelungene Alternative zu konventionellen Holocaust-Biographien gelesen, die die 
postmoderne Geschichtsskepsis auf graphischer und metatextueller Ebene hinterfragt und 
überwindet. Den theoretischen Hintergrund des dritten Teils bilden Texte von Walter 
Benjamin und Paul Eakin.  
Im vierten Teil liegt der Schwerpunkt auf institutionalisierter Erinnerung und auf der 
Rolle des Holocaust in der Konstruktion kollektiver amerikanischer Identitäten. Norman 
Finkelsteins The Holocaust Industry wird als Exempel eines Textes an der Schnittstelle von 
Sachliteratur und Polemik behandelt. Weiters wird auf den „Ausverkauf“ des Holocaust durch 
die Kulturindustrie, den Wilkomirski/Dössekker-Skandal, den Gerichtsprozess zwischen 
Deborah Lipstadt/Penguin Books und David Irving und die „Holokitsch“-Problematik 
eingegangen. 
  
Die Arbeit will keine Antwort auf die Frage geben, wie die Vergangenheit denn nun 
darzustellen sei. Vielmehr sollen die Zusammenhänge zwischen Text und Realität, 
Vergangenheit und Gegenwart aufgezeigt werden. Die Grundlage der Untersuchung bildet 
meine persönliche Überzeugung, dass unser Wissen um und Denken über Geschichte einen 
Faktor für die gegenwärtige Entwicklung von Gesellschaft und Gemeinschaft darstellen, der, 
allen Schwierigkeiten zum Trotz, weder wegdividiert werden kann noch sollte. 
  
121 
 
Appendix B: curriculum vitae 
 
Name:    Christine Schranz 
Geburtsdatum und –ort: 13. 11. 1985, Oberwart 
Staatsbürgerschaft:   Österreich 
 
Ausbildung 
 
2004–2010 Studium der Anglistik und Amerikanistik an der Universität Wien 
2007/08 Joint Study Stipendium am Wellesley College, Massachusetts) 
05 2007 TEFL-Ausbildung mit TEFL International in Quepos, Costa Rica 
1996–2004 Bundesgymnasium Oberschützen 
1992–1996 Volksschule Pinkafeld 
 
Berufserfahrung 
 
seit 2008  Verlagslektorin für novum 
seit 2008  Eventübersetzerin für Ö-Ticket 
seit 2007  Rezensentin im Buchmagazin des Wiener Literaturhauses 
02–03 2010  Volontariat/Sozialarbeit für COMI in Oaxaca, Mexiko 
01 2010  Tutorin für die Wellesley-in-Vienna Winter Session 
06–08 2009  Übersetzerin und Assistentin für Dr. Stephen Marini vom Religion  
& 07–09 2008 Department am Wellesley College 
2007/08  German Teaching Assistantship am Wellesley College, MA 
03–04 2007   Volontariat/Sozialarbeit bei Aldea Yanapay in Cusco, Peru 
08 2006–02 2007 Lehrtätigkeit für Deutsch und Englisch am Phönixinstitut, Wien 
07–10 2006  Mitarbeit an der Organisation des Viennalit-Festivals 
12 2005–09 2006 Co-Editorin des Magazins für Meinungen – mindestenshaltbar.net 
